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Exploring the Nigerian Central Legislative 
Institution
Joseph Yinka Fashagba
The legislative institution in Nigeria had at different times suffered series of abroga-
tion as a result of military intervention in politics. The legislature, as a political 
institution, was one of the foremost political institutions of governance established 
in the early days of Colonial administration in Nigeria.
In 1922, a semblance of modern government was introduced in the emerging 
nation state by the colonialists. The Clifford Constitution introduced in that year not 
only produced a constitutional government but also gave birth to the legislative 
council which had very limited authority (Ojo 1985). As Ojo (1985, p. xi) notes, the 
legislative council ‘could only legislate on certain matters for the Southern prov-
inces while the North was ruled by proclamation’. The 1922 Council made laws for 
the Western and Eastern provinces of Nigeria subject to the Governor’s reserved 
power while the governor alone made laws for the Northern Provinces (Sanni 1992).
The need to make the legislature more relevant and powerful led to the promul-
gation of the Order in Council of 1946. According to Sanni (1992), the 1945 Order- 
in- Council gave the Legislative Council the power to make laws for the whole of 
Nigeria, subject to the reserved powers of the Governor. Thus, while the 1922 leg-
islative Council exercised a limited authority, the 1946 legislature was granted more 
power. Nevertheless, the power vested in the 1946 legislature was still too narrow 
and limited.
In 1951, a new legal order, popularly referred to as the Macpherson Constitution, 
was promulgated. The Constitution was enacted in response to the agitations of the 
emerging Nigerian elites. The emerging local elites were against the previous con-
stitutions because they saw them as colonial impositions. Not only were previous 
constitutions imposed but they were bereft of local contents. The people whose fates 
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and lives were to be shaped and determined by the constitutions were not consulted 
before the previous constitutions were made by the colonialists.
 To accommodate the concern as well as meet the expectation of the people, the 
Macpherson Constitution of 1951 established regional legislative houses. Under the 
constitution, the regional legislatures worked with the regional executive councils 
comprising the Lieutenant Governors and the top government officials to administer 
the regions. Members of the regional assemblies were elected through Electoral 
College System. Each regional assembly, on the other hand, elected those to repre-
sent it in the newly introduced House of Representative at the centre Lagos 
(Fagbohun 2010). The Constitution marked a departure from the past, because it 
was not only parliamentary in context and operation but also ensured that, in addi-
tion to making the leader of the majority in the House of Assembly the leader of 
government business, the house became a true legislature with the leader playing 
important and dynamic roles in governance. The legislatures were however subor-
dinated to the authority of the Lieutenant Governor in the regions
The introduction of a new constitution in 1954 ushered in a proper federal 
arrangement, comprising a central government having a federal legislature and 
three regional governments with each region operating distinct regional legisla-
tive assemblies. The powers of the central legislature were clearly separated from 
those of the regional assemblies. A bicameral arrangement was introduced in the 
Western and Northern regions under the new constitutional order. A two-chamber 
legislature became operational in 1956 in the Eastern region. This transformed the 
regional legislatures into a bicameral system but the unicameral system was 
retained at the centre. By this, apart from the houses of assembly that had been in 
place in the regions, a house of Chiefs was established at the regional level. This 
was however not replicated at the centre as only one chamber was retained 
(Fashagba 2009a).
In 1957, the Western and Eastern Regions became self-governed. As part of the 
efforts to prepare the country for independence in 1960, the bicameral arrangement 
was created at the centre. Under the arrangement, the Senate had fifty-two members 
while the House of Representatives comprised of three hundred and twenty mem-
bers drawn from different parts of the federation (Osaghae 1998). The office of a 
Prime Minister was established. The same structure was more or less retained under 
the first republic Independent Constitution of 1960 and the Republican Constitution 
of 1963 that came later.
The bicameral system was in operation at the federal as well as the regional lev-
els at independence in 1960. However, the Senate had forty-four members nomi-
nated from the regional assemblies under the arrangement. The House of 
Representatives, on the other hand, had three-hundred and twenty elected members. 
The Independence Constitution also retained the division of powers among the lev-
els of government based on the exclusive and concurrent lists provided by the 1954 
constitution. Consequently, while only the federal legislature had power to legislate 
on matters listed in the exclusive list both the central and the regional assemblies 
could legislate on matters listed in the concurrent list. However, the first republic 
legislature was weak and incapable of providing the required anchor needed to sustain 
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democratic governance (Lafenwa 2006). Thus, the first republic collapsed in 1966; 
this was less than 6 years after independence.
The legislature returned to the political scene in 1979 under a presidential sys-
tem. The presidential system was adopted because the legislature was considered 
more viable, vibrant and vigorous under it than was1 usually the case under the 
parliamentary system (Fashagba 2009a). Consequently, a unicameral system was 
adopted for the constituent states while the bicameral arrangement was established 
for the centre under the 1979 constitution. Although the legislature was expected to 
be stronger under the presidential arrangement, but many writers on the republic 
appeared not too impressed with the performance of the second republic legislature 
(1979–1983). The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Nigeria People’s Party 
(NPP) formed a legislative coalition in the period due to the inability of the ruling 
NPN to win the simple majority seats required to control the central legislature. 
Following the collapse of the coalition between the NPN and NPP in 1981, the four 
opposition parties in the National Assembly ganged up to frustrate the ruling party 
(Akinsanya 2002). The implication of the action was the inability of the legislature 
to shape and influence public policy and governance in general. Since a weak legis-
lature is by nature a threat to democratic survival (Fish 2006), the second republic 
democratic government became so fragile and consequently collapsed in 1983, just 
three months into the tenure of a new legislature.
Another attempt by the military to restore democracy that was earlier on trun-
cated in 1983 resulted only in a partial and short-lived democracy in what is popu-
larly called the aborted ‘third republic’ (1991–1993). The presidential election of 
the dispensation was inconclusive, as the military government that implemented 
the transition to civil rule programme terminated the process half-way. Before the 
third republic was terminated, the national assembly and the state Houses of 
Assembly were already inaugurated. The central legislature comprising the Senate 
and a House of Representatives was in operation and the state assemblies working 
alongside the executive cabinet at the state level. Worthy of note, however, is that 
the legislature at different levels had severe limitation imposed on them by the 
central military government. The military put in place different decrees with ouster 
clauses meant to incapacitate the legislative institution in the transition period. This 
was perhaps so because the military constituted the executive organ at the centre 
(Davies 1996).
However, after 15 years of military rule the Nigerian Military finally dropped the 
reins of government on 29 May, 1999. In the new dispensation, popularly referred 
to as the fourth republic-1999 to date, the bicameral arrangement was adopted at the 
centre under the presidential system based on the 1999 constitution. In the constitu-
ent units, the unicameral arrangement was established. Indeed, apart from trans-
forming from the parliamentary to the presidential system, the unicameral 
arrangement has been a major feature of representative democracy at the state level 
1 The adoption of the presidential system was significant because the collapse of the first republic 
was attributed to the parliamentary system which some considered unsuitable for a society that is 
as diverse as Nigeria.
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in Nigeria since the second republic. In other words, the 1999 constitution (amended) 
created the National Assembly as a representative and law-making institution under 
the current dispensation. From independence in 1960 to date, the fourth republic has 
been unique. To be sure, for the first time the national assembly has operated for 
20 years without interruption. In the previous republics, the national assembly did 
not last more than 5 years. This is unprecedented in the history of Nigeria. Also six 
consecutive elections have been held to elect members. Despite the evident chal-
lenges that the institution faced in the first few years of returning to the political 
space, the national assembly has been a key player in the democratisation of the 
polity as well as in stabilising the fourth republic. The amended 1999 constitution 
gave the national assembly some powers and functions. At this juncture, it becomes 
necessary to interrogate the traditional and constitutional functions of the legisla-
ture. This will be the focus of the next section.
 Functions of the Legislature
 Although legislative scholars from different backgrounds and cutting across cul-
tures in different parts of the world have argued that there exist a very wide variance 
in the degrees of powers and levels of influence wielded by different legislatures the 
world over, there is a convergence of opinion on the fact that certain roles are com-
monly performed by majority of the legislatures. These functions are sometimes 
traditional, but in most cases constitutional, because of the increasing importance 
and emphasis on constitutional government. The sole aim of having a constitutional 
government is to have a limited government; a government that has enormous power 
to develop and shape public policy as well as governance and maintain constitu-
tional order but could be checked by other institutions and the people.
 Consequently, certain legislative responsibilities are considered universal 
(Williams 2006). In a vibrant democracy, as Fish (2006) contends, the effective 
performance of the roles assigned to the legislature will not only strengthen demo-
cratic governance but also invigorate the vertical and horizontal accountability of 
the democratic political system (Barkan 2009).
Barkan (2009) in his work, ‘Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracy’ 
identified four ‘core’ functions performed by national parliaments.  According to 
Barkan, the first function is that legislatures are the institutional mechanism through 
which societies realize representative government. Zwingina (2006, p.  285), the 
spokesperson of the Nigerian Senate between 1999 and 2003 avers that, ‘in actual 
facts the role of the parliament goes beyond making laws, and so includes; repre-
senting the interests of the constituencies of the various legislators’. While legisla-
tors are selected using different methods under different electoral systems, they 
however represent the various constituents from where they were elected. By this, 
the representatives are elected to represent different constituencies with occasion-
ally diverse and incongruent cultures and interests. This is especially the case in a 
heterogeneous society like Nigeria characterised by diversity in cultures, religions, 
J. Y. Fashagba
5
languages and ethnic groups. In Nigeria, electoral constituency delimitation may be 
done in such a way that groups which would not have been represented would have 
been given a voice through a conscious delimitation of constituencies for small or 
minority groups. By this, the representative will represent a narrow interest and by 
this may articulate a very parochial concern of the group which he or she represents. 
The national president, especially in a country like Nigeria, who depends on popular 
plurality votes to become elected, represents the diverse constituents and different 
languages, cultures and peoples in the state. The entire nation is the constituency of 
the national president. Therefore, the President must rise above narrow, parochial 
and sectional interest in making decision affecting the state and the governed. Thus, 
the legislators are responsible for advocating for their constituents, ensuring that the 
opinions, perspectives and value of citizens are present in the policy-making pro-
cess. Representational role remains the traditional roles that the legislature performs 
in a representative democracy irrespective of whether it is an old or a new 
democracy.
 The second role performed by the legislatures, as Barkan notes, is the legislative 
role. This role of the legislatures put the body in a position to draft, mold and pass 
bills emanating either from members of the assembly or from the executive into 
laws. While the legislatures perform this role with different levels of involvement 
and efficiency, the institution is however able to shape and re-shape public policy 
through the enactment of necessary and appropriate legislations. Orstein (1992) 
avers that the legislature makes laws that affect the entire nation and are presumably 
intended to resolve differences among groups for the good of the nation as a whole. 
This role is in tandem with the provision of the 1999 constitution which provides for 
law-making for the purpose of maintaining order, peace and good governance. As 
Davies (2004, p. 201) contends, ‘The law-making role of the legislature ensures that 
government policies and programmes including those initiated in the budget, are 
enacted into law while other measures are given political and legal backing to solve 
substantive problems confronting the country’.
 Apart from the representational and law-making roles of the legislatures, the 
institution also scrutinizes administration as well as ensures oversight of activities 
relating to the implementation of laws and measures passed or adopted by the legis-
lature (Fashagba et al. 2014). Since the executive is vested with the responsibility of 
implementing public policy or legislation passed by the legislature, the executive is 
scrutinized by the assembly to ensure compliance with the content and intent of the 
policy framework approved by the legislature. Consequently, the legislative func-
tion does not terminate with the passage of bills. It is therefore only by monitoring 
the implementation process that members of the legislature can uncover any defect 
or deviation from the original intent and act to correct misinterpretation, misappli-
cation or maladministration (Report of a Commonwealth Parliament Association 
Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya 10–14 December, 2001, p. 1; Parliamentary oversight of 
finance, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Nov. 2001). According to 
Barkan (2009), the legislatures exercise oversight of the executive to ensure that 
policies agreed upon through the passing of legislation are religiously implemented 
by the state. The legislature carry out this oversight responsibility on the executive 
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by carefully examining the request for legislative actions, investigating the admin-
istrative action of government departments and the performance and behavior of 
government officials (Davies 2004).
 Williams (2006) notes that a parliament has four fundamental responsibilities in 
the exercise of the oversight of government vis:
• To debate, modify, approve or reject legislation;
• To debate, modify, approve, or reject authority for government to raise revenue 
through taxation and other means;
• To debate, modify, approve or reject proposed expenditure by government and;
• To hold the executive accountable for its governance of society.
However, Williams avers that these salient responsibilities of the legislature are 
often missed by legislators, particularly those belonging to the ruling party who 
often feel it is necessary or incumbent on them to support the government while 
those in opposition seek to oppose the government at all costs, regardless of the 
merits of the proposals of the government.
 To hold the executive accountable, the legislature must be able to investigate into 
the quality of the administrative and bureaucratic networks of the federal govern-
ment (Saffell 1989). The state legislatures must equally be capable of scrutinizing 
the state executive branch in a federal system. To be able to balance the power of the 
executive, the legislature must be able to exercise power of the purse. This power 
gives the legislature effective means to shape public policy through annual appro-
priation making process, levy of taxes, and it also enables the immediate representa-
tives of the people for attaining redress of every grievance and carrying into effect 
just and worthwhile measures.
 Barkan (2009) further identifies the fourth role of the assembly as one performed 
on individuals rather than on a collective basis. However, the way the role is per-
formed, and the extent to which it is performed varies from one legislator to the 
other. For instance, in the new democracies, emphasis is placed on what the legisla-
tors can provide to meet the pecuniary needs of the members of the constituents. 
The focus may also be on providing some basic social facilities/amenities that are 
not available in the constituent. This is usually the case in a new democracy like 
Nigeria where official negligence, administrative ineptitude and bureaucratic and 
political corruption have eroded the capacity of the state to perform its responsibil-
ity of providing some basic facilities. The elected representatives are therefore com-
pelled to take up the responsibility.
 Composition of the National Assembly
 The Nigerian national assembly is made up of two chambers. The first is the Senate. 
This is the upper chamber, but in Nigeria, the chamber is referred to as the ‘Red 
Chamber’. The second chamber is the House of Representatives (HoRs). This is the 
lower house and is called the ‘Green chamber’. The red and green chamber labels 
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derived from the colours of the floor-rugs of the chambers. The House of 
Representatives contested and rejected the lower chamber label at the inception of 
the fourth republic in 1999. The major contention is that members of the chamber 
did not see themselves as inferior to those in the Senate or the Senators, hence the 
rejection of the label. From the provisions of the amended 1999 constitution, the 
two chambers have concurrent power over law-making as well as oversight, espe-
cially power of the purse. However, only the Senate is constitutionally empowered 
to screen and confirm executive nominees (Fashagba 2009b). The senate screens 
nominees of the executive to confirm their suitability for appointment into public 
office or otherwise. The HoRs does not play any role in the screening and confirma-
tion of executive nominees. A nominee may be confirmed or rejected, depending on 
whether the Senate finds him or her suitable or unsuitable for appointment. However, 
the confirmation power has come under executive attack of recent. This is evidenced 
by the case of the Acting Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) whose nominated was rejected twice between 2016 and 2017. 
Despite the rejection of the nominee, the President did not remove him from office. 
Thus, without confirmation, the nominee has remained an acting chairman for over 
2 years, in violation of the amended 1999 constitution. The president and his sup-
porters have put up different arguments to justify the action. By this, the presidency 
sought to redefine the provisions of the constitution on the power of confirmation 
conferred on the Senate.
 In terms of membership, the Senate is made of 109 members. Each of the thirty 
six states of the federation is represented by three elected senators. The senators are 
elected from single member district into a 4 year term. The Federal Capital Territory 
is represented by one elected senator. Indeed, representation in the Nigerian Senate 
is based on equality of state, irrespective of the landmass or population size of a 
state. The turnover rate of members has been very high from 1999, thereby robbing 
the chamber the needed institutional memory for efficiency (Fashagba 2014; 
Fashagba and Babatunde 2016). The House of Representatives on the other hand is 
made up of 360 elected members. Representation in the chamber is proportional to 
the relative population size of each state (Fashagba 2013).
 The Nigerian Senate is headed by the Senate President and assisted by the 
Deputy Senate President. There are other offices like the office of the Majority and 
Deputy majority Leader, Majority and Deputy Majority Whip, Minority and Deputy 
minority Leader and majority and Minority Whips etc. The Senate President pre-
sides over the Senate and on or during any joint sitting of the two chambers. The 
Senate President is the Chairman of the National Assembly. The President of the 
Senate is elected by members from the ruling party. However, with the defection of 
the Senate President in 2018 from the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) to the 
opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and the inability of the ruling APC to 
muster the two-thirds majority members needed to impeach or change the Senate 
President, the opposition took charge of the leadership of the chamber. Earlier on, 
the opposition PDP had produced the Deputy Senate President at the inauguration 
of the assembly in 2015 contrary to the expectation of the ruling party-APC. The 
internal cracks within the majority APC gave the leading opposition PDP the power 
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to strike at the appropriate time by delivering the votes to win and capture the office 
of the Deputy Senate President. Similarly, the House of Representatives is headed 
by the Speaker and assisted by the Deputy Speaker. Other important offices in the 
chamber include the Majority leader, majority whip, minority leader and whip 
(Fashagba and Babatunde 2016). Until 2014, the then ruling PDP controlled the 
house. However, following the  defection of the then Speaker from the PDP to the 
newly formed opposition party-the APC, the new party took over the leadership of 
the House despite being a minority in the chamber. The precedent laid by the APC 
in 2014 therefore emboldened the defecting senate leader in 2018. Party switching 
has remained a major feature of the current democratic dispensation.
The two chambers of the national assembly have been carrying out the bulk of 
their responsibilities through the committees system. The committees have been the 
engine rooms of the national assembly. Through their oversight functions, waste has 
been averted, corruption has been exposed, officer’s excesses have been checked and 
the public has been made aware of activities of government and its agencies. However, 
most of the scandals that have been reported against the national assembly have been 
from the activities of committees. From 1999 to date, the two chambers have prolif-
erated the committees resulting in the rise to over 90 committees in a chamber after 
the inauguration of the assembly in June 2015. The constitution of the committees 
had most often triggered avoidable conflict among members. Most often the conflict 
is not driven by partisan but personal interest. In extreme cases, house leadership had 
been challenged and changed over conflict resulting from the composition of house 
committees. This was very evident in the removal of the speaker in 2007. The consti-
tution of committees is used as a patronage for rewarding members with ‘juicy’ com-
mittee placement by the leadership of both chambers (Fashagba 2009b). For further 
discussion, most of the issues highlighted in this introductory chapter are given 
greater attention the remaining nine chapters.
 Some Constitutional and Emerging Features of the National 
Assembly
The provisions of the amended 1999 constitution of Nigeria reveal some major 
features of the Nigerian central legislature. The features are as follows:
The members of the national assembly are elected under a separate election. The 
president is also separately elected.
The constitution provides for a 4-year term for members. However, there is no 
restriction or limit to the number of time a member can serve provided he or she 
continues to be re-elected.
The national assembly is a bicameral assembly. The lower house is the House of 
Representatives while the upper house is the Senate.
Each state elects three members to the upper chamber, however the Federal 
Capital Territory is represented by only one senator. On the other hand, the relative 
population size of each state determines the number of representatives that represent 
it in the lower chamber.
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The legislature is vested with veto power. By this, if the executive declines assent 
to any bill passed by the national assembly, and the legislature is able to muster the 
two thirds majority of members of members to pass the bill, the bill will become law 
and the assent of the executive will no longer be required.
The assembly is vested with the power to impeach the president. However, the 
procedures for impeachment is also well laid out. The president does not have the 
power to dissolve the legislature.
The Nigerian Senate is headed by the Senate President elected by members from 
among themselves. The House of Representatives is headed by the Speaker elected 
by members from among the members of the lower chamber.
The president and the members of his cabinet are not members of the legislature 
and so cannot participate in the activity of the assembly. However, in the course of 
discharging their oversight function, any member of cabinet may be invited by the 
legislature or its committee to shed light on any matter under scrutiny.
In our further discussion we will briefly examine some features which became 
visible from the day to day operations of the fourth republic national assembly.
The Nigerian national assembly experiences high legislative turnover each ses-
sion. To be sure, in the last four elections (2003, 2007, 2011, 2015), over 60 % of 
incumbent legislators lost their re-election bid and could not return to the chamber 
for a new session. By this, over 60% of members of every new legislative session 
are new members joining the assembly afresh to replace the old members who lost 
in the legislative election.
Another emerging characteristic is the high rate of party switching. On the aver-
age, at least 18% of members switch parties per session in the Senate from 1999 to 
2018 (Fashagba 2014).
Also a feature of the national assembly is that parties that did not win any seat at 
the polls often end up having members in either the Senate or the House of 
Representatives through defection.
The committees of the national assembly have been unduly proliferated.
The national assembly has been very assertive and demonstrated capacity to 
challenge the executive.
Another major emerging feature is the control of either one or the two chambers 
by an opposition party. This was evident in 2014 when the APC controlled the House 
of Representatives in 2014/2015 as an opposition party and 2018 when the PDP 
controlled the two chambers in 2018/2019 as an opposition party. In each instance, it 
followed the defection of the presiding officer(s) to an opposition party. We will 
proceed to the next section to examine the state of legislative studies in Nigeria.
 The State of Legislative Studies in Nigeria
 Nigeria is one of the states in Sub-Saharan Africa where the legislature, as an insti-
tution of government, has been abrogated on several occasions. Indeed, the dissolu-
tion of the legislature has often followed each military take-over of government in 
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Nigeria. This was evident in 1966, 1983 and 1993 when the legislative institution 
was abrogated after military intervention in the politics. The implication is that after 
58 years of statehood, Nigeria has only experienced democracy for about 30 years. 
The first republic operated from 1960 to 1966, the second republic from 1979 to 
1983, the aborted third republic has a legislature that was inaugurated in January 
1992 but dissolved in November 1993. The current fourth republic which took off 
in 1999 is about 20 years old, and is in fact the longest democracy that Nigeria has 
ever experienced at a stretch. The remaining political periods were filled by differ-
ent military regimes.
 The implication of this on the study of democratic institutions is the marginal 
attention they have received from the academic circle. However, while political or 
democratic institutions like the executive, judiciary, political parties and elections as 
well as systems of government like presidential, parliamentary and federal have 
received some little attention from a few different writers, legislative studies have 
not been given the attention the discipline deserved (Fashagba 2009a, b; Lafenwa 
2006). Furthermore, a few more writers have focused on military rule in Nigeria. 
This is largely so because the legislature has remained the main victim of infrequent 
and inconsistent democratic practice. To be sure, while the executive organ has 
always been part of the institutions of governments, irrespective of whether there is 
a democratic regime or not, although the arm is often peopled by the military per-
sonnel under a military regime, and the judiciary existing alongside the executive, 
the legislature was usually dissolved. Perhaps, this has made the legislature less 
attractive to study among both western Africanist and Nigerian scholars.
However, in recent time, a few Nigerian based scholars appear to have discov-
ered the need to correct the academic neglect and lacuna in that area of study. The 
effects have only yielded an insignificant academic output. One of the recent works 
on the Nigerian Legislature is the edited volume by Ojo E. O. and Omotola J. S. 
(2014). Major areas and wide scholarship gap are still evident in the area. For 
instance, while about six of the first ten chapters of the work of Ojo and Omotola 
focused on the national assembly, only four addressed substantive issues. The 
remaining 17 chapters focused on state assemblies. This explains the necessity for 
more academic attention to further examine salient aspects of the Nigerian legisla-
tures, especially at the federal level. However, in this study, our focus is on the 
fourth republic national assembly (1999–2019) only.
 Why This Study?
 There is a prevailing argument in the new literature on legislative studies focusing 
on Nigeria that the Legislature of the first republic was weak (Adebayo 1986). The 
weakness of the assembly was in fact mentioned as parts of the reasons for the 
demise of the republic. The second republic legislature did not fare better; this was 
particularly so prior to the collapse of the coalition between the NPN and NPP in 
1981. Indeed, the legislatures of the first and second republics performed not more 
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than a rubber stamp role in the public-policy and decision making arena. Any legis-
lature with such a weak level of performance is inimical to the sustenance of democ-
racy. For instance, Fish (2006) noted that the stronger a legislature is the stronger 
the democracy which produces the legislature will be.
 Therefore, this study is timely. In this book, we will focus on and discuss in detail 
the ways and manners the national assembly has handled each of its major func-
tions, the nature and ways the two chambers have been relating, the leadership 
structure and the institutional mechanism through which its internal business is 
facilitated and executed. In doing this, apart from documenting the ways the legis-
lature has conducted its business, in some cases, we direct attention at examining 
the level of assertiveness of the legislature, the degree of importance and weight 
attached to their contributions to governance in motions, resolutions and law- 
making among others.
 Lay Out of Chapters
In chapter “Exploring the Nigerian Central Legislative Institution”, Fashagba care-
fully articulated the central issues of the study and laid the background of the study, 
looking, chronologically, at the emergence and development of the legislative insti-
tution in Nigeria. He equally review the roles of the legislatures, the composition of 
the national assembly, the state of legislative studies in Nigeria and the reasons for 
this book. In chapters “The Legislature and Law Making in Nigeria: Interrogating 
the National Assembly (1999–2018), The Trajectory of the Legislature, Law- 
making and Legislation in Nigeria, Legislative Oversight in the Nigerian Fourth 
Republic, and Constituency-Legislature Relations in Nigeria” the authors focussed 
on the three functions of the Nigerian legislature since 1999 to date. Specifically, in 
chapter “The Legislature and Law Making in Nigeria: Interrogating the National 
Assembly (1999–2018)”, Samuel Oni, Faith Oviasogie Olanrewaju and Deinde- 
Adedeji examines the law-making roles of the national assembly and supported 
their claims with data on legislations made from 1999 to 2015. In chapter “The 
Trajectory of the Legislature, Law-making and Legislation in Nigeria”, Ibraheem 
Moheeb further discussed the law-making role of the legislature. He looked at the 
roles from historical perspective and narrowed the discussion down to the current 
fourth republic. In chapter “Legislative Oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic”, 
Omotosho and Oladeji focused on the legislative oversight roles of the legislature 
and provided some good instances of the performance of the roles to clarify their 
positions. The chapter highlighted how the performance of oversight have resulted 
in occasional avoidable conflict. In chapter “Constituency-Legislature Relations in 
Nigeria”, Constituency-Legislators relations received an extensive discussion from 
Murana and Bakare. While anchoring the relations on relevant theories, the media 
of the relations and cases of provision of constituency services also featured to 
enrich the work. Chapters “The Nigerian House of Representatives, 1999–2016 and 
Senate Leadership in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999 to Date” focus on the two 
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chambers of the national assembly. Thus, while Saka and Bakare briefly examine 
the institution of the House of Representatives in chapter “The Nigerian House of 
Representatives, 1999–2016”. Ajayi and Abdullahi focused on the Senate leader-
ship in chapter “Senate Leadership in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999 to Date”. 
Appreciating the importance of the relations between the two chambers of the 
national assembly, namely, Senate and House of Representatives, Fagbadebo 
Omololu helped us to shed light on this subject, drawing out areas of cooperation 
and conflict from 1999 to date in chapter “Inter-Chamber Relations in Nigeria’s 
Presidential System in the Fourth Republic”. In chapter “Executive-Legislature 
Relations: Evidence from Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, Baba Tanko Yahaya takes the 
discussion further by looking at executive-legislature relations at the national level 
from 1999 to 2018. This is a very important study, considering the fact that demo-
cratic institutional checks and balance find expression in the relations between the 
two organs of government, especially in Nigeria from 1999 to date. The chapter 
“Oiling the Legislature: An Appraisal of the Committee System in Nigeria’s 
National Assembly” focuses on the committees of the national assembly. The criti-
cal place of the legislative committees and the politics that have characterized their 
composition and the dramas that have characterised their operations from session to 
session under this dispensation are too relevant to this study to be left out. Thus, 
Agaptus Nwozor and Olarewaju focused on this institution and dissected it analyti-
cally. Finally, Oshewolo, Adedire and Nwankwor examine the gender dimension of 
the national assembly in chapter “Gender Representation in Nigeria’s National 
Assembly Under the Fourth Republic”.
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The fundamental expectation of the modern state is effective and efficient gover-
nance. This expectation is fulfilled by the government which not only provides 
security to the people but also looks after their basic needs and ensures their politi-
cal and socio-economic development (Gill 2002; Oni et al. 2016). These objectives 
are achieved by the government through the enactment of binding rules, the giving 
of direction to societal activities and the enforcement of the rules to ensure compli-
ance (Bang and Esmark 2009). Thus government performs these important func-
tions by mapping out policies, implementing and enforcing the laws and adjudicating 
or administering justice (Nwagwu 2014).
The imperative of effective governance necessitates the division of governmen-
tal powers and functions between its institutions with each having some specific 
powers and performing some specific functions (Edosa and Azelama 1995). 
Perhaps, it is because of the division of the powers and functions among these insti-
tutions of governance that government is defined as a set of institutions through 
which the will of the state is realized (Adler 1996). Thus institutionalist scholars 
averred that powers and functions of government are vested in the legislature, the 
executive and the judicial organs of government which are coordinate or indepen-
dent (Jones 2002). Constitutional government all over the world recognizes these 
three basic departments of government (Ball 1977; Magill 2001). Laski (1992) reit-
erates this position when he averred that since the time of Aristotle, it has been 
generally agreed that political power is divisible into three broad categories which 
include the legislature which makes the general rules for the society, the executive 
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which seeks to apply those rules laid down by the legislature to particular situations 
and the judiciary which settles disputes between government and its citizens and 
those between citizens. This tripartite political and administrative institutional 
arrangement is also corroborated by Kousoulas (1975) as he views that all contem-
porary states, in practice, have three branches of government responsible for carry-
ing out the basic functions of government. According to him, one set of officials has 
the primary function of enacting laws, another set of officials implements state poli-
cies and decisions while the third settles disputes and punishes those who contra-
vene the law of the land.
The legislature holds the place of primacy out of the three organs of government 
being that governance begins by making laws and is followed up by enforcing the 
laws and adjudication of disputes that may arise from the implementation. While 
scholarly works abound concerning the various roles of the legislature in demo-
cratic governance, only a scanty works have been written on the legislative function 
of law-making. This chapter therefore, interrogates the extent to which the National 
Assembly has been able to perform its constitutional role of law-making for the 
Nigerian State. This study is particularly important because, for the first time since 
1960 when Nigeria became an independent state, the legislative institution has sur-
vived and operated for about twenty uninterrupted years. In other words, this is the 
longest democratic experience that Nigeria has ever had with the legislative institu-
tion intact and legislating.
 The Legislature as a Law Making Political Institution
The legislature varies in power, functions, structure, pattern of organization and 
operational procedures among states (Ball 1977; Ray 2004). The variation is contin-
gent upon past traditions, theory of government, character of the regime and most 
importantly, the nature of the society in question (Nwabueze 1982; Okoosi-Simbine 
2010). In some political systems, (e.g. the United States Congress), the legislative 
body assumes wide powers and exercises real power with respect to various 
decision- making processes while in some other political systems (e.g. the former 
Soviet Union), the legislature exists as a mere rubber stamp whose main role is to 
legitimize the policy of government (Burnell 2003; Thomas and Sissokho 2005; 
Nijzink et  al. 2006). Heywood (2007) alludes to this position by noting that the 
twentieth century witnesses a progressive weakening of the legislature’s law mak-
ing power in the form of a decline of legislatures to a mere deliberative assembly.
Despite the declining powers of this institution however, the legislature as the 
primary institution for making law is fundamental to democratic governance. This 
is because acts of the legislature are the embodiment of people’s will transformed 
into the will of the state resulting from a transparent system of political compromise 
and elite bargaining among different social and political interests in a society. As 
observed by Nwaubani (2014), the law making responsibility of the legislature is 
fundamental because the laws of a country are expression of the will of the people 
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and the life of the people are substantially defined by the laws enacted by the legis-
lature. The primacy of the legislature in a democratic polity is further buttressed by 
the fact that it is the legislation of this institution that is implemented by the execu-
tive and interpreted by the judiciary (Mahajan 2012).
The legislature, as a key institution of democratic governance, performs the basic 
role of enactment, repeals, revision and review of laws and regulations for the socio- 
economic and political advancement and wellbeing of the society it serves 
(Anyaegbunam 2012). The law making function of the legislature contributes to 
good government by increasing its capacity to respond to public sentiments/dissat-
isfactions, by playing a part in passing legislation capable of withstanding critical 
scrutiny, and serving as a vehicle for improving the degree of probity, efficiency, 
and responsiveness in the administration of laws. As observed by Laski (1992), the 
legislature has the responsibility for passing laws.
The legislature is the body which lays down the general rules of a society, mak-
ing laws for the good governance of a state. It is the law-making, deliberative and 
policy influencing body working for the furtherance of democratic political system 
(Okoosi-Simbine 2010). These laws may originate as private member’s bills, or 
they may originate from the executive branch (Abonyi 2006; Benjamin 2010). It is 
expected that laws made by the legislature are in the interest of the general popu-
lace with the expectation of modifying peoples’ behaviour and response towards a 
given situation, be of good quality and self-sustaining. This is perhaps the reason 
why Abonyi (2006) averred that bills are expected to be thoroughly examined and 
passed through various stages, and in the process, could be altered through addition 
or deletion.
The fact that law and governance matter for development, be it macro-economic 
growth or the improvement of micro-level basic needs and freedoms is the reason 
the legislature holds a pivotal role in any democratic governance. The strength and 
the state of the legislature is therefore, among the strongest predictors of a country’s 
democratic development and survival (Poteete 2010).
 The National Assembly and Law Making: A Historical 
Analysis
From the most ancient times to the present, there has always existed in every politi-
cal community, a system of rules and regulations codified or not which gives direc-
tions to societal activities and governmental institutions which map out policies and 
enact rules to regulate the interactions among members of the community (Edosa 
and Azelama 1995; Fashagba 2009). In this regards, there had existed traditional 
system of rules and regulations as well as law making political institutions in the 
various communities and kingdoms in Nigeria through which laws were made 
(Bereketeab 2011; Oni 2013). While laws in these traditional settings were either 
derived from customs, traditions and religious injunctions, or issued by the kings as 
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their commands, modern law making and institutional frameworks in Nigeria are 
however, traceable to the British colonial government which produced various con-
stitutions for Nigeria in 1922, 1933, 1946, 1951, 1954 and 1960. In all these consti-
tutions, legislative organs were created at various times in different regions of the 
country (Okoosi-Simbine 2010).
The British Colonial powers established the Legislative and Executive Council 
in 1862 for the Colony of Lagos and following the amalgamation of the Colony 
of Lagos with the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914, a Nigerian 
Council which existed side by side with the Legislative Council was established 
(Nwabueze 1982).
The Legislative Council was however merged with the Nigerian Council to 
become the Nigerian Legislative Council for the whole of Nigeria by the 1922 
Clifford constitution (Oyediran 2007). Its jurisdiction was confined to the Southern 
provinces, including the colony of Lagos. The Northern Nigeria continued to be 
governed by order from the colonial office in London and the Governor in Lagos 
(Oyediran 2007). Perhaps the most striking feature of the 1922 Constitution was the 
introduction of Elective Principle which, for the first time, provided opportunity for 
Africans to elect their representatives and participate in the legislative process 
(Akinboye and Anifowose 2008).
The Richard Constitution of 1946 which replaced that of Clifford created a 
Central Nigeria Legislative Council with overwhelming African majority and hav-
ing jurisdiction to make laws for the whole country. The constitution also estab-
lished three regional assemblies for the three provinces, viz—North, West and East 
(Akinboye and Anifowose 2008). The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 represented 
a major step forward in the political development of colonial Nigeria. The constitu-
tion created a House of Representatives that replaced the Legislative Council and 
the regional legislature (Houses of Assembly). Thus the number of the elected 
Nigerians into the legislative councils both at the central and regional levels was 
increased. Both the North and the West had a bi-camera Legislature each while the 
East had a single-chamber legislature (Ojo 1998; Dudley 1982). In terms of power 
vested in the assemblies, while the House of Representatives could legislate on any 
matter whatsoever, the regional legislatures were no longer consultative or advisory 
bodies. The 1954 Lyttleton Constitution consolidated and improved on the founda-
tion laid by Macpherson thereby creating a through federal system for the country. 
To be sure, for the first time, the constitution created three separate lists, namely, the 
residual, exclusive and the concurrent lists, and defined the spheres of powers 
between the central and regional legislative houses. Each region had a legislature, 
while the Governor-General and the regional governors were no longer members of 
the legislature (Dudley 1982). The House of Representatives was presided over by 
the Speaker instead of the governor that was previously performing the function. 
The House of Representatives was vested with power to make laws for the country 
and discuss financial matters. Regional legislatures were to become independent of 
the Central Legislature and thus the centre’s power to approve regional laws was 
removed. Following the federal structure, three legislative lists were created—an 
exclusive legislative list which specified the items on which the House of 
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Representatives had powers to legislate upon, a concurrent list which the House of 
Representatives and the Regional Houses of Assembly had coexisting legislative 
powers and a residual list made up of items on which the regional legislatures alone 
had powers upon (Ojo 1998). In order to avoid conflict of powers therefore, the 
constitution stipulated that in the event of a clash under the concurrent legislative 
matters, the regional laws was void to the extent of its inconsistency with that of the 
central legislature (Oyediran 2007).
The salient issue that needs to be raised at this juncture is the way and manner 
the legislature evolved and developed under the colonial administration. The colo-
nial legislative institutions were mere advisory tools in the hands of the Governor 
consisting of Nigerians and a majority of nominees of the colonial government 
(Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 2003). Their resolutions did not have the force of law, 
as the British intended them only to be deliberative houses and hence performed no 
law making functions (Nwabueze 1982). The colonial legislative institutions were 
not for any altruistic motive, rather they were essentially administrative strategies 
designed for better administration of the colonial state (Akinboye and Anifowose 
2008). The colonial legislature were merely designed to complement the work of 
the colonial governments by serving as agencies for articulation of views and venti-
lation of popular feelings that were not expected to radically change the patterns and 
policies of the respective colonial governments (Oni 2013). Furthermore, the subor-
dination of the legislative council to the executive subjected the latter to the whims 
and caprices of the Governor. The Governor was empowered to veto or give consent 
to any law passed by the Legislative Council subject to the instruction given to him 
by the British Government. No law took effect until he or the British Government 
had assented to it. He also had power to suspend any member of the council with the 
approval of the British Government (Akinboye and Anifowose 2008). At no time 
during the colonial period did the type or the extent of legislative power seemed to 
be an important issue. Even when the independence constitution was under discus-
sion, there seemed to be little or no attention paid to the type of political institutions 
which should be established. This political orientation was to have a long lasting 
effect on the performance of the legislature, not only during but even years after 
effective renunciation of colonial rule. Thus at independence, Nigeria inherited 
weak legislative institutions (Juergensmeyer 1964; Nwabueze 1982; Dudley 1982).
The Independence Constitution of Nigeria established a Parliamentary system 
modeled after the British parliamentary democracy (Mbah 2007). Chapter V of 
the Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature made up of a House of 
Representatives, presided over by a Speaker and the Senate headed by a President. 
Two legislative lists were established—the Exclusive Legislative List of 44 items 
for the Parliament and the Concurrent Legislative List consisting of 28 items on 
which both the Parliament and the Regional Houses of Assembly were empow-
ered to make laws (Ojo 1998). Both the Federal and the regional legislatures were 
competent to legislate with respect to matters contained in the concurrent list 
(Dudley 1982).
The legislative institutions operating at the centre were replicated at the regional 
level and following the parliamentary tradition, the same structure of party 
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 government existed in each region, but under an entirely different shape as de-facto 
one- party rule was the major feature of regional governments during the republic. 
The Senate, however, had very limited legislative powers; it had delaying powers 
only and lacked jurisdiction over financial matters. In addition, the house appeared 
to have been transformed by the politicians into a dumping ground for those who 
failed to win seats at popular elections but who had ambition to be ministers 
(Osaghae 2002). Moreover, the legislature in the First Republic consisted of the 
Queen, represented by the Governor-General at the centre and the Governor at the 
regions. A legislative measure therefore, could never become an Act without any 
one of these institutions (Ojo 1998). Thus, despite the country’s independence, the 
legislature of the Nigeria’s First Republic did not change in relations to the legisla-
tive power of the British Crown in Nigeria (Omoweh 2006).
The First Republic parliamentary system was, however, terminated following the 
military intervention of January 1966. The collapse has been attributed to the inap-
propriateness of the political institutions and process bequeathed to Nigeria and 
their not being adequately entrenched under colonial rule as well as the failure of 
the elite to follow the rule of the game due to lack of political culture that sustains 
democracy (Dudley 1982; Akinwumi 2004).
The military intervention in 1966 dethroned the Nigeria’s democratic gover-
nance and marked the end of the First Republic. The legislative bodies were abol-
ished with the law making powers exercised by the Military. Military incursion into 
the political arena of Nigeria consequently further worsened the precarious situation 
of the legislative body in the country (Nwabueze 1982; Okoosi-Simbine 2010). The 
military rule arrogated to itself the supreme power of the Nigerian state by abolish-
ing the constitution and governed the country by decrees.
Unlike the First Republic, the Second Republic Constitution enacted by Decree 
No. 25 of 1978, adopted a presidential democracy modeled after the United States 
of America. Legislative power was vested in the National Assembly (bi-cameral) at 
the Federal level. Members of the National Assembly are elected to a maximum of 
two 4-year terms (Oyediran 2007). Sections 4, 5 and 6 of chapter of the 1979 
Constitution established and provided for the distinct and specific functions and 
composition of the National Assembly.
While the Senate was largely a ceremonial body in the First Republic, the 1979 
Constitution gave the Senate equal powers with the House of Representatives 
(Suberu 1988). A unicameral legislative house of assembly was established in the 
states of the federation. There were two legislative lists which defined the powers of 
the National Assembly exclusively on Exclusive Legislative List matters and con-
current powers with Houses of Assembly in the States on Concurrent Legislative 
items (Oyediran 2007). The Second Republic was abruptly terminated by a Military 
coup on December 31, 1983 and the 1979 Constitution was suspended. The National 
Assembly was abrogated and the military exercised legislative powers by way of 
promulgating Military Decrees.
Through a carefully controlled plan for the return to civilian rule by the Armed 
Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) under Babangida administration, a new Constitution 
was promulgated in 1989 for the Third Republic through Decree Number 12 of 
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1989 (Oni 2013). It is pertinent to note that the Constitution did not fundamentally 
depart from the 1979 Constitution except for certain provisions such as the estab-
lishment of Two-Party System among others. Unfortunately however, the constitu-
tion was merely promulgated but did not wholly come into operation due to lack 
of full democratic governance in the country. It was only at the state level that it 
was practiced for 2 years. The national and State legislatures only existed but were 
powerless as the military held on to power (Akinboye and Anifowose 2008). The 
Presidential election that held in June 12, 1993 which would have ushered in prop-
erly constituted democratic governance at the centre was annulled by the military 
regime.
The annulment of the presidential elections was a major setback for the country 
as the level of public disenchantment with military rule had grown tremendously. 
Due to both local and international pressures, the military rulers relinquished politi-
cal powers in 1993, leaving behind an interim, unelected civilian government. 
Amidst public outcry against the illegitimacy of the Interim National Government 
(ING) which the military government handed over power to on August 26, 1993, the 
military moved swiftly again and toppled the government. It abolished the constitu-
tion and governed the country by decrees, having disbanded the legislative bodies 
and proscribed elections until when the country returned to a presidential democ-
racy in 1999 (Egwu 2005).
 The National Assembly and Law Making in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic (1999–2018)
The 1999 Constitution (now amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria estab-
lished the legal framework for the democratic government of the Fourth Republic. 
The constitution established a presidential democracy with a legislature that is 
bicameral. By this, at all levels of government, the constitution preserves the three 
basic presidential institutions, namely, the executive, the legislature and the judi-
ciary. According to Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution, legislative responsibility for 
the federation is vested in the National Assembly, a bicameral legislature. Subsection 
1 provides that “the legislative power of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be 
vested in a National Assembly for the federation which shall consist of a senate and 
a House of Representatives”. Subsection 2 empowers the National Assembly to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government for the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to any matter in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. In order to avoid conflict of jurisdictional power, Sections 3, 4 and 6 
of the constitution clearly demarcate between the areas which can be legislated 
upon by the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly of the states. These are 
contained in the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists. The National Assembly 
has exclusive jurisdictional power to legislate on matters included in the exclusive 
legislative list, to the exclusion of the Houses of Assembly of the states, while both 
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the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly have legislative powers on 
those matters contained in the concurrent legislative list. It is apparent from the 
items on the exclusive legislative list that the federal government enjoys overwhelm-
ing power to legislate virtually on every subject. This is clearly an indication of the 
federal government dominance at the expense of the states and of course, inimical 
to the tenet of federalism which the constitution enunciated.
It is instructive to note that while separation of powers is a fundamental constitu-
tional principle of the 1999 Constitution, nevertheless absolute separate among the 
organs was not what the constitution intended. In fact, power overlap, which is a 
major hallmark of presidential democracy, was essentially a major feature of the 
1999 constitution. A system of checks and balances exist among them. Sections 58 
(1) and 100 (1) reveal that the President or the Governor shares the law making 
power of the legislature by virtue of the constitutional provision for presidential or 
governor’s assent to bills before they become laws. According to sections 58 (5) and 
100 (5) however, at the event of presidential or gubernatorial refusal to assent to 
bills, the respective legislature can override such refusal by two-thirds majority.
The legislative power vested in the legislature under the 1999 Constitution is 
subject to judicial review as to its constitutionality. Section 4 (8) states that the exer-
cise of legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly 
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of judicial tribunals estab-
lished by law, and accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall 
not enact any law, that ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or 
of a judicial tribunal established by law. This system of checks and balances is nec-
essary for maintenance of, and at the same time, needed for co-operation and inter-
dependence among these fundamental institutions of governance with the essence 
of promoting liberty and as well, harmony that are essential in governance.
Since the emergence of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, the National Assembly has 
metamorphosed from being a nominal and peripheral to an active institution and 
exerting its influence on the law making process for the peace, stability and good 
governance of Nigeria (Oni 2013; Nwaubani 2014). Despite the tendency towards 
executive dominance, excesses and overbearing, the 4th Assembly was able to exer-
cise its law making powers in the country by deliberating on a total of 74 bills dur-
ing its existence between 1999 and 2003 (Lewis 2011). One of the issues on which 
the National Assembly demonstrated its resolve to protect it constitutional power 
was the scrapping, by President Obasanjo, of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) estab-
lished under Decree No. 25 of 1994. The action of the president was viewed by the 
National Assembly as usurpation of its constitutional responsibility of making and 
repealing laws. It however took the intervention of the Attorney-General and 
Minister of Justice to lay the matter to rest. The Minister argued that the President’s 
action was not unconstitutional going by the provision of Section 315 (4) (a) and (c) 
of the 1999 Constitution which provided that the President could modify any exist-
ing law. He argued that the modification could be addition, alteration, omission or 
repeal (Ehwarieme 2010).
Another notable bill passed to law by this assembly was the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC) Act 2000. The executive bill aimed at curbing the 
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spate of corruption in the country. The Electoral Act of 2001 was another remark-
able legislation of the National Assembly. In the original bill, clause 80 (1) had 
submitted that at the close of nominations for the 2003 general elections, any politi-
cal party which fails to sponsor at least 15% of the candidates for councillorship, 
council chairmanship, and state houses of assembly respectively throughout the fed-
eration, spread among two-thirds of the states of the federation, and the Federal 
Capital Territory, shall not participate in the general elections (Ogunmupe and 
Phillips 2002). This clause would have made it impossible for new political parties 
to field candidates in the 2003 general elections except for council polls. Section 80 
(1) of the bill was however amended. Thus, the provisions changed to a newly reg-
istered political party would be eligible to participate in federal and state elections 
provided that the political party shall first participate in the local government elec-
tion and win at least 10% of the councillorship and chairmanship positions through-
out the federation, spread among two-thirds of the states of the federation and the 
Federal Capital Territory (Dunmoye 2002).
The 5th National Assembly existed between 2003 and 2007 and was able to pass 
159 bills into law out of the 298 bills it considered (Iroanusi 2018). In a similar vein, 
the Nigeria’s 6th National Assembly (2007–2011) was able to pass 91 bills into law 
out of the 757 bills introduced to the assembly during the period. Similarly, the 
assembly passed a total of 92 resolutions (Uche 2011). Remarkable amongst these 
legislations which had great influence on the political stability of the country is the 
‘Doctrine of Necessity’ which on February 9, 2010 transferred power from the ter-
minally ill late President Yar’Adua to Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as the Acting President 
of Nigeria. The failure of President Yar ‘Adua to transmit a written declaration to the 
National Assembly to inform it that he was proceeding on health vacation caused a 
power vacuum with the danger of truncating Nigeria’s nascent democracy if some-
thing was not urgently done (Fashagba 2010). Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution 
provides that whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, a written declaration that he is proceeding 
on vacation or unable to discharge the functions of his office, until he transmits to 
them a written declaration to the contrary, such functions shall be discharged by the 
Vice President as Acting President (CFRN 1999). Though the Constitution man-
dates the President to transmit to the National Assembly his inability to perform the 
functions of his office and his consequential proceed on vacation, it does not specify 
the modality and time limit for transmitting the written declaration (Sagay 2010). 
For more than 100 days politicians took advantage of the lacuna, inadequacies and 
the ambiguities in the provisions of the 1999 Constitution by given divergent inter-
pretations to further their personal interest at the expense of the country (Fashagba 
2009). As aptly argued by Sagay (2010), the vacuum in the constitution led to the 
adoption of the “doctrine of necessity” in that what was otherwise not lawful was 
made lawful by necessity. Other major law making achievements of the assembly 
was the repealing and re-enactment of the Electoral Act 2010 which granted credi-
bility to the 2011 general elections.
Some other notable billed passed by the 6th Assembly include the Hydroelectric 
Power Producing Areas Development Commission Bill, Freedom of Information 
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Bill, National Health Bill, National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Bill, Prevention 
of Terrorism Bill, Anti-Money Laundering Bill, Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (Establishment) Bill, National Sovereign Investment Authority Bill, FCT 
Abuja Area Courts Bill, Alteration of the 1999 Constitution Bill. Others include 
National Human Rights Commission Act, (Amendment) Bill, Independent National 
Electoral Commission Act (Amendment) Bill, Remuneration of Former President's 
Head Federal Legislative Houses and Chief Justices of the Federation and other 
Ancillary Matters Bill, Institute for Democratic and Legislative Studies Act 
(Amendment) Bill, Employees Compensation Bill and National Assembly Service 
Commission Act (Repeal and Enactment) Bill (Uche 2011).
The Nigerian 7th National Assembly (2011–2015) on the other hand, had 1,063 
bills sponsored out of which it passed 106 into law (Umeagbalasi 2015). Some of 
the acts with landmark influence on Nigerian development include the Pension 
Reform Act 2014, Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, National Health Act, and 
the Terrorism (Prevention) Act (Agbakwuru and Erunke 2015). Some observers 
have however,  scored the 7th Assembly low in its constitutional responsibilities. 
They have noted the Assembly’s persistent recesses and adjournments which made 
it rather difficult to beat the constitutional threshold for mandatory number of sit-
tings (Ugwuanyi 2015). By the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), 
each chamber of the National Assembly ought to sit for a minimum of 181 days in 
a year which totals 724 legislative sittings throughout the 4-year tenure. It is instruc-
tive to note however, that quite a number of the bills introduced to the assembly 
were private members bills though public interest and expert bills did not feature 
much during the assembly (Ugwuanyi 2015). A good number of the bills passed 
were also sponsored by the executive (FGN 2017). Such bills include the appropria-
tion (budgetary) and supplementary appropriation bills and bills permitting the 
Presidency to borrow loans.
The 8th Assembly was inaugurated June 9, 2015 and as at July 2018 has enacted 
a total of 213 laws (Umoru 2018). The Assembly has witnessed some Senate mem-
bers being very active in proposing bills for consideration into law. For instance, as 
at July 2018, Dino Melaiye had sponsored 15 bills while Stella Oduah had spon-
sored 5 bills among which is the bill for the construction of Dams to remedy the 
perennial flood disasters in Nigeria. Abiodun Olujimi a Senator representing Ekiti 
South sponsored 11 bills including the Whistle Blowers Protection Bill 2016 passed 
into law in 2017. Mallam Shehu-Sani representing Kaduna Central had sponsored 
over 10 bills. In 2017, Senator Ben Murray-Bruce proposed over 10 bills, one of 
which is the Ward Security Bill that seeks to protect Nigerians from herdsmen 
attacks and other insecurities related threats through the creation of Community 
Policing. In like manner, Enyinnaya Abaribe representing Abia South senatorial 
district sponsored the Public Procurement Act (Amendment) Bill of 2015 which 
seeks to promote Made-in-Nigeria products in the country. Ovie Omo-Agege spon-
sored a bill to establish the University of Petroleum Resources in Effurun, Warri, 
Delta State.
Some other bills passed into law include the National Senior Citizens Centre Act 
2018 and the Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) 2018 which strengthens the 
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legislators’ power to implement their legislative functions. This comprises power to 
call upon any one to appear before the assembly to provide evidence and, power of 
an officer of the legislative house to arrest any person that commits an offense 
against the Act. Other laws include Chartered Institute of Project Managers of 
Nigeria (Establishment) Act 2018, Chartered Institute of Local Government and 
Public Administration Act, 2018, National Institute of Legislative Studies 
(Amendment) Act, 2018, Nigeria Agricultural Quarantine Service (Establishment), 
Act 2018; Dangerous drugs (Amendment) Bill 2015 which empowered the Minister 
of health and members of the public with respect to control of consumption of 
harmful drugs and also reviewed penalties, petroleum industry governance bill 
2017, whistle Blowers Bill 2015, national grazing routes and reserve bill 2016, 
Nigeria Legion Act (Amendment) Bill 2016 and the Petroleum industry governance 
bill (Adeniran 2018).
Some bills were vetoed and with assent withheld by the president after been 
passed by the National Assembly. They include the disability bill passed by the 
national assembly in March 2018 (Adeniran 2018). The Corporate Manslaughter 
Bill 2018 was rejected because section 1(5) of the bill was at variance with section 
36(5) of the 1999 Constitution which supports the presupposition of innocence until 
suspected offender is convicted by a tribunal, court or competent jurisdiction 
(Onyedi 2018). National Child Protection and Enforcement Agency (NCPEA) Bill 
2018 was rejected because the responsibilities of the proposed agency are the statu-
tory responsibilities of the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs. Furthermore, there 
were claims that the creation of the NCPEA could lead to the replication of man-
dates of the federal ministries, thus resulting in wastage of resources. Others include 
the Electoral Act (Amendment) Bill 2018, National Agricultural Seeds Council Bill, 
2018; The Chartered Institute of Entrepreneurship (Establishment) Bill 2018; The 
Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences (Amendment) Bill 2017, The 
Subsidiary Legislation (Legislative Scrutiny) Bill 2018; National Research and 
Innovation Council (Establishment) Bill 2017; National Institute of Hospitality and 
Tourism (Establishment) Bill 2018; Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety 
Agency (Amendment) Bill 2017 and Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund 
Amendment Bill, 2018. The rejections of these bills were alleged to be owing to 
some unaddressed issues relating to the drafting of the bills (Onyedi 2018). The 
Peace Corps of Nigeria bill 2017 was also vetoed by the president. Indeed, while 
President vetoed less than ten bills in 8 years, and Jonathan left a number of bills 
unassented to by the time he left office in 2015, the number of bills vetoed by 
President Buhari in 3 years appeared to be more than what his predecessors vetoed 
in 16 years. Apart from the 4th assembly (1999–2003) which successfully counter- 
veto two bills, the legislature had often defer to the executive once the executive 
vetoes any bills passed by the assembly. Perhaps, partisan politics played a role as 
the People’s Democratic Party controlled both the national assembly and the presi-
dency between 1999 and 2015, while the All Progressive Congress controlled 
majority in the national assembly and captured the presidency from 2015 to date.
What is evidently clear from the foregoing analysis is that private members spon-
sored a good number of bills from one assembly to the other. Despite this  observation, 
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it suffice to note that the executive bills have higher possibility of been passed by the 
national assembly and assented to by the executive. For instance, during the 1st ses-
sion (2007/2008) of the 6th assembly in 2009, the House of Representatives received 
and considered one hundred and fourteen (114) bills. 18 of the bills emanated from 
the executive, while 94 originated with the members of the House. The 18 executive 
bills translated to 15.78% while the 94 bills translated to 82.46%. The remaining 
two bills were transmitted from Senate to the House. Eleven bills representing 
9.56% were passed out of all. Six (54.55%) of the eleven bills were executive bills 
while five (45.45%) were members bills. In the second session  (2008/2009), the 
House received 181 bills in all. 141 (77.90%) of the 181 were members bills. 38 
(21%) of the bills were executive bills. Two of the bills were transmitted from 
Senate to the House. Out of the 181 bills, 41 (22.66%) were passed into law. 18 
(9.95%) of the bills were executive bills, while 19 (10.50%) private members were 
equally passed. Senate bills passed during the session was four (2.21%) (National 
Assembly Statistical Information 2009).
Similarly, most bills that the executive vetoed from 1999 to 2015 were largely 
private members bills. By this, legislative initiative appeared not to be enjoying 
executive support and approval as evidenced by the unwillingness of the executive 
to assent to bills emanating from the national assembly.
 The National Assembly and the Challenges of Law Making
There are a number of issues that have made the Nigeria’s National Assembly not to 
live up to expectations. These factors have affected its ability to guarantee good 
governance through the enactment of good and necessary legislations to drive the 
development of the state.
One apparent hindrance is the subjugation of the legislature by the executive. The 
executive treated the legislature as an appendage of the presidency especially from 
1999 to 2007. Although the executive has changed its approach from 2007, essentially 
following the change of regime, yet, the subsequent presidents have not yet fully under-
stood the import of a separate and independent legislature in a democracy. Perhaps, this 
is a trace of military hangover which is yet to completely vanish from the political 
scene after about two decades of the return of democratic rule (Alabi and Fasagba 
2009). The implication of this is that while the legislature exists as veritable instru-
ments of representative democracy, it is unable to perform is role of serving as effective 
checks on the executive as well as making laws capturing the interests of the people.
Parliamentary mercantilism, quackery and the commodification and commercial-
ization of the law-making process and activities remain another pungent banes to 
effective law making and law making processes in Nigeria. Law making processes 
in Nigeria have been grossly compromised and commercialized over the years. The 
crave for pecuniary and personal gains drive legislators and legislative action. This 
often rob the legislature of critical supports of the public. The executive sometimes 
take advantage of this to blackmail the legislature. it appeared that the lack of effec-
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tive and well-structured lobbying system sometimes expose the legislature to temp-
tation to succumb to pressure from moneybags interested in influencing legislative 
activities. Nevertheless, it appeared also that some legislators see their positions as 
means of promoting selfish and parochial interest rather than national interest 
(Lafenwa 2009). Public interest legislative issues are often abandoned, relegated and 
sometimes compromised for subsidiary legislative functions such as constituency 
projects, legislative probes, budgetary legislation amongst others (Umeagbalasi 
2015). This is substantiated by the fact that public interest bills and expert bills were 
very minimal. For instance, in the first 12 years of the Fourth Republic, the parlia-
ment only passed 134 legislations, most of which were the several appropriation 
bills in which the lawmakers habitually have vested interests (Nwalonue and Ojukwu 
2012). Also while the 112th U.S. Congress (2011–2012) passed a total of 326 Bills 
over a 2-year tenure, the 6th National Assembly only passed 91 Bills over its 4-year 
tenure (2007–2011) (Okigbo and Oyeka 2012). Additionally, by the provisions of 
successive appropriation Acts of the Federation, the Seventh National Assembly got 
over N600 billion ($3 billion) in budgetary allocations on an annual average of over 
N150 billion. This suggest that the national assembly got N5.77 billion for each of 
the 106 bills passed into law. The average cost per legislation is high on the basis of 
this. Furthermore, the processes involved in the initiation of Private Member bills 
both at the State and Federal legislative levels were also characterized by bribery and 
fraud. Huge amounts of money exchanged hands in some cases to initiate a bill 
through a member of the National Assembly (News Express 2015).
The Nigerian National Assembly remains one of the extravagant and expensive 
parliaments in the world (Sanusi 2010; Oni 2013). The cost of running the National 
Assembly has been on an ascending trajectory since Nigeria return to democracy in 
1999, even as the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty continues to grow. 
Between 11  years of Nigeria’s democratic rule (between 1999 and 2010), the 
National Assembly was assumed to have drawn over N684.6 billion from Nigeria’s 
treasury (Ajani et al. 2010). According to Okigbo and Oyeka (2012), the average 
annual spent (salary and allowances) on a Senator and a member of the House of 
Representatives is about N240 million ($1.6 million) and N204 million ($1.36 mil-
lion) respectively. Sanusi (2010) observed that the overhead cost of running the 
National Assembly is about 25.4% of the nation’s total budget whereas 61.2% of 
Nigerians whose interests the legislators purport to represent live on less than $1 per 
day. The productivity and results is not proportional to the cost.
Another major challenge is the high turnover rate of members with each new 
assembly populated by new members. Institutional memory suffers due to perennial 
mass non-reelection of incumbent legislators (Omoweh 2006). Learning the legisla-
tive process and procedures take time for new members and this limit the extent to 
which they contribute to the activity of the institution.
Frequent allegation of corruption against some members constitutes another 
challenge facing the Nigerian federal legislature. The legislature has the duty of 
controlling and protecting public treasury, upholding the standard of transparency, 
ethics, accountability, efficiency and leading by example so as to serve as a spring 
board for a democratic and corruption-free society (Joshua and Oni 2014). The 
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Nigerian legislature at all levels of government-federal, state and local has not been 
able to satisfactorily discharge the onerous duty of protecting public funds and 
other resources due to the activities of some of its corrupt members (Alabi and 
Fasagba 2009; Oni 2014). Rather than facilitating accountability through scrutiny 
of the executive, some members often pay attention to the material and financial 
benefits they could amass using their power and office (Alabi and Fasagba 2009; 
Benjamin 2010; Oni and Joshua 2014).
Some political analysts have also argued that one of the major reasons for the 
poor performance of the Assembly is the frequency of recesses and adjournments. 
This made it rather difficult for the federal legislature of the 7th Assembly to beat 
the constitutional threshold for mandatory number of sittings. By the provisions of 
the 1999 constitution as amended, each chamber of the National Assembly ought to 
sit for a minimum of 181 days in a year which total 724 legislative sittings through-
out their 4-year tenure. This was not met due to incessant recesses and adjournments 
(Ugwuanyi 2015). The 6th and 8th National Assemblies also had too many recesses 
that robbed the national assembly some precious times that should have been dedi-
cated to legislative activities.
 Conclusion and Recommendations
Nigerian legislature has no doubt witnessed a gradual evolution from advisory roles 
to active partner in governance for the peace, political stability and development of 
the country. This view is supported by Nwaubani (2014) who noted that the legisla-
tive institution in Nigeria evolved from minimal to marginal and to an active legis-
lature. The role of the National Assembly as the primary law making institution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria has had consequences for the political stability and 
development of the country.
Thus, the National Assembly needs to consolidate on the progress it has made 
under the Fourth Republic. Indeed, despite the challenges the body has faced from 
1999, its contributions to the stability of the current democratic practice is self- 
evident. It has been assertive despite efforts to undermine it by the executive. Yet, 
for it to make useful contributions and enjoy the support of Nigerians, the body 
must purge itself of most vices associated with it and get rid of the label of corrup-
tion and perception of self-serving attached to the institution.
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Studies abound (Almond et  al. 1996; Aiyede 2006; Coleman 1970; Hague and 
Harrop 2004; Hans 2000; Lijphart 1992; Obiyan 2007; Eminue 2006; Olson 1994; 
Theen and Wilson 1986) on the relevance and significance of the legislature at the 
national and subnational levels of government. This chapter focuses on the Nigerian 
experience in legislative practices and legislation, particularly at the national level 
within the context of the two environments of the legislature. The chapter is a fol-
low-up to the existing works on legislative studies in Nigeria focusing on lawmak-
ing, representation and oversight. It is also within the context of the Nigeria’s share 
of the myriads of distinguishing characteristics of postcolonial and post-conflict 
systems of its kind including transactional politics, the pervasive defective state 
system, poverty and inequality, desperate quest for power, appropriation of the state 
and the reign of impunity. It acknowledges the nature and character of the state 
system, a dearth of autonomous civic culture, prevalence of distinct traditional and 
religious patterns, distorted development trajectory of representative institutions 
and the peculiar circumstances of successive electoral processes as some of the 
consequences of the chaotic party politics that hinder legislative performance and 
undermine representative government. This intervention does not intend to run a 
detailed history of the myriads of self-inflicted and externally induced crises that 
bedevilled the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic; neither does it intend to 
This chapter drew inspiration and benefitted from a paper by this author on the topic: “The Nigerian 
Experience in Legislative Practice, Process, and Legislation”, African Journal of Politics and 
Society. Volume 2, Number 3, July 2016. pp. 49–97. The chapter is also a follow-up to similar 
works by the author on the subject matter.
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embark on partial or wholesale assessment of the extensive government programmes 
at the federal level (Muheeb 2016b). The Nigerian representative governance is an 
emerging and ongoing project.
 Introduction
The legislature is the critical unit that joins society to the legal structure of authority 
in the state. Legislatures are symbols and agencies of popular representation. It is 
the most organised theatre of political action and a veritable avenue for the mobili-
sation of people’s consent for the system of rule. Legislators play an essential role 
of standing for the people by providing a formidable defence against executive tyr-
anny (Hague and Harrop 2004). This presupposes that the legislature’s performance 
is to be rightly measured vis-à-vis people’s expectations. As critical units of a politi-
cal entity, the legislature is expected to make the values, goals and attitude of a 
social system authoritative in the form of legislation. The combination of these vari-
ables better explains why the legislature constitutes desirable subjects and objects 
of analysis in contemporary democratic governance discourse (Almond et al. 1996). 
The legislature is an institutional representation of the popular will that legitimises 
the system of rule. The two major environments of the legislature, that is, the legis-
lature–executive relations and the legislature–electorate relations provide the struc-
tural context for the assessment, characterisation and classification of legislative 
institutions. The identified network of relationship is essential in understanding and 
explaining the nature and character of the legislature in the foremost tasks of law-
making, representation and oversight. Legislators must think highly of their respon-
sibilities as trustees of the electorate. They are expected to perform an intermediate 
role between the government and the people whose wishes and desires must take 
precedence (Muheeb 2016a, b, c).
The significance attached to the legislature derives from the extensive powers 
vested in the legislative institution and the broad range of functions it is expected to 
perform, which include, but not limited to, representation, deliberation, lawmaking, 
exercise of power of the purse, education, socialisation and recruitment, interest 
articulation, aggregation and harmonisation, and keeping a potent check on other 
arms of government through oversight, scrutiny and investigation (Anyaegbunam 
Emmanuel 2010; Hague and Harrop 2004; Olson 2004, 1980; Mahler 2003; 
Akinsanya and Idang 2002; Almond et al. 1996). The extent to which the legislature 
represents the interest of the people in the conduct of members vis-à-vis their rela-
tionship with other actor-institutions in the governmental process; particularly, the 
executive is crucial to the nature and character of the legislature (Muheeb 2016a, b). 
As Olson noted, in a representative government, the legislature as an institution is 
not an extension of the executive but a partner working with the executive for public 
good (Olson 1980). Representation signifies an individual or sizeable number of 
individuals acting on behalf of a larger group of individuals, as a feasible mecha-
nism for harmonising interests. Expectedly, representatives are to project the 
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 opinions and choices of the individuals who elected them. Consequently, a repre-
sentative must be responsible to no one but the electorate because each representa-
tive in the legislative assembly is autonomous in relation to other representatives 
and to the executive (Hans 2000).
Following Hague and Harrop (2004), the legislature’s exercise of power of the 
purse manifests in the exerting of authority over government spending, approving 
of, or withholding executive authority to make financial transaction on state’s 
account as may be considered necessary. Public expenditure must have legislative 
approval as government budget is subject to legislative review. This includes the 
legislature’s significant inputs in the budgetary process among other responsibili-
ties. The legislature reviews the bills for revenue sharing, possible taxation as well 
as catalogue of financial transactions of the executive. Thus, legislators are statuto-
rily recognised as the custodians of budgetary power. In this regard, the legislature 
could initiate consultative assemblies where people are expected to put forward, and 
defend their immediate budgetary needs. Legislators are equally vested with the 
powers to check any noticeable trend of budgetary failure and ensure the smooth 
operations of budgets and the budgetary process. The people, therefore, become 
involved in the budgetary process through their representatives in the legislature.
 Essential Features and Functions of the Legislature
The renewed emphasis on legislative scrutiny and oversight appears to have further 
enhanced the prominence of the legislature as a watchdog over the executive. 
Legislative oversight entails monitoring and reviewing the actions of the executive 
and aligning executive performance with the rules and dictates of the governance 
process. Through oversight, the legislature ensures that the executive gives account 
of its actions or policies, as and when necessary. The legislature also ensures that the 
executive make amends for any fault or error and take steps to prevent its reoccur-
rence in the future. Deliberation functions of the legislature suggest that the organ is 
vested with the right to make laws (legislation) and, where and when necessary, 
alter executive proposals. It entails giving due consideration to issues of public 
importance. The executive initiates and forwards bills to the legislature while the 
latter review and work on them as deemed fit. Legislators, as representatives of the 
people, a fact which qualifies them as trustees of the society, are expected to bring 
to bear their intra- and inter-institutional networking knowledge, competence and 
expertise on issues brought before them. In this manner, important issues are 
exhaustively debated and deliberated upon, setting the tone for the consequent leg-
islative outcome, legislation. This implies that bills are scrutinised and authorised 
by the legislature, as lawmaking is clearly deliberative, involving extensive consul-
tation, serial readings and debates modifying in the process executive proposals 
(Hague and Harrop 2004).
Baldwin posits that virtually all legislative institutions are constitutionally desig-
nated for giving assent to binding measures of public policy, that assent being given 
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on behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government elite respon-
sible for formulating those measures (Baldwin 2013). While stressing the impor-
tance of representative government with broad powers and authority derived from 
the people, Born and Urscheler, nonetheless, recognise the variations in the func-
tioning of the legislature particularly as regards the interplay of forces in the shap-
ing of legislature–executive relations. Consequently, they posit that there are no 
universal standards or best practices for legislative oversight; more so that accepted 
substantive and procedural principles and practices as well as legislative structures 
in one established democracy may be a radical departure from what is obtainable in 
another system (Born and Urscheler 2002). This is in conflict with the emphasis on 
the minimum standard to which the legislature must conform (Muheeb 2016a, b, c).
 Structure of the Legislature
Legislatures vary in structure, form, shape, sizes, power, functions, autonomy, pro-
cedures and traditions. The size and diversity of a country plays a significant role in 
determining the size and form of its legislature. However, the two most prominent 
classifications of the legislature in the literature are: unicameral and bicameral leg-
islatures. At the national level, both types are characteristically reflective of such 
variables as; diversity, hegemony, party politics, political arrangement, forms of 
government and regime type, among others. Unicameral legislatures are one-House 
or one-Chamber legislatures common to most one-party states like Israel. In some 
federal systems like Nigeria, the subunits (states and local governments) have each 
a single chamber legislature. Bicameral legislature, on the other hand, presupposes 
two chambers, often referred to as the lower and the upper chambers. The Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 vests legislative powers in the Senate and 
the House of Representatives being the upper and lower chambers respectively. This 
is by the provisions in Section 4(1) of the Constitution. Article 1 Section 1 of the US 
Constitution equally vests legislative powers on Congress, which consists of the 
Senate and House of Representatives. Germany has the Bundestrat and Bundestag 
as upper and lower chambers as well, while the British Parliament comprises the 
House of Lords and House of Commons. Baldwin (2013) observes that while 
Demark (the Folketing) and New Zealand (the House of Representatives) are uni-
cameral legislatures; others, France (the National Assembly and the Senate), Russia 
(the State Duma and the Council of the Federation) are bicameral legislatures. 
According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union there are no fewer than 114 unicameral 
and 79 bicameral functional legislatures around the world.
Countries opt for either of unicameral or bicameral legislative structure not neces-
sarily based on the size of their population. Choice of structure could be a function of 
the political and constitutional history and development of each country. For exam-
ple, the People’s Republic of China with a population of more than 1.3 billion has a 
unicameral legislature with a statutory 3000 members (though currently 2978 mem-
bers), while bicameral legislature suffices in Antigua and Barbuda with a population 
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of some 87,884 consisting of the House of Representatives (with 19 members) and 
the Senate (with 17 members). Baldwin also noted that some countries like Denmark 
in 1953, Sweden in 1970 and Peru in 1993 were previously bicameral but have moved 
to unicameral structure. Others like Tunisia in 2005 were unicameral and subse-
quently moved to a bicameral structure. Again, Turkey was unicameral from 1921, 
became bicameral in 1961 and reverted to unicameral structure in 1982. Structure in 
this regard is the result of the political and constitutional history and development of 
each country (Baldwin 2013).
Baldwin (2013) also noted that there are the highly disciplined, tightly controlled 
legislatures of one-party authoritarian states such as the former Soviet Union, the 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and other Soviet bloc countries or 
those that can be seen today in the People’s Republic of China (the National People’s 
Congress) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (the Islamic Parliament of Iran, or 
Majles). There are unruly, fragmented legislatures like the Knesset in Israel, in 
which executive control often appears difficult if not impossible to establish. The 
working relationship between the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 
USA, particularly when one party has a majority in one chamber and a different 
party is in majority position in the other can lead to an inability to get anything 
through the legislative process, producing “legislative logjam”. The legislative term 
2010–2012 witnessed such logjam when the Republicans controlled the House and 
the democrats controlled the Senate and the executive under President Obama had 
difficulty getting government policies and programmes (like the Obama Healthcare 
programme tagged Obamacare) requiring legislative backing through the Congress.
A functional representative legislature holds far-reaching implications for the 
people as well as the system of rule. Recourse to the legislature on virtually every 
issue best captures the very essence of representation and the legislature. Such 
words as: assemblies, congress and/or parliament could be used interchangeably to 
denote the legislature as applicable to different climes. The legislature in the USA 
comprises the House of Representatives and the Senate, both of which make up the 
US Congress. The British Parliament, which comprises the House of Lords and the 
House of Common constitute the British legislative arm of government (Hague and 
Harrop 2004). The word “assemblies” often refer to legislatures at the national or 
sub-national levels of government in Nigeria. According to Baldwin Nicholas 
(2013), legislatures are known by different names from one polity to another. The 
word “Parliament” suffices in the UK, “State General” in the Netherlands, “Cortes 
Generales” in Spain, “Federal Assembly” in Russia, “Diet” in Japan, “Supreme 
Council” in Ukraine and “Congress” in the USA.
 The “Operation of Legislatures”
The extent to which a legislature is able to exercise power and exert influence is 
dependent upon a variety of variables. They include the institutional nature of the 
system within which it operates, for example presidential or parliamentary, unitary 
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or federal, electoral factors, that is, the nature of the electoral system, the use of dif-
ferent systems for the choice of the head of the executive. There could be staggering 
of executive and legislative elections. Other factors are the position as outlined in 
the constitution and the extent of its constitutional authority; its working practices 
and the extent of its political independence from the executive. The extent to which 
it is affected by the nature of the party system; its standing in the eye of the public; 
and its organisational coherence, particularly the independence and strength of its 
committee system and the professionalism of its membership are also imperative 
(Muheeb 2015a, b, 2016b, and Baldwin 2013). Baldwin also brought the UK parlia-
mentary experience to bear to reinforce his argument, pointing to the importance of 
such factors as: the party balance, particularly whether one party forms a majority 
government or whether coalition or minority governments are the norm; the size of 
the majority; the perceptions among MPs of the authority and popularity of the 
Prime minister; the skills of the prime minister in managing the parliament; the 
skills and abilities of parliamentary business managers (such as the Chief Whip); 
the prevalence of “divisive issues”; the quality of the institutional structures by 
which the parliament can scrutinise the executive; the unity and quality of the oppo-
sition; and national and international events. These are essential considerations 
when assessing the nature and status of the relationship between the legislature and 
the executive to determine whether it is the legislature or the executive that has the 
upper hand (Baldwin 2013).
It is however important to note that influence can be exerted “behind the scenes”, 
in private meetings with other political actors, and when the interests of the execu-
tive and the legislature align, it may be difficult to determine to what extent the 
executive is leading the legislature or responding to it (Muheeb 2015a, b, 2016b; 
Baldwin 2013). Also of importance is the fact that electorates have increasingly 
looked up to the executives for succour and that governments have often been found 
wanting. This has tended to bring political institutions and political actors under 
criticism, weakening legislatures in the process. Against the background of the 
growing complexity of contemporary governance, the policies and aspirations of 
even the most powerful political entities, legislatures or executives are vulnerable to 
development and decisions elsewhere over which they have little influence and less 
control, as the global economic crisis starting from 2008 readily attests. This fact, 
among others, including the increasing interface with ICT and the ease of cross- 
border movement for improved life chances poses significant threats to the ambi-
tions and jurisdictions of national political entities, be they legislatures or executives. 
They risk losing credibility by holding on religiously to claim of competence in the 
face of biting hardship and limited economic choices (Muheeb 2005, 2015a, b, 
2016a, b; Baldwin 2013).
In the final analysis, Baldwin’s argument suffices. The reality of the position of 
a legislature in a political system is dependent upon the prevailing history, tradi-
tions and special circumstances of such a system. The operation of the legislature 
in such system goes beyond mere assessing the position and capacity of the legisla-
tive vis- à- vis the executive. Even in instances where the balance of power undeni-
ably favours an executive it is not to the point of total subordination, as there are 
I. O. Muheeb
39
evidences of concrete legislative input and impact. The executive–legislative rela-
tionship is relative on lawmaking, representation and oversight, being the three 
crucial roles of the legislature, except in the most extreme cases of executive domi-
nance (Baldwin 2013). Thus, what can be identified when assessing legislatures is 
“a complex set of interrelationship often involving the capacity to influence, as 
opposed to determine; the ability to advise, rather than to command; the facility to 
criticize but not to obstruct; the competence to scrutinize rather than to initiate; and 
the desire to ensure that light is shed upon what is going on rather than to have 
things covered by a veil of secrecy.” Therefore, there is ample justification to align 
with Baldwin that many modern legislatures are better equipped than previously to 
function effectively in their onerous tasks. Regardless of possible shortcomings, 
legislatures remain the linchpin joining the people to the political system of a polity, 
the intermediaries in the peaceful transfer of executive power, the articulators of 
grievances, the agencies of oversight and forums for scrutiny of the executive 
(Baldwin 2013).
 The Nigerian Legislature Before 1960
The history of modern legislature in Nigeria could be said to have started with the 
Legislative Council established in 1862 by the British colonial powers to legislate 
for the Colony of Lagos. The Legislative Council was composed of the colonial 
governor, six officials, two Europeans and two Nigerians, who were unofficial 
members. The council only functioned in an advisory capacity to the governor. 
Nigerian Council, which existed side by side with the Legislative Council, was 
established following the amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos with the Southern 
and Northern Protectorates in 1914. The Nigerian Council was put in place to reflect 
the expanded size of the federation largely in terms of representation of the various 
units in its composition. It was larger than the Legislative Council but had only 
advisory powers, with neither executive nor legislative authorities.
The Clifford Constitution of 1922 established new Legislative Council of 46 
members. It was the first Legislative Council with elected members. The new 
Legislative Council was empowered to legislate for the peace, order and good gov-
ernment of the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Province. The governor legislated 
for the Northern Province by proclamation. The Richards Constitution of 1946 
replaced the Legislative Council with Central Legislative Council. The Central 
Legislative Council had an enlarged membership, which featured an unofficial 
majority. The council was empowered to make laws for the entire country but sub-
ject to the reserve power of the governor. The constitution also made provision for 
regional assemblies by dividing the country into North, East and West. While the 
Northern Regional Council was bicameral, the West and East were, each, unicam-
eral. The Northern Regional Assembly comprised the House of Chiefs and the 
House of Assembly. The Regional Assemblies largely served in an advisory capacity 
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and also nominated those who would represent their various regions at the Central 
Legislative Council (Muheeb 2016b).
The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 was the product of the Ibadan general 
conference of January 1950. It replaced the Central Legislative Council with the 
House of Representatives. The constitution strengthened the regional Legislative 
Council put in place by the Richards Constitution with an elected Nigerian majority. 
The regional councils were to make laws on a range of issues but subject to ratifica-
tion by the Central Legislative Council. The regional councils were to also serve as 
electoral colleges for both the council of ministers as well as the Central Legislative 
Council, the House of Representatives. The Central Legislative Council had powers 
to legislate on all matters affecting the entire country, including appropriation and 
those matters that were under the purview of the regional councils. The Council was 
comprised the governor as president, 6 European officials, including the lieutenant 
governors, 136 representatives elected by the Regional Houses; (68 by the Northern 
Regional Assembly, 34 each by the Western and the Eastern Regional Assemblies, 
and 6 special members appointed by the governor to represent interests and com-
munities which had inadequate presence in the House of Representatives). The 
House of Representatives then had no powers over bills relating to public revenue 
and public service.
The constitution provided for a bicameral legislature in the North and West with 
a House of Chiefs and a House of Assembly. The Eastern Region had only one 
house, the House of Assembly. Notwithstanding the desire for regional autonomy, it 
must be noted that regional bills could only become laws with the consent and 
approval of the Central Legislative Council. The governor was empowered to make 
laws with the advice and consent of the House of Representatives under the 
Macpherson Constitution; he was also given reserved powers in areas like public 
finance, foreign policy and public service. To maintain the legislative supremacy of 
the governor, the House of Representatives was given pseudo-supremacy of vetoing 
legislation made by the Regional Houses of Assembly.
The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 retained the House of Representatives, but 
without the governor presiding. Instead, the House of Representatives had a speaker, 
3 ex-officio members, and 184 Representatives elected from the various constituen-
cies in Nigeria. With direct election of members by the constituencies, the regional 
assemblies ceased to be electoral colleges for the Central Legislative Council. The 
House of Representatives was empowered to make laws for the country and discuss 
financial matters. Legislative powers were divided along three legislative lists, 
namely exclusive, concurrent and residual. Exclusive Legislative List contained 
about 68 items on which the House of Representatives had powers to make laws. 
These include defence, currency issuance, foreign relations and so on. The 
Concurrent List included those issues on which the House of Representatives and 
the Regional Houses of Assembly had concurrent legislative powers, like education 
and basic facilities. However, federal laws and powers would take precedence in the 
event of conflict of interest. The Residual List made up of items on which the 
Regional Legislatures had the final say in passing a bill into law.
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Ojo (1997) recalled that from January, 1955, Nigeria’s premier legislature, the 
House of Representatives started the conduct of its legislative affairs under a 
“speaker” appointed for the first time, as the affairs of the legislature were being 
conducted along strict parliamentary lines neither subservient to the former presi-
dent of the house, then the governor, nor subjected to mere “rule of thumb”. Thus, 
Nigeria adopted in full measure, the parliamentary system of government. The 
Parliament consisted of the governor-general, as the queen’s representative, the 
Senate and the House of Representatives without any of which a legislative measure 
could not become an act or a law. Any measure originating in a bill in any of the 
Houses, Senate or House of Representatives must have the concurrence of the other 
House after which it must go to the governor-general for assent. It then became an 
Act of Parliament. The 1960 Constitution was a replica of British system tagged 
“Parliament” rather than “Assembly” or “Congress”.
 The First Republic 1960–1966
The 1960 Constitution established a Parliament made up of a House of 
Representatives of 320 elected members and a Senate of 44 nominated members. 
This was in keeping with the practice of the House of Lords in the UK. In line with 
the federal system or government, which the imperialists had favoured with the 
Richards and Macpherson Constitutions, the 1960 Constitution also provided for a 
bicameral legislature at the Regional level with “Houses of Assembly and Houses of 
Chiefs” to distinguish them from the central legislative body tagged “Parliament” 
consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The 1960 Constitution 
made provisions for the central legislature in its Chapter IV, giving details of its 
composition (Part 1), Procedure in Parliament (Part 2), Summoning, prorogation 
and dissolution of Parliament (Part 3) and its legislative powers (Part 4). Part 4 
(Sections 69–83) listed the legislative powers of parliament as including powers of 
parliament to make laws “for peace, order and good government of the Federation” 
in regard to matters in the exclusive legislative list and the concurrent legislative list 
as well as in relation to emergencies in respect of any area of the country and in 
respect of any subjects whatsoever. Parliament would also make laws in respect of 
money (grants and loans) as well as imposition of taxes and in respect of treaties. 
Thus, two legislative lists were established—the Exclusive Legislative List of 44 
items for the Parliament and the Concurrent Legislative List consisting of 28 items 
on which both the Parliament and the Regional Houses of Assembly were empow-
ered to make laws. In addition, the Parliament was conferred with emergency 
powers.
The Republican Constitution of 1963 was not a complete departure from the 
1960 Constitution, as all the changes it made were to the effect that the Queen of 
England had ceased to be Nigeria’s Head of State as well as sit in the Legislative 
Houses. The fundamental change from a monarchy to a republic was the major 
alteration of the 1960 Constitution, making the contents of both the 1960 and 1963 
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constitutions generally the same. The parliamentary system of government was still 
retained, as the three arms of government, the judiciary, the legislature and the exec-
utive, continued to function as of the old and the same Standing Orders of the legis-
lature were in use. Highlights of the changes effected in the 1963 Republican 
Constitution included the fact that the Queen’s Representative ceased to be the Head 
of State but now replaced by a president elected by representatives in the Parliament 
to reflect the new independent and republican status of the federation. The contents 
of both constitutions including parliamentary procedures were largely the same 
both under the monarchy from 1960 to September 1963 and as a republic from 
October 1963 to January 1966 when the military took over (Ojo 1997). The standing 
order was based on the provision of Section 65(1) of the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions 
in the following terms. The section stated thus: “65(1) subject to the provisions of 
this Constitution, each House of Parliament may regulate its own procedure.” This 
section conferred the Parliament with the power to make laws in accordance with 
the provisions under Section 69 of the constitution in respect of the legislature.
The specific powers for the internal working of the legislature to enable it per-
form the legislative tasks specified above were contained in Part 2 of Chapter V—
Procedure in Parliament and included Oaths to be taken by members of Parliament, 
Presiding in Senate, Presiding in House of Representatives, Quorum in Houses of 
Parliament, Mode of exercising legislative power, Restrictions with regard to certain 
financial measures, Limitation of powers of senate and Regulation of Procedure in 
Houses of Parliament (Sections 55–65). Therefore, the House of Representatives, in 
1962, issued the “Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1962”, and the 
Senate followed suit in relation to its own legislative procedure. The two procedures 
were virtually similar, save that the House of Representatives was the more power-
ful of the two with exclusive powers to initiate money bills (the power which the 
Senate did not have).
However, Ojo’s observations on some identifiable shortcomings of the parlia-
mentary system as regards its negation of the full application of the principle of 
separation of powers suffice. The prime minister and his ministers, both of cabinet 
and non-cabinet status, as well as their parliamentary secretaries were all legislators 
before being appointed ministers. They must have won their seats in the elections 
into the House of Representatives, or must have been nominated as senators. Again, 
most of the legislative measures including bills and resolutions coming before the 
parliament emanated from the Council of Ministers and were introduced by the 
appropriate ministers. A few bills and resolutions in form of Motions were also 
brought before the House by floor or ordinary members. Such measures must, how-
ever, have the consent of the Council of Ministers in order for the bills and resolu-
tions to succeed. The minister of finance usually assumed leadership of the House 
or of government business from 1960 to 1966. All financial measures including the 
appropriation and finance bills must originate in the House of Representatives as 
provided for under Section 62(2) of the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions (Ojo 1997).
In line with parliamentary tradition and as earlier noted, the real power resided 
with the prime minister who doubled as the head of government. The governor- 
general or president from October 1963 was the head of state who followed the 
I. O. Muheeb
43
advice of the prime minister and would not likely veto the laws passed by both 
legislative houses. Any important measure of the government, which failed to pass 
in the House and any motion of no-confidence, which succeeded, would result in 
bringing down the government before the completion of the 5-year term of office. 
The government and opposition legislators would then have to seek a new mandate 
from the people. Since the government controlled the majority in the legislature, 
either of these measures, usually promoted by the opposition, hardly ever suc-
ceeded. Thus, there was a thin line between the executive and the legislature. The 
executive remained dissolved with the legislature and the latter stood dissolved 
whenever the government resigned. Instructively, the executive so controlled the 
legislature that the latter became completely subordinate to the former, and the for-
mer almost becoming a rubber-stamp legislature (Ojo 1997). These were to later 
provide justifications for the jettisoning of parliamentary for presidential system of 
rule as shall be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
 The Civilian, the Legislature and Lawmaking (1979–1983)
After 13 years of legislative hiatus, democracy was restored in 1979. In 1976, the 
then military government heeded the call of Nigerians for a return to civilian consti-
tutional and democratic governance through a transition to civil rule programme. 
Accordingly, a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) was appointed to review 
not only the 1963 Constitution but to also look at what other constitutional practices 
and lessons from other parts of the world could be used as input in crafting a consti-
tutional system suited to the Nigerian environment. For effective leadership, national 
unity and the need to develop bargaining and consensus approaches to politics and 
decision-making, the CDC recommended a departure from the Westminster parlia-
mentary system of government and the adoption of the American executive presi-
dential system (Muheeb 2016a, b, c).
The CDC recommendations were debated by the Constituent Assembly mem-
bers before their coming into force on October 1, 1979 as Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. The federal government proclaimed a new constitution for the 
country, based on the presidential system of government. Among other provisions, 
the constitution acknowledged the creation of 19 states, established a bicameral 
National Assembly consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and 
unicameral legislative Houses of Assembly for the States in the Federation. The 
functions of the legislature include lawmaking, representation and checking, super-
vising and controlling the administration. The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1979 established a bicameral National Assembly as recommended by the 
CDC and unicameral legislative Houses of Assembly in the States. There were two 
legislative lists: (1) the Exclusive Legislative List and (2) the Concurrent Legislative 
List defining the powers of the National Assembly on Exclusive Legislative matters 
and the concurrent powers with the Houses of Assembly in the states on Concurrent 
Legislative items. Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo handed over power to President 
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Shehu Shagari who was declared the winner of the national elections in the military 
midwifed the military-to-civilian transition in 1979.
The constitutional provisions for the legislature under the presidential system of 
government were quite similar to those for the legislature under the previous parlia-
mentary system with provisions for a bicameral legislature for the Centre—Senate 
and House of Representatives as was the case under the Parliamentary system of the 
first Republic. The legislature also developed its own Standing Orders called 
“Rules” in the House of Representatives and “Standing Rules” in the Senate. The 
Standing Orders of the parliament of the First Republic (1960–1966) and the Rules 
of the Assembly of the Second Republic (1979–1983) derived their power and 
authority from the same sources, namely constitutional and statutory provisions, the 
unwritten rules (practices and conventions of the legislature), the written rules 
(standing orders) and rulings from the presiding officers. To enable the legislature 
perform the tasks enumerated in the exclusive legislative list, the 1979 also outlined 
the procedure in the legislature to include Oaths of Members (Section 48), Presiding 
at Sittings (Section 49), Quorum (Section 50), Languages (Section 51), Voting 
(Section 52), Mode of Bills (Sections 54 and 55), Regulation of Procedure (Section 
56), Committees (Section 58) and Sittings (Section 59).
However, after 4 years and 3 months, there was yet another military takeover of 
government in December 1983 consequent upon which the 1979 Constitution was 
suspended, the National Assembly abrogated and the military exercised legislative 
powers by way of promulgating military decrees.
 The Aborted Third Republic
The Constitution Review Committee (CRC) was set up in 1987 to re-examine the 
1979 Constitution. The CRC recommended a retention of the 1979 Constitutional 
stipulations and therefore a 1989 Constitution was promulgated which established a 
National Assembly in the same way it was done under the 1979 Constitution. Going 
by the provisions under Sections 56, 57(4) and 98 of the 1989 Constitution, a bill 
that has been passed by the National Assembly or an Act of the National Assembly 
shall become a law after assent of the president, and a bill passed by House of 
Assembly of a State shall become a law only after assent of the governor in accor-
dance with the provision of the Constitution. Where the president or governor with-
holds assent, otherwise known as vetoing, the bill is returned to the assembly and 
the bill, if again passed by the assembly by two-thirds majority, “shall become a 
law”, and the assent of the president or governor, as the case may be, “shall not be 
required”. The entire transition to civil rule programme midwifed by the Babangida 
regime was brought an abrupt end in August 1993 as a result of the aborted June 
121,993 presidential elections, which took place under the 1989 Constitution. The 
legislature was short-lived though but both the National and sub-National Assemblies 
were accused of conniving with the Executive in stifling the legislative institutions 
through impeachment campaigns against the principal officer until another military 
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regime of General Sani Abacha took over in November 1993 and again disbanded 
the legislature. The Military retained power but the continued agitation for the 
return to civil rule informed the convening of a National Constitutional Conference 
in 1994 with a Report in 1995. Again, the Constitutional Conference retained the 
pattern established under the 1979 Constitution, namely a bicameral National 
Assembly consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives with exclusive and 
concurrent legislative powers. The military administration led by General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar commissioned a Constitution Review Committee whose 
recommendations brought about the promulgated 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (Muheeb 2016a, b, c).
 The Re-emergence of the Legislature (1999–2015)
Nigeria exited authoritarian dictatorship to embrace civilian rule in May 1999 with 
the successful inauguration of the Obasanjo administration after prolonged popular 
pro-democracy agitation and several attempts at democratisation. As noted else-
where, the military to civilian transition ushered elected officials into the executive 
and legislative institutions both at the national level and the component units for a 
renewable term of 4 years under the provisions of the 1999 federal Constitution. It 
is noteworthy that the 1999 Constitution largely incorporated the provisions of the 
1979 Constitution. The 1999 Constitution provides for an executive presidency, a 
bicameral legislature of two chambers, the Senate and House of Representatives at 
the national level and a unicameral assembly, and a State House of Assembly in 
each of the 36 States of the Federation. There is an Exclusive Legislative List of 68 
items and a Concurrent List defining the extent of federal and state legislative pow-
ers. Section 4(1–7) clearly defined the legislative powers of the National Assembly 
and the State Houses of Assembly.
 The Legislature and Lawmaking in the Fourth Republic
Chapter V, Sections 47–89 and 90–129 outline details on the composition and staff 
of the legislature, procedure for summoning and dissolution of the legislature, qual-
ification for membership and right of attendance, election into the legislature as well 
as legislative powers and control over public funds including right to the conduct or 
investigations and to seek evidence within the confines of legislative oversight. 
Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution, therefore, enjoins separation of powers and 
checks and balances. The powers conferred on the legislature in the Constitution are 
exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the legislature to make laws with 
respect to any matter within its legislative competence and to correct any defects in 
existing laws; and expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or 
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administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or 
administration of funds appropriated by it (Nyong 2000).
The Constitution enjoins the principle of separation of powers and personnel, 
which entails provisions limiting executive influence in and on the legislature. 
These include provisions that clearly define the direction of legislative–executive 
relationship vis-à-vis the principle of checks and balances. For example, Section 
100(1–5) of the Constitution requires that a bill passed by a State House of Assembly 
be presented to the governor for assent and for the Assembly to by-pass the gover-
nor’s assent when and where such action is delayed or denied. Section 101 granted 
the Assembly power to be self-regulatory. Section 105(3) granted the governor 
power to issue a proclamation for the holding of the first session of the House of 
Assembly or for its dissolution as and when necessary. These are similar to Sections 
58 and 64 as regards National Assembly. Sections 60 and 101 grant the legislature 
at the National and state levels concurrent rights to be self-regulatory. Section 188 
empowers a State House of Assembly to remove, as a measure of last resort, an err-
ing governor or deputy governor as the case may be, in line with these provisions. 
This is similar to provisions under Section 143, which empowers the National 
Assembly to remove an erring president or vice-president. Thus, the 1999 
Constitution made adequate provisions for the effective functioning of, and a repre-
sentative legislature.
 Composition of the National Assembly
The composition of the Senate is based on equal representation of the States of the 
Federation, irrespective of size. There are 109 Senators comprising three each from 
each of the 36 States of the Federation and one senator representing the Federal 
Capital Territory. In line with Section 47 of the Constitution on leadership composi-
tion, and in fulfilment of Section 60, which grant the National Assembly rights to be 
self-regulatory, the leadership of the Senate comprises the president and deputy 
president at the helm. Other principal officers include the majority leader, chief 
whip, deputy majority leader, deputy chief whip, minority leader, minority whip, 
deputy minority leader and deputy minority whip. There are 54 standing commit-
tees, each headed by a chairman appointed by the senate president. Similarly, the 
House of Representatives consists of 360 members elected based on proportional 
representation of population of each of the 360 States of the Federation and the 
Federal Capital Territory. The leadership of the House of Representatives consists 
of the speaker and the deputy speaker. Other principal officers include the house 
majority leader, chief whip, deputy majority leader, deputy chief whip, minority 
leader, minority whip, deputy minority leader and deputy minority whip. There are 
84 standing committees in all, each headed by a chairman appointed by the speaker.
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 The Legislative Process in the Nigeria’s National Assembly
A bill for a law or an act of the National Assembly undergoes a definite process 
requiring extensive deliberation, serial reading, and consideration of the many inter-
ests and implications of the bill. The processes and the tasks involved are usually in 
stages. Stage One involves the identification of the need for a bill. A bill could be 
entirely new with novel ideas and insight not yet covered by an existing law. It could 
also be an amendment to an existing law, which may be thought to be inadequate 
either because of some changes in government policies or changes in the society. 
The existing law could also be considered to be an infringement on another legal 
framework, thus necessitating changes requiring legislative actions. An individual 
within or outside the legislature can initiate a bill. However, only a member of the 
Senate or House of Representatives can introduce a bill on the floor of the House or 
the Senate. Bills are grouped into three categories, namely Executive, Member and 
Private. A bill is like a proposal that has to be deliberated upon and passed into law 
by the legislature. In processing Executive bills, the presidency is expected to for-
ward a prepared copy to the speaker of the house and the senate president with a 
cover memo from the president. Bills from the Executive arm of government could 
be deliberated upon concurrently in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
A bill from members of the House of Representatives is presented to the speaker 
while the one from Senate is presented to the senate president. Bills from members 
of the Assembly and Private individuals are first deliberated upon in the chamber of 
its origin before it is forwarded to the other chamber for passage.
All bills are marked according to their chamber of origin. For example, a bill 
from the House of Representatives is marked HB (house bill) while the one from the 
Senate is marked SB (senate bill). An executive bill is marked with “Executive” 
printed on the title page of the bill. On the receipt of a bill, the speaker forwards it 
to the Rules and Business Committee, while the senate president sends it to the 
Committee on Rules and Procedure. These committees have preliminary view of the 
bill to determine whether it meets the standards in draft and presentation. Otherwise, 
it is forwarded to the Legal Department of the National Assembly for redrafting and 
further advice. The committee thereafter forward the bill for gazette and for subse-
quent stages involving the first, second and third readings. Executive bills are 
gazetted or published in the House/Senate Journal once, while those introduced by 
members are published three times before they can be presented to the House/
Senate for consideration. The House Rules and Business Committee or the Senate 
Committee on Rules and Procedures is also expected to determine the day and the 
time a bill is to be discussed in the House/Senate. All bills must receive three read-
ings before they can be passed into law and the readings must be on different days. 
Some bills can receive accelerated consideration based on urgency, and significance 
and related considerations, in which case, rules of the House/Senate are to be sus-
pended or set aside to accommodate the special circumstances.1
1 ibid.
The Trajectory of the Legislature, Lawmaking and Legislation in Nigeria
48
Stage Two involves serial readings of the bill. The clerk of the House or the 
Senate usually does the First Reading of bills scheduled on the House/Senate calen-
dar. S/he reads the short tittle of the bill and then proceeds to “table” it, in which the 
clerk places the bill on the table before the speaker/senate president. There is no 
debate on the bill on the floor of the House/Senate at this stage, as the first reading 
simply notifies members that a particular bill has been introduced and received. The 
Second Reading involves a debate, which commences with a motion by the Senate 
or House Leader that the bill be read the second time, if it is an executive bill. The 
motion must be seconded (supported) by any of the other parties’ leaders. When it 
is not seconded, the bill cannot be debated but in most cases, Executive bills are 
allowed, as a matter of courtesy to proceed to a second reading. However, the spon-
sor of the bill would move the motion that it be read the second time if the bill is by 
a member of the House or the Senate and the motion must be seconded (supported) 
by another member of the House or Senate.2 Also, when a bill by a member cannot 
get the support of another member in the House or Senate, it cannot be debated and 
it stands rejected. The individual moving the motion, be it an executive or member 
bill, is expected to highlight the objectives, general principles and subject matter of 
the bill. He is also expected to state the benefits of the bill if passed into law. If the 
House agrees to the motion, the clerk will read the long tittle of the bill, after which 
members signify their intention to speak on the bill. Speakers on a bill are usually 
allocated time of about five or 7 min to speak. Either of two things could follow at 
this stage, namely the bill may receive the support of the majority of the House/
Senate and be allowed to move to the next stage. Once it gets the needed support, it 
moves to the committee stage. The bill may be “Negatived” (killed) if it does not get 
the support of the majority of the House or Senate members. When a bill is killed, 
it is taken off the table and cannot be discussed until it is reintroduced at a later date. 
After the debate on the general principles of the bill, it is referred to the appropriate 
standing committee. The senate president/speaker of the house is empowered by the 
rules of both Senate and the House to determine the relevant committee(s) to which 
the bill would be referred.3
The committee stage is that moment when the committee assigned to further 
action on a bill examines it critically. The House and the Senate, each, have two 
types of committees, namely the Committee of the Whole House, and the standing 
committees. The deputy speaker of the House acts as the chairperson if the 
Committee of the Whole House is to discuss a bill. The speaker would vacate his or 
her seat for the clerk’s seat at this point. The chamber’s symbol of authority, the 
mace would occupy the lower table for the Committee of the Whole House delibera-
tion to commence. In the case of the Senate, the senate president acts as the chair-
person of the Committee of the Whole House and thus presides over sittings. When 
the deputy speaker or the senate president presides over the Committee of the Whole 
House, s/he is stopped being addressed as the deputy speaker or the senate presi-





the period of the committee session. As for the standing committees, the chairper-
son, appointed by the senate president/speaker of the house, presides over the com-
mittee, and in his or her absence the deputy steps in instead.
The assigned standing committee examines all aspects of the bill clause by clause 
and point by point. They also organise public hearings on the bill either at the 
National Assembly Complex or any other location the committee deems appropri-
ate. The public hearing would afford interested member(s) of the public or expert(s) 
opportunity to make intervention and contribute to the public debate of the bill. 
However, while members of the public can offer suggestion(s) on any aspect of the 
bill, only a member of the committee can propose amendment to the bill. 
Amendments must be in line with, and relevant to the principle and the subject mat-
ter of the bill as agreed to at the second reading stage. It is pertinent to stress that a 
bill could touch on areas of two or more standing committees. The committee with 
dominant issues is assigned the bill, while others will form subcommittees to con-
sider their areas of interests and report to the main committee. The main committee 
will collate all suggestions and amendments of the “sub-committees” and report to 
the House/Senate.4
A standing committee on a bill reports back to the Committee of the Whole 
House/Senate in plenary after the committee has concluded its work with or without 
amendments. The committee must ensure that the House Rules and Business 
Committee or Senate Committee on Rules and Procedure include the bill on the 
House/Senate Calendar for the hearing of the committee’s report. It is important to 
stress that the Committee of the Whole House must also report back to the House/ 
Senate. The speaker or the senate president takes his or her former seat and the mace 
is returned to its original position where Committee of the Whole House is reporting 
back on the bill. Whether it is the standing committee or the Committee of the 
Whole House that considered a bill, at committee stage, the chairperson is expected 
via a motion to report progress on the bill and the clerk of each chamber prepares a 
clean copy of the bill for members. For the Third reading thereafter, a motion may 
be moved that the bill be read the third time either immediately or at a later date and 
passed after each chamber has certified the contents of the clean copy to be accurate. 
Amendment cannot be entertained after the third reading stage. If a member wishes 
to amend or modify a provision contained in the bill or to introduce a new provision, 
s/he must give notice of his or her intention “That the bill be re-committed” before 
the motion for the third reading is moved. If the motion is agreed upon, the House/
Senate will dissolve itself into Committee of the Whole House/Senate immediately 
or at a later date to discuss the amendments; and after all necessary amendments, the 
House or the Senate will thereafter proceed on the third reading and pass the bill.5
4 For example, all committees are always involved in the “Appropriation Bill” (Budget), but they 
act as sub-committees to the Appropriation Committee in the House/Senate. In other words, they 
report back to the Appropriation Committee with their changes or amendments. http://nass.gov.ng/
page/the-legislative-process accessed 19/06/2016.
5 op. cit.
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On Stage Three, a clean printed copy of the bill, incorporating all amendments 
will be produced, signed by the clerk and endorsed by the speaker/senate president 
when it has been read the third time and passed. The copy will then be forwarded to 
the clerk of the House or Senate as the case may be. The copy will be accompanied 
with a message requiring the concurrence (passage of the bill or agreement) of the 
receiving chamber (House or Senate). In the case of the executive bill, both cham-
bers will just exchange copies of the bill since they both received copies and dis-
cussed the bill almost the same time. When a bill is sent to either chamber for 
concurrence, three things may happen: the receiving chamber may agree with the 
provisions of the bill and pass it; the chamber may not agree to some part of the bill 
and make amendments; or the chamber may not agree with the bill and therefore 
reject it in its entirety. This situation is however rare and has never been witnessed 
in Nigeria. The Joint Conference Committee is constituted when there are differ-
ences in a bill passed by both legislative chambers. Membership of the committee is 
based on equality, usually six members from each chamber with a senator acting as 
chairperson.
The mandate of the committee is to harmonise the differences between the two 
chambers on the bill. They cannot introduce any new matter into the bill at the joint 
conference committee. The decision of the committee on those areas of differences 
is binding on the chambers. Failure to accept the decision of Joint Conference 
Committee may lead to a joint sitting of both the Senate and the House with the 
senate president presiding on the area of contention. The report of the Joint 
Conference Committee is presented in both chambers for consideration. If both 
chambers adopt the report, all the original papers are sent to the clerk of the cham-
ber where the bill originated. The clerk puts together all the amendments and pro-
duces a clean copy of the bill, which is sent to the clerk of the National Assembly 
who then sends it to president for his signature. At the conference committee stage, 
members or select members of the committees, which considered the bill, originally 
meet and deliberate only on the areas of disagreement between the two chambers.
Stage four involves the presidential assent, as the bill does not become law with-
out presidential assent. The clerk of the National Assembly will “enrol” the bill for 
the president’s signature. Enrolment is the production of a clean copy for the assent 
of the president. The clerk of the National Assembly produces the clean copy, certi-
fies it and forwards it to the president. In line with constitutional provisions, the 
president has 30 days to give his assent. If s/he disagrees with the provision of the 
bill or some aspects of it, s/he can veto by withholding his or her signature. Within 
the 30 days the president must communicate to the National Assembly his or her 
feelings and comments about the bill. The president must state the areas s/he wants 
amended before s/he signs the bill. If the National Assembly agrees with the presi-
dent the bill can be withdrawn for deliberation on the amendments suggested by the 
president. As noted earlier, the National Assembly is empowered by the Constitution 
to overrule the veto of the president. If, after 30 days, the president refuses to sign 
the bill and the National Assembly is not in support of the president’s amendments, 
the two chambers can recall the bill and repass it with two-thirds majority vote. If 
the bill is passed in the form it was sent to the president by two-third majority vote 
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in both chambers, the bill automatically becomes a law even without the signature 
of the president.
 Record of Bills Tabled Before the National Assembly 
1999–2015
By and large, in addition to a number of motions, the record of which was not read-
ily available, no fewer than 1367 bills were reportedly table before the fourth, fifth, 
sixth and the seventh national assemblies, 1999–2015, as available on the Nigeria’s 
National Assembly website. Seventy-four bills were reportedly tabled before the 
1999–2003 assembly, 298 bills were reportedly tabled before the 2003–2007 fifth 
assembly, 757 bills were recorded against the 2007–2011 sixth assembly and 238 
bills were recorded against the 2011–2015 seventh National Assembly.
 The Legislature and Legislation 1999–2015
As stated elsewhere (Muheeb 2016a, b, c), the prolonged years of authoritarian rule 
devoid of legislative institution afforded the executive the benefit of sustained via-
bility, established order of public service, visibility and prominence over the legis-
lature. The political instability occasioned by military incursion, disrupted the 
immediate post-independence representative rule and the nurturing of a vibrant and 
enduring legislative and democratic culture. Hence, a preponderance of political 
actors crave for conquest, command, obedience and loyalty as opposed to cordiality, 
mutuality, tolerance, bargaining and compromise that could have enhanced institu-
tional cohesion. This state of affairs was bolstered by the politics of godfatherism, 
in which prospective public office seekers weaved their political aspirations around 
personalities and individuals with political and financial prowess to deliver victory 
by whatever means possible including taking the most extreme measures to grab 
power. The politics of personality has had damnable consequences for the much 
desired effective inter-institutional relationship, quality representation and effective 
government beginning 1999. The military background of the Republic tainted the 
disposition of political actors as exhibited by President Obasanjo in his disposition 
towards other political and governmental institutions and component units of the 
federation (El-Rufai 2013; Bugaje 2003). Nevertheless, the National Assembly 
recorded considerable successes in lawmaking and representation. It has risen up to 
the challenge of democratic consolidation when viewed against an empowered 
executive through prolonged military rule. In addition to scrutinising and passing 
annual budgets and supplementary appropriation bills, the legislature made inputs 
into the budgetary process, sometimes adjusting budget proposals made by the 
executive when and where considered necessary to meet exigent needs.
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Following Muheeb (2016a, b, c), the National Assembly for the legislative term 
1999–2003 exhibited traits of institutions in transition in the ways and manners it 
disposed of its legislative responsibilities and the ease with which it fell prey to 
occasional executive antics of the Obasanjo presidency. Principal officers in both 
chambers of the National Assembly were victims of impeachment campaigns on 
sundry allegations including financial impropriety, abuse of office and allied mis-
conduct depriving the two chambers the benefit of cohesion, leadership and institu-
tional stability. In the heat of the overbearing influence of the executive in what was 
popularly referred to as the era of “banana peel”, neither the Senate nor the House 
of Representatives was able to maintain its autonomy by managing its affairs inde-
pendent of external interference particularly from the executive. The chambers were 
enmeshed in both intra and inter-institutional politics with harvest of scandals and 
brinksmanship on account of inexperience in legislative practices and processes. 
There was the preponderance of single-party majority with People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) at majority advantage.
Thus, political party and executive dominance suffice, as legislators rode on the 
influence of influential party leaders with enormous goodwill to secure membership 
of the legislature, and this cuts across the most prominent political parties, namely 
the PDP, AD and APP. This culminated in poor perception of roles and responsibili-
ties by the lawmakers who supplanted loyalty to the system of rule by loyalty to 
primordial causes. Being political parties’ and executives’ appendages, the National 
Assembly became susceptible to external manipulation. There was competition 
between the legislators and executive officials on sundry issues like the execution of 
constituency projects (Muheeb 2016a, b). The legislature was not self-regulatory 
but institutionally weak. Although there were adequate constitutional provisions for 
the legislature to perform, it fell short of the requisite human and material resources 
to initiate and sustain independent action. Comparatively, the magnitude of intra- 
institutional conflicts was not comparable to full-blown crises witnessed across the 
State assemblies though, yet infightings festered among the transitional National 
Assemblies of 1999–2003, and 2003–2007. They manifested in the ease and fre-
quency of deployment of impeachment, which accounted for the high turnover of 
leadership and principal officers (Muheeb 2016a, b).
The legislature, nonetheless, recorded considerable success in lawmaking. In 
addition to a number of crucial motions, the record of which was not readily avail-
able to this author, no fewer than 248 bills were reportedly enacted by the fourth, 
fifth, sixth and the seventh national assemblies, 1999–2015, as available on the 
Nigeria’s National Assembly website. This figure represents 18.14% of the total 
number 1367 of bills tabled before the National Assembly during the period under 
review. From this figure, not less than 30 bills representing 41% of a total of 74 bills 
received were reportedly enacted by the 1999–2003 assembly, 94 bills representing 
32% of a total of 298 bills received were reportedly enacted by the 2003–2007 fifth 
assembly, 70 bills representing 9.24% of a total of 757 bills received were report-
edly enacted by the 2007–2011 sixth assembly, and 54 bills representing 23% of a 




The legislature complemented the federal government’s economic reform initia-
tives with the passing of such bills as the Sovereign Wealth Bill, the Freedom of 
Information (FOI) Bill, Money Laundering and Antiterrorism bills, Income Tax Bill 
and other crucial bills that were of significance to the economy (Oluwole 2011a, b, 
c). Aiyede (2006) recalls that the National Assembly passed the Niger-Delta 
Development Commission bill and the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Act into laws on the strength of their two-thirds majority power even against presi-
dential assent on both bills by Obasanjo. The legislature played prominent roles in 
shaping the business environment. The National Assembly particularly helped to 
resolve sensitive issues of national importance including long pending onshore–off-
shore dichotomy that has been a subject of controversy between the federal govern-
ment, the component units and the oil-producing areas. The National Assembly, 
however, could not ensure the passage of the all-important Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB), which holds greater promises for the oil and gas sector of the economy, being 
a legal framework capable of addressing the rot in the industry.
Going by Oluwole’s (2011a, b, c) account, the legislature worked towards effect-
ing comprehensive amendments to the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act 
2010. The legislature has been a major stabiliser in the nation’s fragile and fledgling 
democracy. The National Assembly has to its credit the invocation of the Doctrine 
of Necessity that launched President Goodluck Jonathan to power as the Nigeria’s 
president following the death of the incumbent, Alhaji Umar Yar’Adua. Passing 
such bills as the Sovereign Wealth bill, the FOI bill, money laundering and antiter-
rorism bills, income tax bill and other crucial ones that would affect the economy 
and Nigerians positively speak volumes of the significant contributions of the legis-
lature to national development (Oluwole 2011a, b, c). The two chambers of the 
National Assembly have since been maintaining consistent leadership stability, and 
away from the initial compromising posture, they have been more assertive, insinu-
ations of executive inducements and occasional blackmail notwithstanding (Muheeb 
2016a, b).
On lawmaking, much of the landmark bills to the credit of the legislature have 
been highlighted in the previous sections of this chapter, and to avoid repetition, 
other bills of national importance would be touched on in this section. The passage 
of the Anti-Same Sex Bill, prohibiting marriage of people of the same sex in all 
parts of Nigeria, was quite remarkable among a number of other bills during the 
Seventh Assembly. Deliberation on the bill and its eventual passage by the Seventh 
Assembly was highly controversial, as lawmakers were subjected to intense pres-
sure from the international community for legislative actions on the bill to be jetti-
soned. The lawmakers were, however, resolute in seeing to the eventual passage of 
the bill, which has since been assented to by President Jonathan, thus making gay 
and lesbian marriage in Nigeria illegal. Another bill which stipulates capital punish-
ment for anyone found guilty of terrorist acts was also successful pursued.
The Terrorism Prohibition Bill was passed in 2013 and was assented to by the 
president. The Pension Reform (Amendment) Bill 2014, which phased out the old 
Pension Reform Act promulgated during the Obasanjo regime, was meant to eliminate 
all forms of bottlenecks associated with delays in payments and attendant  frustration 
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experienced by retirees in the course of waiting endlessly for and during verification 
and allied exercises. The amendment in the new bill, which has since been signed into 
a law, requires retirees to register with the retirement savings account (RSAs) into 
which their employers and employees will jointly contribute pension on a monthly 
basis. The funds managed by pension administrators can only be accessed after retire-
ment. The bill also reduces the years of experience of the Director-General of Pension 
Commission (PENCOM) from 20 to 15 years.
 Concluding Remarks
There is no gainsaying the fact that the legislature has undergone several changes in 
major functions, composition, operational efficiency and administrative infrastruc-
ture since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999. In spite of the com-
plexity of its operational environment, particularly the increasingly fluid party 
platforms, the palpable determination to be self-regulatory is reassuring with sus-
tained reform of requisite legal framework as well as commitment to internalising 
best practices. Viewed against the background of a false start in 1999, the legislature 
has played quite significant roles in stabilising the polity, validating its democratic 
identity and updating its representative credentials. During the period 1999–2003, 
the Fourth legislature was almost ineffective, as it was practically overshadowed by 
the executive. It has continued to improve subsequently through Fifth, Sixth into the 
Seventh legislature at the national and subnational levels. However, the legislature’s 
increasing reinvigoration contributed significantly to the increasing recurrent expen-
diture across levels; yet there are adequate justifications for the optimism that a 
constitutional representative government through enduring legislative institutions is 
being entrenched (Muheeb 2016a).
Barkan’s (2008) edited volume on Legislative Power in Emerging African 
Democracies, which revolves around the question of whether more democracy 
leads to stronger legislatures, or stronger legislatures lead to more democracy, 
attests to the significant improvement in the National Assembly’s representative 
credentials. The study acknowledged that, when viewed against other legislatures 
across sub-Saharan Africa, the Nigeria’s National Assembly was becoming rela-
tively stronger as the country strived to consolidate its democratisation process. The 
complementary role of the National Assembly Service Commission in making the 
legislature self-regulatory cannot be overemphasised. Much the same was the insti-
tution of the Institute of Legislative Studies for capacity building and allied services 
to the legislature. The legislature demonstrated its resolve to hold executive account-
able resulting in the deployment of impeachment threat, without which the execu-
tive would possibly have assumed dictatorial tendencies. Barkan’s (2008) volume, 
nonetheless, canvassed for the reformation of the legislatures. It opines that build-
ing legislative capacity requires changes to the rules that structure legislative–exec-
utive relations coupled with provision of commensurate resources both to the 
legislature as an institution and to the legislators as individuals. The transformation 
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of the  legislature also requires a revisit of the issue of campaign finance. The pursuit 
of election and re-election into the legislatures often makes legislators vulnerable to 
financial inducements from the executive and patronage from overbearing party 
leaders, which invariably hinders legislators’ independence in the discharge of their 
official duties to the detriment of their mandates (Muheeb 2016a).
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The necessity to curb the despotic tendencies of human nature and ensure good 
governance is the core of doctrine of Separation of Powers. Indeed, a major ingredi-
ent of democracy is the institutional compartmentalisation of governmental powers 
in such a way as to ensure that the same group of people or institution is not saddled 
with the responsibilities of law-making, law execution and law interpretation. This 
implies that there should be three separate organs/arms of government with their 
separate sets of functions and powers in a democratic system. Thus, the need to limit 
the powers of each of the various organs of government is at the centre of constitu-
tional democracy using the instrumentality of compartmentalization of governmen-
tal powers (Omotoso and Oladeji 2015). To be sure, government performs its role of 
effective governance by dividing its powers and functions between distinct institu-
tions and personnel, with each performing some specific but interrelated and some-
times overlapping functions (Edosa and Azelama 1995, italics added).
Essentially, the legislature makes authoritative policies/laws for the smooth run-
ning and administration of the stat. The executive gives meaning to the legislations 
or policies through enforcement. The essence of which is to ensure that that the 
governed are provided good living condition and environment. To ensure compli-
ance with the policy content, the legislature follows up during implementation of 
the policies and measures approved or promulgated by the body. The ultimate goal 
of which is to ensure good quality of life of all its citizenry. The judiciary organ is 
the third arm of government and its main role is to interpret the laws, as well as 
arbitrate any disputes that may arise from the processes of authoritatively making 
and executing governmental decisions (Omotoso and Oladeji 2015). However, there 
are inbuilt checks and balances mechanisms under the principle of separation of 
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powers. To be sure, through the power of interpretation, the courts can declare laws 
made by the legislature unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 
On the other hand, the legislature has the power of oversight over the execution and 
administration of laws by the executive. The executive holds the powers of 
investigation, coercion and implementation of laws and can as well use these powers 
to call the legislature and judiciary to order (Onyekpere 2012).
In the main, the legislature is an essential constituent of any democratic govern-
ment and a major factor in its sustenance. In fact, its existence predates modern 
democracy. For instance, it has been noted that the emergence of the legislature 
dates back to the twelfth century and a product of medieval European civilization 
transformed in the age of democracy to suit the needs of contemporary political 
systems (Loewenberg 1995, p. 736). Boynton (2003, p. 279) notes that...constitu-
tions incorporate national legislature to replace extant governing institutions 
throughout the world and that the influence of legislature continues to be on the 
rise in twenty-first century. Similarly, Yaqub (2004) contends that the “popularity 
of the legislature cannot be divorced from the wave of democratic growth across 
the continents. And that if democracy is a system anchored on the informed and 
active participation of the people, the legislature is a vehicle for equal and wider 
representation”.
From the foregoing analysis, the legislature as the representatives of the citizens 
could be seen as the hallmark of a democratic government. It must however be 
noted that across political systems, legislatures differ in composition and relationship 
with the executive arm of government. While there is fusion of power between the 
legislature and the executive in a parliamentary government, there is a clear power 
separation between the two in a presidential government. Despite the variations in 
composition and structure across political systems, two cardinal principles are 
common to all legislatures–representation and law-making. As representative of the 
citizens, the legislature not only makes laws, but also acts as a watchdog on the 
other arms of government, especially the executive. Indeed, the legislative oversight 
and representational duties are critical to sustainable development, good, responsible 
and accountable government (Usman 2015).
The survival of any democracy and its ability to propel development depends 
largely on the capacity of the legislature not only to make good laws for the ordering 
of the society, but also to ensure that the laws so enacted are not violated by the other 
arms of government, especially the executive (Poteete 2010). Often time, the legis-
lature does this through oversight and scrutiny of administration. In presidential 
democracy, the power to invite members of cabinet, policy implementation agency 
of the state and investigate executive excesses or its application of resources is a 
major weapon in the hands of the legislature to ensure accountability and transpar-
ency in government. Therefore, legislature could be regarded as the custodian of 
sustainable democracy, good governance and development. In other words, if well 
applied legislative oversight could serve as a bulwark against executive reckless-
ness, encourages checks and balances; enthrones fiscal discipline, good governance, 
accountability and transparency in public offices. Indeed, the importance of legisla-
tive oversight in a democracy cannot be over emphasised, especially in a new 
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democracy where the legislative institution is relatively young and the legislative 
culture is absent due to the prolonged military rule (Ewuim et al. 2014). This is more 
so in Nigeria where democracy has been very infrequent and legislative hiatus has 
been the rule. Indeed, the current fourth republic is unique in Nigeria because, 
unlike the first, second and the aborted third republics, where both the democracy 
and the legislative institution collapsed in less than six years of existence, the cur-
rent fourth republic has lasted for two decades. This calls for some scholarly evalu-
ation of the institution considered as the pillar of democracy. However, in this 
chapter our focus is on oversight function of the Nigerian national assembly.
Consequently, from the foregoing, the following questions can be raised: To 
what extent has the legislature been performing its oversight functions in Nigeria, 
especially since the country returned to democracy about two decades ago? Could 
the governance and development crises confronting the Nigerian state be seen as a 
result of failure of the legislature to perform its oversight functions? Does the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution empower the legislature to perform oversight functions 
optimally? How can the legislature be strengthened in the discharge of its oversight 
functions? These and more questions are what we attempt to provide answers to in 
this chapter.
 Historical Evolution of Legislature and Oversight Roles 
in Nigeria
The Nigerian state, as presently constituted, was a creation of the British colonial-
ists. The state evolved in piecemeal through various phases, which started at the 
Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 where the scrambling European Powers partitioned 
African territory among themselves. The geographic territory that would later 
become Nigeria fell under the British control. However, arguably Nigeria became a 
state in the real sense of the world in 1914 with the amalgamation of the hitherto 
separately administered North and South Protectorates. The amalgamation thus 
completed the colonial process of state creation by bringing together the two 
protectorates under the same national colonial government.
In the same vein, it is colonialism to which the modern legislative institution in 
Nigeria owes its origin. But, it must be stated here that the above statement does not 
suggest that there were no institutions of governance in traditional Nigeria prior to 
colonialism. Indeed, many traditional Nigerian societies had well developed 
structures and institutions of state before the advent of colonialism. A good example 
here is the Yoruba democratic traditional city-states (Atanda 1973; Omotoso and 
Oladeji Forthcoming; Oyediran 2003). To be sure, the Yoruba traditional system of 
government was highly democratic with the decision of Alaafin subjected to the 
approval of the constituents and oversight of a group of Kingmakers (the Oyomesi) 
and the Ogboni cult group. It must be emphasised that the Oyomesi performed rotes 
similar to modern day parliamentarians in a democratic setting.
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However, with the advent of colonialism, everything in Africa that was not exotic 
or derived from western model was depicted as bad. The African traditional mode of 
governance underpinned by religious beliefs and practices was the principal culprit 
and was discarded, except where it served the extractive and domineering tendencies 
of the colonialists (Omotoso and Oladeji Forthcoming). Thus, the emergence of the 
legislature in Nigeria could be traced to the 1914 Lugardian Advisory Council con-
sisting of 36 members that were handpicked by the colonial masters to serve colonial 
interests. While the Advisory Council lacked real legislative powers, the real attempt 
at instituting a legislature with legislative powers was under the 1922 Clifford 
Constitution, which also introduced elective principles that allowed Nigerians to be 
elected into the central legislative body. From this point on, legislative structures are 
provided for in subsequent Nigerian constitutions. However, it must be noted that 
despite constitutional provisions for legislatures under colonial constitutions, the 
legislatures could not exercise any oversight of the colonial government other than 
serving as rubberstamps for colonial policies in most cases. In fact, under colonial-
ism, the executive assumed prominence and dominated governance at the expense of 
the legislature. A gradual constitutional reform introduced from 1946 climaxed with 
the transfer of power to the educated Nigerian political class in 1960.
Nigeria gained independence on 1st October 1960. Despite the political indepen-
dence, the executive arm of government continued to dominate governance at the 
expense of the legislature. Indeed, as argued by Basiru (2014, p. 86), “during the 
First Republic, despite the inclusion of parliamentary oversight in the 1960 
Constitution, the parliament hardly checked the executive.” The legislature was 
weak and lacked the capacity to scrutinise the executive. Some have attributed this 
to the fusion of power under the parliamentary arrangement of the first republic. The 
First Republican Constitution was terminated in a military coup and the countercoup 
of 196. The collapse of the republic in a manner that raises suspicious of ethnic 
cleansing plunged the country into a three year civil war between 1967 and 1970.
By the time the military was disengaging from politics in 1979, a presidential 
constitution was introduced. Thus, the 1979 Presidential Constitution, unlike the 
parliamentary constitution that predated it introduced separation of powers. To be 
sure, the 1979 Constitution in Section 4(1) vested the Legislative Powers of the 
Federation in a National Assembly consisted of a Senate and a House of 
Representatives (FRN 1979). The oversight powers of the national legislature under 
the 1979 Constitution relates to its control powers over Public Funds (see Sections 
55, 74, 76 and 77). Apart from this, the constitution empowered the National 
Assembly to conduct investigations into any matter or thing with respect to which it 
has powers to make laws and the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry 
or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of 
responsibility for executing or administering laws and disbursing or administering 
moneys (Section 82(1)). The constitution further gave the legislature power of 
evidence in Section 83.
However, despite the above constitutional provisions regarding legislative over-
sight powers, the Second Republic legislature still exhibited weakness like the first 
republic legislature in its relations with the executive. That is, though the National 
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Assembly retained its structure of representation, it had a relatively weak structure 
as the executive preferences shaped the political agenda and more importantly, the 
legislature did not exercise significant oversight of the executive or other govern-
ment operations (Basiru 2014, p. 87). It must be noted that by December 1983 the 
Second Republic too fell to a military coup led by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. Thus, 
another tortuous and long journey to democracy began with the military experiment-
ing with different political models, which came to head with the transition pro-
gramme of the Babangida-led military administration. The administration had 
elaborate transition programmes, which took off with the inauguration of the 
Political Bureau in January 1986. The transition became effective at the local, state 
and the National Assembly where civilians had taken over institutions of govern-
ment. However, the planned transition to civil rule by 27 August, 1993 became a 
stillbirth with the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election.
The annulment of the presidential election and the cancelation of the transition 
programme by the Babangida administration threw the whole country into chaos 
which culminated in Babangida stepping aside and hurriedly transferred power to 
an Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan on 26 
August, 1993. But by November of 1993 General Sani Abacha toppled the interim 
government in a bloodless coup. Under General Abacha, the transition to civil rule 
programme changed to self-succession plan as Abacha did all he could to suppress 
all politicians who showed interest in the presidency with a view to transmuting 
himself to a civilian president. However, the ambition was cut short by his sudden 
death on 8th June 1998. General Abdulsalami Abubakar that succeeded him quickly 
began another transition programme and by May 29, 1999 he successfully transferred 
power to democratically elected civilians under the 1999 Constitution. The new 
constitution was fashioned in line with the 1979 Constitution with very little 
modification.
It must be noted that between December 1983 (when the military took power) 
and May 1999 (that civilian regained political power in Nigeria), the legislature was 
abrogated and there was no institution to serve as the watchdog over the executive 
or call the executive to account. Thus, over the period under review, the legislature 
was infrequent, immature and inconsistent vis-a-vis the executive. It was under this 
state of legislative experience that the Fourth Republic legislature was inaugurated 
in 1999. But before examining the oversight performance of the legislature under 
the current Fourth Republic, it is wise to first examine some constitutional provisions 
of legislative oversight under the 1999 Constitution.
 The 1999 Constitution and the Legislative Oversight 
Functions
The extent to which the legislature of any state can shape governance and public 
policy as well as initiate reforms and push them to successful end depends on the 
constitutional provisions. The constitution as the ground norm sets parameter of 
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behaviour in any polity and demarcates the sphere of powers and or influences of 
each arm of government. A presidential constitution like that of Nigeria 
compartmentalizes governmental powers and institutions into three distinct arms 
with the executive, the legislature and the judiciary draw their powers from the 
constitution (See Sections 4–6 of 1999 Constitution, as amended). Indeed, the 
Section 4(1) of 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers of the Federation in a 
National Assembly, which comprises of a Senate and a House of Representatives. 
The constitution thus provides for a bicameral legislature with the composition of 
the Senate based on equal representation of three Senators from each State and one 
from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the House of Representatives 
composed of three hundred and sixty members representing constituencies of nearly 
equal population (See Sections 48 and 49). Specifically, Subsection 2 of Section 4 
of the 1999 Constitution invests National Assembly with “power to make laws for 
the peace, order and good governance of the federation …’ (FRN 1999).
The Constitution also gives National Assembly powers and control over public 
funds and other matters such as: the establishment of revenue fund, authorization of 
expenditure from consolidated revenue fund, authorization of expenditure in default 
appropriations, contingencies fund, remuneration etc. of the President and certain 
other officers, appointment of Auditor-General among others. Furthermore the 
constitution empowers the legislature to prescribe how money could be withdrawn 
from the federation account. Thus, the legislature is constitutionally empowered to 
control government purse and this allows it to shape government policies and 
programmes (Saffell 1989; Verney 1969).
This is achieved through legislative power to debate, deliberate, mould and/or 
amends the annual budgetary appropriation proposal by the executive. Also, the 
power to impose tax or duty is vested in the National Assembly, according to Section 
163 of the 1999 constitution. Due to many challenges in the country such as: long 
history of military rule, lack of institutional accountability, corruption, 
mismanagement of national resources and dysfunctional public policy, the role of 
legislature in budgetary appropriation proposal is of essence in the Nigerian 
democratic system. Moreover, the oversight of the executive by the legislature is 
provided for in Section 88 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that:
each House of the National Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its jour-
nal or in the Official Gazette of the government of the Federation to direct or cause to be 
directed an investigation into (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to 
make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government 
department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for (i) 
executing or Administering laws enacted by the National Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or 
administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly” 
(Section 88, Sub-sections 1(a)-(b) and 2(a)-(b)). Sub-section 2(a)-(b) of the same Section 
88 provides that “the powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of 
the section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to (a) make laws with respect 
to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and 
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws 
within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds 
appropriated by it(FRN 1999).
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Furthermore, Section 89 of the Constitution endows legislature with the power of 
investigation. According to Section 88, the legislature is authorised to procure evi-
dence, invite and examine persons as witnesses to give evidence but such evidence 
must be given on oath. In addition, it is constitutionally empowered to summon 
persons to procure additional documentary or oral evidence and (where necessary) 
issue warrant to compel attendance by any person so required, and punish those who 
fail to honour such summon. From the foregoing constitutional provisions, it could 
be seen that the legislature is saddled with the responsibilities of ensuring good 
governance particularly prudency, fiscal discipline, efficient service delivery and 
rule of law in the country. Moreover, legislature is empowered to intervene in the 
judicial administration as shown in Section 233 and Sub-section 21 of the 1999 
Constitution as amended. The legislature could override executive veto on any bill 
by using its two-thirds majority power to pass the bill into law. Therefore, such bills 
passed in this manner do no longer require presidential assent to become law 
(Fashagba 2013).
In the main, the legislative oversight functions of the legislature can be graphi-
cally presented under the following thematic headings.
The Power to Make Approval To ensure good governance and public trust in the 
democratic process the legislature is empowered to perform certain oversight of the 
executive through approval powers of the former over some policies of the latter. For 
instance, it is mandatory for the President to send the list of nominees for top gov-
ernment positions to the legislature for scrutiny and approval/rejection before such 
appointment could be made. For the first time under the fourth republic, the exercise 
of this power has been challenged by the Buhari-led administration, following the 
senate rejection of the executive nominee for the chairmanship of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) by the Senate. The president has disregarded 
the constitution by retaining a rejected nominee as the head of the EFCC. Also, 
certain governmental policy proposals must be sent to the legislature which will 
properly examine and debate them before they are passed into law or otherwise. 
These may include: proposal to raise funds through loan, ratification of treaties and/
or bilateral agreements with other countries, the need to carry out or embark on 
some policies, especially the ones that may not have been provided for in the consti-
tutions, approval to embark on the establishment of developmental projects and pro-
grammes, etc. That is, as a watchdog to the other arms of the government (Executive 
and judiciary), the legislature must be alert to its responsibilities and be ready at all 
times to treat all issues fairly and without sentiment and must be shielded from 
executive preponderance through financial strangulation and intimidation to force 
the legislature to support its policy proposals at all times.
The Power to Conduct Investigations The essence of the legislature conducting 
investigations on those matters appropriated to it by law is to ensure or make its 
legislation apparently effective for good governance. The national assembly has 
from time to time used this power to investigate the departments, ministries and 
agencies of government. In recent time, the investigation of subsidy disbursement in 
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2012, the utilisation of the subsidy re-investment funds and SURE-P fund in 2018 
and others are clear examples of the power of the central assembly to investigate the 
executive organ. Aside the constitutional provisions, is an established democratic 
practice for the legislature to conduct investigations for the good governance of the 
country, but the question is, how effective and transparent is the legislative houses 
in carrying out these investigations?
Impeachment as an Instrument to Guarantee Good Governance One of the 
most important constitutional responsibilities assigned to the legislature in the 
legislative processes, which gives room for good governance and constitutes a 
subtle check on executive excesses and discretion is perhaps the impeachment 
power. The impeachment of the Chief Executives and their deputies is one of the 
highest sanctions given to these elected officers, which must not be based on 
sentiments, but on evidence of gross misconduct or bad governance. Away from the 
impeachment of the Chief Executives and their deputies, impeachment could also 
be carried on the principal officers of the legislature, which include the Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President and the Deputy 
President of the Senate. While there has not been any case of executive President 
being impeached in Nigeria, there are cases of impeached Governors, Deputy 
Governors, Senate Presidents, and Speakers of State House of Assemblies (Nkwede, 
Ibeogu and Nwankwo 2014). Worthy of note is that most of these impeachments are 
done not to improve governance but are mostly to settle cheap political scores and 
most of them never complied with constitutional provisions.
Supervision and Monitoring of Projects by the Legislature Another oversight 
function of the legislature to ensure good governance is through supervision and 
monitoring of projects and programmes embarked upon by the executive arm of 
government. Constitutionally, the executive is saddled with the responsibilities of 
executing developmental projects through the use of funds appropriated by the 
legislature. On the other hand, the executive is monitored and kept under constant 
surveillance by the legislature. The legislature is charged to check, raise questions 
and where necessary directs the executive through the political heads (ministers) of 
various ministries to appear before the appropriate committees of the parliament or 
on the floor of the house to defend allegations levelled against their ministries, 
especially as relates to performance or compliance with the laws. Thus, Akintola 
(1999, p. 52) argues that supervision of the executive by the legislature, sometime 
assumes the nature of legislative control when exercised through questions addressed 
to ministers or through the rejection of executive proposal or bill forwarded to the 
Houses of parliament. Therefore, this makes the executive arm, under democratic 
settings to live up to its responsibility and ensure good governance.
Effective Representation as a Responsibility of the Legislature As the represen-
tatives of the people, it is expected of the parliamentarians to provide effective repre-
sentation to the electorates by taking decisions or making laws that are not detrimental 
to the survival of the electorates. This must have informed the emergency seating 
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convened by the 7th House of Representatives on Sunday 8th January, 2012 to move 
against the deregulation of the downstream sector of the Petroleum Industry and the 
increase of pump price of Premium Motor Spirit (P.M.S) by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s 
led government from sixty-five Naira (N65.00) to one hundred and forty-one naira 
(N141.00). The intervention of the lower chamber and the mass protests of various 
coalitions of civil society organizations (CSOs) forced the government to reduce the 
price to ninety-seven naira (N97.00). Also, the legislators as elected representatives 
of the people must constantly be closer to the people they represent with a view to 
educating them adequately about the activities of government.
The Power to Raise and Control the Spending of Public Fund (Budget) In a bid 
to ensure that government (the executive) performs her statutory responsibility of 
catering for the welfare of the people, the law empowered the legislature to ensure 
effective management of public fund. The legislature also has great influence 
(monitoring and supervision) over the borrowing powers of the state. All these are 
to ensure prudent management of public fund and promotion of good governance. 
To be sure, Section 81(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “the President shall 
cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any 
time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the 
federation for the next following financial year.” Also, Section 80(2–4) provides that 
no moneys can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any public 
fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure for which such funds are meant 
through Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act or an Act passed by 
the National Assembly. In line with the legislative powers of the legislature to raise 
and control public spending, section 59(2) of the 1999 Constitution states that where 
there are differences between the proposal and amendments made by the Senate and 
House of Representatives, a joint Finance Committee of the two Houses shall be 
convened by the Senate President, to resolve the differences. The final version 
mutually agreed to by the joint finance committee must be referred to each of the 
two Houses (sitting jointly or separately) for approval, before it is sent to the 
President for assent.
 Assessing Legislative Oversight in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: 
1999–2015
There is no doubt that the National assembly is invested with enormous constitu-
tional powers. The legislature has absolute power to determine its internal opera-
tions (as stipulated in section 101 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution). It is equally 
empowered to shape and influence government policies, programmes and policy 
reforms. However, the effective use of these powers determines its societal rele-
vance (Fashagba 2013).
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Legislative oversight is not only the tool used to ensure compliance with legisla-
tive intents by the executive for effective service delivery; it equally constitutes the 
core function of the legislative assembly on governance and public office manage-
ment in any democratic system. This is not different in Nigeria where legislative 
power as shown in section 88 of the 1999 Constitution gives the National Assembly 
the requisite legal and constitutional backing among other things to: assemble infor-
mation on proposed Bill, prevent or expose corruption, inefficiency or wastage in 
the implementation of laws within its legislative competence and in the disburse-
ment and administration of funds appropriated by it.
It must be noted that the Nigeria’s National Assembly has demonstrated capacity 
and capability in exercising its constitutional power since 1999. It has exposed cor-
rupt practices among the officials in both executive and legislative arms of govern-
ment. For examples, the mismanagement of Petroleum Technology Development 
Funds PTDF and shady deals associated with this particularly by the former presi-
dent Obasanjo and his deputy, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar were exposed by the National 
Assembly. This is in addition to the discrepancies in power sector spending between 
1999 and 2007. The committee of the lower house had in 2007 exposed massive 
misappropriation of funds meant for the national power project. The misappropria-
tion of the oil subsidy funds was also exposed by a committee of senate in 2012. The 
on-going investigation into the spending of the subsidy re-investment funds and the 
SURE-P funds may likely expose more rot in the executive organ. Similarly, many 
of the principal officers of the upper legislative assembly were at one time or the 
other relieved of their positions as a result of confirmed sharp practices ranging from 
corruption, certificate forgery and the likes. Such indicted officers included Evan 
Enwerem, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, Salisu Buhari, etc. However, some of them have 
been pardoned by the state. But the truth of the matter is that their indictments were 
based on the successful investigations undertaken by the National Assembly to 
expose abuse of power in government. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there were 
instances where members of the National Assembly compromised the confidence 
reposed in them. This no doubt often eroded the capability of the institution to serve 
as safeguard against corrupt practices in government (Fashagba 2009).
The National Assembly is seen as cesspool of scandals which constraint its over-
sight functions, limit its capability to impact positively on the society and resulted 
in the removal of at least three Senate Presidents and two Speakers of the House of 
Representatives between 1999 and 2009 (Bello-Imam 2005). Consequently, the 
oversight functions of the legislature or its investigative power has attracted some 
degree of criticisms by Nigerians due to obvious abuse of this time tested and essen-
tial parliamentary mechanism. In some cases, most legislators at the National 
Assembly see legislative oversight function as a short-cut to richness. This is a very 
wrong perception of parliamentary tool. It is worrisome because it negates the 
principle of good governance (Nwagwu 2014).
To give fillip to this is the undue struggle and lobby by many legislators who also 
employ several shady tactics to be committee’s chair or membership of supposed 
‘juicy committees’. The essence of this is to use the position for personal 
aggrandisement from government parastatals and departments under their 
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supervision. To achieve this desire, they resort to humiliation and intimidation of 
their prey (government officers) and forced them to do the biddings of the legislators. 
There are cases where ministries, parastatals, agencies and other organizations that 
are supposed to be under the ‘supervision’ of the legislature end up sponsoring the 
law-makers and their nuclear families, paying for their overseas trips and others. 
Indeed, the legislature has reduced this all important constitutional responsibility to 
mere alarm mechanism being used sometimes to blackmail or witch-hunt political 
opponents, extort money from the ministries, departments and agencies under its 
supervision for selfish or personal aggrandizement (Nwagwu 2014). The case of 
bribery scandal of 620,000 US Dollars between ‘Honourable’ Farouk Lawan, 
Chairman, House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel 
Subsidy and the Chairman of Zenon Oil and Gas readily comes to mind here. In the 
course of probing into an alleged 1.3 trillion naira fuel subsidy scam involving some 
oil importing companies, The Chairman, Zenon Oil had alleged that the chairman of 
the investigative committee had demanded and received US$500,000 as gratification 
from him with a view to removing the name of his companies from those being 
investigated. Although, the allegation was denied by the legislator initially but he 
later admitted that the money was meant to be reported and serve as an exhibit 
against his accuser. The case is presently in a court where the legislator is facing 
prosecution over abuse of office. The bribery allegation was in its entirety a negation 
of the legislative oversight function, particularly on its resolve to ensure probity, 
accountability and transparency in the conduct of its business.
Putting the above legislative misnomer into perspective, Akomolede and Bosede 
(2012) argue that:
The legislature is truly not independent of the executive and therefore, is often incapacitated 
from acting as the watchdog of executive activities. Thus, the inordinate ambition of 
members and leadership of the legislative houses often see them hob-nobbing with the 
executive such that valuable time for law-making is lost in the process of lobbying for juicy 
leadership positions and committees in the legislative houses. It is common knowledge that 
a good number of members of the legislative houses pursue pure selfish interests that often 
inhibit them from combating the challenges of lawmaking. Members pursue contracts from 
the leadership of the houses and even from the executive such that they easily compromise 
when it comes to contributing meaningfully to debates on the floor of the house. At times, 
some members resort to absenteeism from the floor of the house and do not participate at 
all in the proceedings. Again, many of the legislators have ambitions to contest for leadership 
positions in the house or membership and chairman of juicy committees. A lot of valuable 
legislative time is wasted while pursuing these ambitions.
A good case of such legislative rascality and activities by some members of the 
legislature is that of House of Representatives Committee on Capital Market and 
Institutions investigations into the corruption charges preferred against the former 
Director-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Ms. Aruma 
Oteh in 2012. The report of the investigation showed that as part of its statutory 
oversight functions, the House Committee probed the cause of the near collapse of 
the Capital Market for two years running. However, instead of relying on available 
evidence, the Committee resulted to intimidation to compel and bring the Director- 
General of SEC to her knees. It was alleged that the House Committee Chairman 
Legislative Oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic
68
(Mr. Herman Hembe) resorted to unguarded utterances on the accused thus: “you 
are not fit to regulate the sector”. The Committee Chairman allegedly accused Ms 
Oteh of profligacy, asserting that she had “been spending money as if it was going 
out of fashion since assuming office one year ago’. “You stayed in a hotel for eight 
months and spent over N30 million”. “In one day you spent N85,000 on food at the 
hotel. The other day you spent N850,000 on food”. “These are the things we should 
look at to see how you will regulate a market that is collapsing” (The Nation, March 
21, 2012, p. 2). The accusations and counter-accusations of corruption between the 
DG SEC and the Committee Chairman over the Chairman’s demand for N39 Million 
contribution to a public hearing and N5 million for himself from the SEC marred 
the investigation and showed how some legislators could use all means to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the state and the people who elected them as their 
representatives.
Aguda (2012) made reference to the time-honoured procedure for the conduct of 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings which has long been well established by the 
courts in all the common law countries, including Nigeria. The procedure requires 
that any person against whom any allegation is made, or whose interest may be 
adversely affected by such allegation, or by any statement made, must be clearly and 
fully informed of such allegations or statements in advance of any trial or investiga-
tion involving the accused (http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index/php/
politics/48492-national-assembly.html). Aguda (2012) observed that in carrying out 
the statutory legislative oversight function, had the Committee Chairman followed 
the requisite judicial requirement to give the accused prior notice of the charges he/
she was going to face at the trial, he would have found out, as the accused subse-
quent defence might have indicated, that she had plausible explanations for the alle-
gations the House Committee Chairman was making against her.
Thus, the legislative oversight process in Nigeria shows that the legislature has 
not lived up to the expectation of Nigerians in terms of administrative scrutiny that 
will guarantee good governance for the benefit of all and sundry. Some of the 
legislators are driven more by personal gain and the desires for wealth accumulation 
(Akomolede and Bosede 2012; Kadir n.d.).
 Challenges of Legislative Oversight in the Fourth Republic
From the foregoing assessment of legislative oversight in Nigeria, it is obvious that 
a lot still needs to be done by the legislature to ensure and/or promote good 
governance in Nigeria. However, the oversight function of the legislature is faced 
with a lot of challenges that must be addressed if the legislature must be able to 
perform effectively its oversight of the executive and thus contribute meaningfully 
to democratic good governance in Nigeria. Some of these challenges are thematically 
assess below.
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Dysfunctional Democratic Culture Nigerian democracy is still far from being 
consolidated as the evidence of military hangover still manifest from time to time. 
Basic democratic principles like rule of law, free and fair elections and institutional 
accountability are still rarity. This has resulted in the weakening of democratic 
culture, structures and institutions. Thus, the legislature as a major institution of 
democracy has been at the receiving end and has therefore often attracted negative 
comments and dim view from the public. As a result of some of its actions, the 
executive often treats institution with disdain (Egwu 2005).
Political Culture of Corruption A corollary to the above is an entrenched culture 
of corruption in Nigeria, itself a consequence of the several years of military (mis)
rule. As noted earlier in this chapter, it is often the case that legislators in the 
discharge of their oversight duties are more interested in financial gains accruable to 
them than ensuring good governance through such duties. The implication of this is 
that investigations into any issue bothering on governance cannot be subjected to 
thorough scrutiny in the best interest of Nigerians so long as the ministries/
departments of government concern know how to ‘settle’.
Interference with Legislative Oversight Functions by the Executive As 
observed earlier in this work, the legislature is adequately empowered by the 
constitution to perform oversight functions and act as the watchdog of the executive. 
Again, the legislature must screen and approve certain appointees of the executive. 
The legislature is further empowered to even remove the President, Vice President, 
Governor and the Deputy Governor through impeachment procedure provided for 
in the constitution. It is however disheartening to say that the exercise of the above 
functions to ensure good governance for the benefit of all and sundry is often 
interfered with and hampered by the executive. This is done, first and foremost, by 
the executive ensuring that their cronies are elected as the leaders of the two 
chambers. Executive interference manifests in some covert excessive politicking, 
and occasionally it deployed the needed funds and logistics to install a pliant 
legislator in leadership position. Also, where the legislature musters enough courage 
and ventures to carry out any of the oversight functions, the executive often resorts 
to the use of money to pursue a ‘divide and rule’ agenda to create a crack among the 
legislators. The effect of the game is that good governance is denied to Nigerians 
who are entitled to have same (Aiyede 2005).
Personal Interests of the Legislators It is common knowledge that a good num-
ber of members of the legislative houses at both federal and state levels pursue pure 
selfish interests that are often at variance with the primary roles. Where personal 
interest override collective interest, as occasionally seen in the national assembly, 
the system will be undermined and legislative efficiency will be compromised. The 
foregoing challenges, amongst others, have largely robbed Nigerians the opportunity 
of enjoying good governance through effective and efficient legislative oversight of 
the executive. The actions or inactions of the national assembly has in turn resulted 
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in a situation in which the state has failed state to move in the right direction and 
deliver necessary democratic goods.
 Conclusion and Recommendations
Legislative oversight function is the mechanism through which the people in gov-
ernment are kept under watch (Nwagwu 2014). It aims at curbing waste, ineffi-
ciency, ineffectiveness, corruption, mismanagement of public resources, etc in 
governance. Oversight function is essentially valuable to a democracy in ensuring 
that the intent of the legislature in legislating laws that will improve the living 
standard of the people is reflected in the performance of the executive functions. 
Thus, to improve legislative oversight in Nigeria, the following are recommended:
There is need to observe and adhere to the basic tenets of the principle of separa-
tion of power as provided in the 1999 Constitution of the Federation as amended.
The legislature should be guided by professionalism and the globally tested leg-
islative working ethics. Ability to distinguish between private and public interests 
and resources will go a long way in enthroning necessary morality to guide official 
conducts. The interest of the country should override personal and legislative 
corporate interests of members. Congressional assignments should not serve as 
sources of exploitation to enrich individuals.
The legislators should see their membership in the legislature as a call to national 
duty which demands sacrifice, commitment to duty, sincerity of purpose in all 
aspects of governance and a demonstration of the true representatives of the people. 
Fraudulent enrichment must be abhorred because it is a total negation of social 
value, ethics of good governance, expectations and aspirations of the electorates.
The functions of the legislative oversight should advance beyond mere investiga-
tion and recommendation. There is need for constitutional and/or legal teeth to be 
structured for effective and efficient legislative oversight, as a watchdog on the exec-
utive arm and its agencies, to bite culprits or cause any persons found culpable to be 
sanctioned to serve as deterrent. The legislature should introduce some constitu-
tional power through the amendment of the constitution to be able to compel the 
executive arm of government or its representative to appear before the legislature or 
to take appropriate action to cause to be prosecuted any indicted individuals. This is 
only possible if the legislature can amend the constitution to separate the ministry of 
justice from the office of the attorney general of the federation.
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The notion that the legislature occupies a central position among the institutions of 
democratic governance seems to continuously enjoy the support of scholars, practi-
tioners and observers. The argument of the centrality of the legislature to democratic 
governance was supported by Blondel (1973) when he averred that democracy can-
not exist in any country without a healthy and lively legislature. While lending his 
voice to the argument, Murana (2018) noted the indispensability of legislative activ-
ity to the advancement of democracy. In the same manner, Bogaards (2007) and 
Poteete (2010) contended that the strength, composition and the state of the legisla-
ture is one of the strongest measures and predictors of a country’s democratic devel-
opment and survival. Similarly, the National Democratic Institute [NDI] (2006) sees 
democracy as dependent on the legislature. Furthermore, Oni (2013) pointed out 
that the legislature occupies a fundamental place in democratic governance and per-
forms the crucial role of citizens’ representation for the advancement and well-
being of the citizenry. Edosa and Azelama (1995) also noted that the nature of the 
legislature that is adopted determines whether a given political system is democratic 
or not. This is because while democracy has been defined in many different ways, 
depending on the influence of many factors including culture, tradition, ideology 
and politics, what is much less crucial is that citizens would like to have at least 
some meaningful say in how they are represented by their governments (Janzekovic 
2010).
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On this note, legislature is seen and known to be the heartbeat of democracy. Its 
functions are defined in term of lawmaking, representation, oversight and constituency 
related responsibilities, all of which are pivotal to the good health of democracy 
(Omotola 2014, p. 3). The legislature ensures that government operates and functions 
in such a manner that the ultimate goal is to meet the expectation of the governed. In 
addition, it also serves as an arena for reconciling differences in opinions about policy 
within the state; its oversight and representational duties are critical to sustainable 
development which is considered one of the ends of democracy. Thus, it is arguable to 
say that it is possible to have a government without the legislature, whereas there can 
never be a democracy without the legislature. As Muhammad (2007) rightly averred, 
the existence of an independent legislative institution made up of the representatives of 
the people is a distinctive hallmark of democratic government. It distinguishes a demo-
cratic government from an autocratic government; as both systems have the executive 
and judiciary arms. Legislatures are a symbol of popular representation. They join 
society to the legal structure of authority in the state. As representative bodies, they 
reflect the sentiments and opinions of the citizens. Thus, the legislature is the essence 
of representative democracy and this has made representation an important function of 
legislature. Perhaps, it is in the light of this that Fashagba (2009) sees the legislature as 
a link and bridge for information, communication and policy making between the 
constituents and the government. Thus, elected members respond to the needs and 
demands of people through legislations and policy making.
One of the distinctive features of modern legislatures centres on the fact that they 
are constituted by people chosen by the electorate to represent them. The elected 
Representatives therefore, are required to interact with their constituent members 
and as much as possible reflect the interests of their constituents in their general 
conducts and activities. It is against this backdrop that Esebagbon (2005, p.  3) 
argues that:
In a modern democracy today, the legislature evokes the idea of representative democracy, 
more than any other branch of government. Thus, democracy can only be sustained when 
legislatures have the will, ability and information to make decisions that reflect the interests 
and needs of the society. Similarly, the governed must have the will, ability and information 
to transmit their needs and interests to their legislators and to evaluate the performance of 
the legislators and the various parties and to reward or sanction their actions.
This assertion is a true reflection of the function of a legislature as a representative 
institution of governance in a democracy. To this end, if democracy is a system 
anchored on the informed and active participation of the people, the legislature is a 
vehicle for equal and wider representation (Yaqub 2004). However, as important as 
this role is, especially in a state like Nigeria where prolonged military regime has 
not only stifled mass participation in public decision-making but also reduced gov-
ernance to the affairs of a handful clique, the interest of the few scholars on legisla-
tive performance in Nigeria has been largely confined to its lawmaking and oversight 
functions (Fashagba 2009). Yet there is a real representational gap as observed by 
Fashagba (2009); Nijzink et al. (2006) that requires study and analysis to know the 
media of legislative–constituencies relations in Nigeria, the degree of utility of each 
medium of constituent relation and their effectiveness. With particular focus on 
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Nigeria, there is a gap in knowledge on legislators–constituencies relations. Thus, 
this chapter addresses the question of the legislator–constituency relations in 
Nigeria. How has the Nigerian legislators fared in the areas of constituencies proj-
ects, welfare packages and social responsibility? What have been their challenges in 
carrying out these assigned duties? And how can these challenges be mitigated?
 Conceptualizing the Legislature
Legislative arm of government is the most important organs of political representa-
tion. In fact some have erroneously argued that representative government is con-
fined to the election of members of the legislature, whose role purpose is ‘not to 
govern, but to watch and control the government’ (Fairlie 1940, p. 463) cited in 
(Edigheji 2006), which in this view comprises the administrative, executive and 
judicial officials. In modern times, however it is generally acknowledged that the 
legislative arms of government perform three important functions—they represent 
the electorate, make laws and oversee the executive. They also interact with con-
stituencies and citizens.
The term “legislature” has been given different names across nations of the 
world. It is referred to as parliament in Britain, National Assembly in Nigeria, 
Congress in the USA, Diet in Japan and Duma in Russia. Legislatures are, generally 
speaking, elective and accountable bodies. The legislature is an assemblage of the 
representatives of the people elected under a legal framework to make laws for the 
good health of the society. It is also defined as “the institutional body responsible for 
making laws for a nation and one through which the collective will of the people or 
part of it is articulated, expressed and implemented” (Okoosi-Simbine 2010, p. 1). 
The legislature controls through legislation all economic, social and political activi-
ties of the nation. It also scrutinizes the policies of the Executive and provides the 
framework for the judiciary to operate. Carey (2006) conceptualizes the legislature 
as a body with large membership that offers the possibility both to represent more 
accurately the range of diversity in the polity and to foster closer connections 
between representatives and voters.
To Anyaegbunam (2000), the legislature is the institution having the role of mak-
ing, revising, amending and repealing laws for the advancement and wellbeing of 
the citizenry that it represents. Lafenwa (2009) defines the legislature as an official 
body, usually chosen by election, with the power to make, change and repeal laws, 
as well as the power to represent the constituent units and control government. 
Okoosi-Simbine 2010 sees the legislature as the lawmaking, deliberative and policy 
influencing body working for the furtherance of democratic political system. He 
describes the legislature as the First Estate of the Realm, the realm of representation 
and the site of sovereignty, the only expression of the will of the people. It follows 
from this analysis that the authority of the legislature is derived from the people and 
should be exercise according to the will of the people that they represent. This is the 
position of Bogdanor (1991) when he affirms that the authority of the legislature as 
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a political institution is derived from a claim that the members are representative of 
the political community, and decisions are collectively made according to complex 
procedures. Similarly, Oni (2013) argues that the legislature is the primary mecha-
nism of popular sovereignty that provides for the representation in governance, of 
the diverse interests in a multicultural and sub-national society. Perhaps, it is in the 
light of this that Smith (1980) sees the legislature as the symbol of power and legiti-
macy because its decision is based on the collective wisdom of men and women 
who enjoy the confidence of the electorate.
Jewell (1997) on the other hand, identified legislation and representation as the 
features that distinguish the legislature from other branches of government. 
According to him, the legislature possesses formal authority to make laws, and 
members are normally elected to represent various elements in the population. It is 
on the acknowledgement of the representative role of the legislature that Carey 
(2006) argues that plural societies warrant representation of broad diversity within 
the legislature. Loewenberg (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010) seems to concede 
to this important notion of the legislature as the people’s representative when they 
view the legislature as assemblies of elected representatives from geographically 
defined constituencies, with lawmaking functions in the governmental process of a 
country. Thus, Davies (2004) averred that representative liberal democracy cannot 
exist without a healthy, lively and credible legislature. He noted that the establish-
ment of the legislature rests on the assumption that in the final analysis, political 
power still resides in the people and that the people can, if they choose, delegate the 
exercise of their sovereignty to elected representatives.
 Political Representation
Etymologically, the concept of representation in western political theory could be 
traced back to the later centuries of Rome, when the prince was regarded as the 
representative of the Roman people as a collective (Fairlie 1940). In the medieval 
period, both the monarch—that is, the king, the emperor, the pope and such bodies 
as the cardinals in the church—and assemblies and councils of qualified citizens in 
organised communities, were attributed the character of representatives. This meant 
that representatives were conceived in terms of single rulers and largely hereditary 
or property-qualified groups. The monarch was the trustee of the people. To a large 
extent, the trustees/representatives were free to act in a manner they deemed served 
the national interest. In the early conception of representative government, repre-
sentation did not necessarily involve election of the representative. It is either by 
appointment or inheritance, with a single ruler acting on behalf of all the people and 
not particular constituencies (Edigheji 2006, p. 96). Over the centuries, the idea of 
political representation has changed fundamentally.
In the modern system of government, representation is generally recognised as a 
necessary condition for democracy in practice in an urbanised polity. Thus, J.S. Mill 
points out:
A. O. Murana and A. R. Bakare
77
The only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in 
which the whole people participate... But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a 
single small town, participate personally in all but minor portions of the public business, it 
follows that the ideal type of perfect government must be representative (Mill 1861, p. 80).
Representative democracy, in the view of Fairlie (1940, p. 456), is that system of 
government where the powers of sovereignty are delegated to elected representa-
tives, who exercise them for the benefit of the whole nation. Viewed from this per-
spective, political representation can be defined as the machinery or process to make 
democratic government possible. To a considerable extent, the different conceptu-
alisations of political representation are based on the different interpretations of the 
relationship between the representative and his or her constituents, as well as the 
functions of an elected representative. Also, the disagreements centre around how 
representative institutions are to be composed, the conditions under which they act, 
and the scope of their authority. How any of these are conceived has different mean-
ings and implications for representative democracy and political representation.
According to Loewenberg and Patterson (1979), political representation is 
regarded as a relationship between the representative (legislature) and the repre-
sented (constituents). These two scholars pointed to four basic elements of repre-
sentation expressed by the legislature. According to them, the first feature is the 
focus of representation expressed in terms of legislators’ perception of what make 
up their constituents. The constituents can be geographical delineated area, political 
party or other kind of constituency such as ethnic groups, gender, social classes or 
interest group. The second feature, according to Loewenberg and Patterson (1979), 
is the style of representation which focuses on the way the legislators respond to 
their constituents. In this view, the legislators can act on the expressed preferences 
of their constituents (delegate), follow his intuition (trustee) or act according to 
prevailing circumstances (politico). The third feature however, is the components of 
the responsiveness, that is, the kind of expectations the legislators respond to. Thus, 
the expected components could be policies on certain issues, provision of some 
services, allocation of public resources or symbolic (psychological needs).
Mansbridge (2003), cited in Oni (2013), on the other hand, identifies four differ-
ent forms of representation in modern democracies. The first, according to them, is 
the promissory representation which is the one in which the representatives focus on 
what they had promised their constituents before they were elected. The second 
form of representation is the anticipatory representation, that is, the type in which 
the representatives focus on what they think constituents will approve in the next 
elections. The third form is the gyroscopic representation, a type in which the rep-
resentatives look within their personal background to derive interests and principles, 
without external incentives. The fourth type of representation, according to 
Mansbridge (2003) and Oni (2013), is the surrogative representation. In the latter 
form of representation, the representatives tend to represent individuals, groups, 
party or institutions outside their particular constituency. Example of this form of 
representation is the monetary surrogacy which occurs when citizens with high 
income contribute to the electoral success of representatives outside their district or 
party and as a result have an influence over them. This type is likened to the politics 
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of godfatherism in Nigeria in which elected representatives tend to satisfy the inter-
ests of their godfathers who were seen as instrumental to their electoral victory at 
the detriment of the electorate.
 Constituency–Legislature Relations
Political scientists have recognized constituency related services as one of the key 
legislative functions (Eulau and Karps 1977). Representatives devote part of their 
time and resources to activities such as responding to mail, answering phone calls, 
sending out newsletters, and managing casework (Cain et al. 1987). For some, these 
duties represent the central component of their job, more important than bill or 
policy-related responsibilities (Eulau and Karps 1977). Scholars have argued that 
office holders purposefully engage in these important activities to bolster their elec-
toral prospects (Cain et al. 1987). Explaining heterogeneity in constituency service 
provision has implications for the literatures on incumbency advantage, legislative 
organization, the allocation of scarce legislator’s resources, inter-branch relations, 
and member–constituent interactions.
The increased research on legislatures in less developed countries has empha-
sized the attention given by legislators to their constituents. Although much of that 
research has concentrated on constituent service and district projects, some infor-
mation has been collected concerning the ways in which legislators perceive their 
district and maintain contact with it. Some of these studies are primarily descriptive. 
A study of Malaysian MPs (Ong 1976) describes in some detail visits of members 
to their districts, emphasizing urban–rural differences. Some studies provide more 
systematic data on communication patterns. Narain and Puri (1976) have measured 
the frequency and methods of contact between constituents and members of an 
Indian legislature. A study in the Indian state of Rajasthan (Sisson and Shrader 
1977) provides data on the members’ perceptions of the constituency affairs. A 
study of members of the national parliament in India (Maheshwari 1976) provides 
data on the amount of time MPs spend in the district and the numbers of communi-
cations of various kinds they receive from constituents. A recent study of Malaysia 
(Musolf and Springer 1979) describes the methods by which legislators maintain 
district contacts and the frequency of such contacts as letters and visits; it also 
describes the priorities MPs assign to various types of activity within the district. 
The most detailed study of constituency communication patterns comes from a sur-
vey of legislators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (Kim et al. 1983). The data come 
from interviews with legislators and with constituents and local elites in legislator–
constituent communications. Although the level of attention to the district is 
 relatively high, the data show variations among legislators and among the countries 
in the priority accorded to the district.
A study of the Canadian parliament (Kornberg and Mishler 1976, pp. 191–199), 
devoted primarily to measuring influence within the institution, contains some sta-
tistical information on constituency communications. The data show that the levels 
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of mail and other contacts from constituents are relatively high, and that these con-
tacts are mostly requests for assistance. MPs are found to use newsletters, question-
naires, town meetings, and other forms of contact extensively and communicate 
with local elites such as party workers to get a sense of local opinion. The major 
finding of the research on constituency activities in non-Western and developing 
countries has been that most legislators devote considerable amounts of their time 
and give high priority to seeking and attracting projects and benefits to their districts 
and acting as intermediaries between their constituents and the bureaucracy. In 
those legislative bodies that have minimal policy-making functions, this may be the 
most important activity performed by legislators. Those legislatures where these 
activities have been shown to be important include Tanzania (Hopkins 1970), 
Afghanistan (Weinbaum 1977), national and state levels in India (Maheshwari 
1976; Narain and Puri 1976), Bangladesh (Jahan 1976), Malaysia (Ong 1976; 
Musolf and Springer 1979, pp. 50–55), and South Vietnam (Goodman 1975).
Several surveys of allocation and service responsiveness provide additional anal-
ysis of the causes or consequences of these activities. Goodman (1975) found that 
in the late 1960s about one-third of the legislators in South Vietnam had initiated 
constituency service work. Weinbaum (1977) found that in Afghanistan the legisla-
tor’s service activities made him an intermediary between the citizens and the 
national and provincial governments, thereby adding some support to the fragile 
parliamentary system. Kim et al. (1983) describe in some detail the resource alloca-
tion and constituency service activities of legislators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. 
Data are presented on legislators’ perceptions of constituency needs, the types of 
services performed, and constituent awareness of services. The authors argue that, 
in performing these roles, legislators are an important linkage between the central 
government and local communities, a linkage which may enhance support for the 
government. However, despite these findings on non-Western and developing coun-
tries about legislator–constituencies relations particularly on constituency projects 
and media of constituency relations/communications, Nigeria has not been cap-
tured. Therefore, the current effort is needed to fill the lacuna.
 Media of Legislative–Constituent Relations and their Degree 
of Utilities and Effectiveness
A research carried out by NDI (2006) shows that effective communication with the 
constituents demonstrates legislator’s commitment and responsiveness to the plight 
of the people he or she is representing. To corroborate this, Nigerian legislators are 
mostly assessed not by the number of bills sponsored rather by the rate of access 
which the people have to them. The legislators who are accessible by the people are 
likely to continue to enjoy their electoral support. This is premised on the fact that 
legislative–constituents relations enhance routine interactions, exchange of views 
and information to enable citizens express their preferences and provide support or 
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opposition for decisions that affect their lives (CID n.d., p.  1). This benefits the 
constituents as their views are considered during decision-making and policy mak-
ing. To this end, the legislators use different media to communicate with their con-
stituents. These include e-mail, text messages, phone calls, social media platforms 
and constituency offices. However, in advanced democracies, legislators compli-
mented these platforms with others such as office/party newsletters, letters to the 
editors, opinion editorials, posting flyers, local radio or TV shows, public service 
announcement and public forums and direct public outreach/meetings to communi-
cate with the constituents.
Out of these media, constituency office remains the most prominent in Nigeria. 
There is provision for the establishment of constituency offices by all legislators 
situated within their territorial constituency. However, while some constituency 
offices witness beehives of activities, others are just structure without life. A number 
of staff members are recruited mostly among the members of the political party of 
the legislators to man the constituency office. In some cases, family members and 
relations are also recruited. The office is usually the meeting point of the legislators 
with members of the constituencies when there is need to deliberate on issues of 
concern. It is also used as a meeting place for political party leaders in the absence 
of befitting party secretariats. Constituent members also submit letters of request, 
complaint, protest or petitions to the office for onward delivery to the legislators.
As a result of the boom in the usage of the new social media, most legislators in 
Nigeria, especially those from the urban constituencies, use social media platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Instagram, among others, to communi-
cate with their constituents. Legislators recruit bloggers who manage the social 
media platform on their behalf. Pictures of legislative activities are usually posted 
for people to know the effectiveness of their representatives. The platform is also 
used to gather and articulate opinions of the elite constituents on national or regional 
issues. It is usually the fastest means of communication between the elite constitu-
ents and the legislators especially for the legislators who have the capacity to oper-
ate it.
Nigerian legislators also communicate with their constituents through local print 
media and electronic media especially radio advertorials. In addition to this, text 
messages and telephone calls are used. Telephone conversation ought to be the most 
used but it is seldom used. This is because very few constituents have the direct 
telephone numbers of the legislators. The constituency office telephone number is 
usually circulated thus hinder direct access to the legislators. In a situation where 
many people eventually have access to the direct line, it is often changed. To correct 
this, the Sahara Reporters released a list of the telephone numbers of the 109 Senators 
of the eighth National Assembly (2015–2019) with the intent of helping their respec-
tive constituents to have direct access and socialize with them. In order to avoid their 
usual changing of viral telephone numbers, several postings were publicly made to 
call for protest in each constituency should any of them become inaccessible through 
the phone numbers. For the telephone numbers, visit http://www.nigerianmonitor.
com/full-list-of-telephone-numbers-of-the-109-senators-of-the-national-assembly/.
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Attending Community Development Associations (CDAs)’ meetings are another 
media of Legislative–Constituent relations. The CDAs often serve as middlemen 
between the constituents and legislators by harvesting people’s complaints and 
requests, filter them and table the most cogent ones before the legislators during 
their meetings. The outcome or responses of the legislators are usually fruitful to the 
advantage of the constituents because it is usually an avenue to secure popular sup-
port and re-election by the legislators. To this end, it is the most viable medium of 
communication.
We did an online opinion survey to examine the utility of each of the media of 
communication in respect of their effectiveness. Our findings show that legislator–
constituent communication in Nigeria is very weak. Most of the respondents never 
communicated with their legislators on both national and constituency issues. The 
few ones (mostly in Lagos State) that communicated with their legislators did so on 
the basis of Community Development Association meetings. The few meetings 
were also as a result of electioneering activities to seek for peoples’ mandate for 
re-election bids. It is observed from the survey that most legislators do not attend the 
CDA meetings except during election periods.
Many of the respondents claimed to have sent e-mail request for jobs, commu-
nity development appeals, financial support requests and letters of recommendation 
to the embassies for visa application and workplace for employment consideration, 
among others. Very few admitted to have received replies from the legislators. Out 
of the responded, 66.4% received promise without fulfilment, while 18.1% received 
positive and fulfilled responses. The remaining 15.5% only received acknowledge-
ment of mail responses without any further correspondence.
For those who sent text messages and phone calls to the direct telephone num-
bers of the legislators, many of them claimed that the legislators’ aides usually pick 
the calls. The aides mostly replied them that the legislators are busy and will return 
their calls and messages at appropriate time. Most of the messages were never 
replied and calls mostly not returned.
For social media interactions, the respondent observed that the kind of responses 
received shows that most legislators hire bloggers who manage their social media 
platforms and give no concrete responses to requests. This shows that most of the 
bloggers either do not relay postings to the legislators or legislators are unwilling to 
respond.
Indeed, our study shows that Nigerians are not also interested in asking the leg-
islators about their floor voting or their stand on national issues. Rather, they are 
mostly interested in what they can get in terms of material and tangible benefits 
from the legislators. The inability of the legislators to satisfy all their needs and 
requests make them to evade accessibility by their constituents. Akinderu-Fatai 
(2016) apprised that he spent an average of 300,000 naira for every visit to the 
 constituency office on daily basis. To him, the peoples’ requests range from per-
sonal upkeep to community development projects which are mostly out of his con-
stitutional mandate and beyond his financial capability. He noted that failure to 
satisfy these needs will make the people to tag the legislators as not giving them the 
dividends of democracies. This corroborated the argument of Udefuna et al. (2013, 
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p. 648) that Nigerians are hungry for democratic dividends and demanded the same 
from the legislators which led to the yearning for constituency projects.
 Legislative Constituency Projects in Nigeria: Rationale, 
Controversies and Clarification
The issue of constituency project has been generating heat in Nigerian since the 
return of democratic governance in 1999. The National Assembly requested for its 
approval by the Obasanjo Administration to take care of the enormous request for 
the dividends of democracy by the constituents. Upon approval, Obasanjo released 
N5million and N3million each for the Senators and House members respectively 
despite the fact that the budget did not make provision for such funds (Udefuna 
et al. 2013, p. 647). The process became controversial as a result of lack of transpar-
ency in the implementation and poor handling of the projects. The constituency 
project fund became controversial and a source of executive–legislature acrimony 
when the legislators started deciding on the kind of constituency projects to provide 
and were awarding contracts like the executive. Most legislators tilted their interest 
away from their primary assignment of lawmaking and their offices became pil-
grimage centres for contractors looking for jobs.
Legislative–constituency project as a concept is not peculiar to Nigeria alone as 
it is practiced in developed and developing democracies. However, the point of 
divergence is the method of operating it. Legislators are involving themselves in 
attracting developmental projects to their constituency in order to foster develop-
ment in their area and prove their ability to translate the needs and aspirations of 
their constituents into policy outcomes. While in countries like India, Tanzania, 
Kenya and Philippines, the legislators are paid Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF) as part of their salaries and allowances, other countries like the USA, the UK, 
Singapore, Australia and Nigeria retained the CDF with the executive. See Table 1 
below for the countries and amount of CDF per member.
The argument or rationale for its inclusion in most democracies is a result of the 
attempts to be responsive to the yearning of the people requesting for the dividends 
of democracy especially in the rural areas where the impact of the executive is hardly 
felt. Its aim is to ensure minimum presence of government in every constituency by 
siting developmental projects to the benefit of the people (Okuronmu 2009).
As a result of the controversies and the intrigues that characterized the CDF in 
Nigeria, the implementation of the concept was redesigned. The legislators were 
striped of the power to award contract and only required to consult with the con-
stituents and identify the preferred projects for inclusion in the budget by the 
 executive. After budget approval, the appropriate executive agencies will identify 
the contractor to execute the projects and award the contracts, supervise the pay-
ments and ensure their execution (Okuronmu 2009).
There is wide allegation that Nigerian legislators still lobby the executive to 
either get the contract for companies of their interest or get kickback from the contract 
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execution. In view of this allegation, Udefuna et al. (2013, p. 652) established that 
Nigerian lawmakers do engage in the determination of constituency project execu-
tion as the fund for the project is routed through them. Though, this claim is con-
stantly disputed by the legislators (see Turaki 2015). Either way, what is certain in 
Nigeria is the fact that the legislators have overbearing influence on the kind of 
projects to be implemented. Most constituencies get what the legislators want and 
mostly not what the constituents want.
Aside from the official constituency projects, some legislators privately engage 
in the provision of constituency projects, welfare packages and social responsibility, 
among others, in the form of empowerment schemes, health services, digging of 
boreholes, education supports, visa procurements and construction of drainages, 
among others. Akinderu-Fatai (2016) apprised that this became necessary as a result 
of the fact that not all projects listed for inclusion in the budget would be executed 
by the executive. In this case, the constituents will not understand but will blame the 
legislator for not pursuing their interest or even allege that he or she has diverted the 
money for the constituency project for personal use. It is as a result of this that most 
lawmakers personally embark on execution of private constituency projects and 
empowerment schemes in a bid to fulfil electioneering pledges and boost his or her 
chances of re-election.
 Challenges of Legislative–Constituency Relations in Nigeria
In as much as most legislators will want to relate with their constituents, there are 
challenges hindering such relationships. These ranges from time and resource con-
straints, misconception of the roles of the legislature by the constituents, enormous 
Table 1 Countries and 
amount of CDF per member 
(in US dollars)













Source: Udefuna et al. 2013, pp. 651–652
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needs of constituents, overbearing influence of local political gladiators, political 
party’s interest and legislators’ personal interest, among others.
The fact that no government in the world has enough resources to take care of the 
people’s needs has a trickle-down effect on the legislators. On several occasions, the 
National Assembly often complains of paucity of fund which negatively affects leg-
islative activities. A comparison of the annual pay of legislators in the USA and 
Nigeria shows that while a senator and a member of the house in the USA are annu-
ally entitled to $3,409,422 and $1,429,909 respectively, those of Nigeria get 
$184,961 and $166,739, respectively (NILS 2015). This implies that the annual 
remuneration (including salaries and yearly allowances) of a Nigerian Senator is 
pegged at N12, 902,360.00 and a member of the house is entitled to N9, 525,985.50 
annually as salaries and allowances (Saliu and Bakare 2016). Though, it is widely 
believed, as argued by Amaefule (2015), that the salaries and allowances of legisla-
tors (especially in Nigeria) are not limited to the ones officially stated; rather, there 
are others that accrued through self-appropriation and corruption. However, the 
Table 1 below shows the breakdown of the official entitlements of Nigerian legisla-
tors. Going by the official amount of money at the disposal of an average legislator 
in Nigeria, one may agree that it cannot take care of the enormous constituency 
needs before him or her. Table 2 below shows the breakdown of official salaries and 
allowances of legislators in Nigeria.
From the Table 2 above, one can see that a Senator is paid N5,000,000.00 annu-
ally to support his or her constituency, while a House member takes N1,985,000.00 
annually for the same purpose. Going by the analysis of Hon. Akinderu-Fatai who 
claimed to spend an average of N300, 000.00 daily to support the needs of the con-
stituents, an average legislator will need about 100 million naira (N100,000,000.00) 
for constituent supports. In addition, there is also time constraints as legislators are 
usually busy with legislative works (plenary and committee sittings, oversights and 
project sites tours, party caucus meetings, etc.) which gives little or no time for 
constituency relations. To this end, financial and time constraints greatly hinder 
legislative–constituency relations in Nigeria.
Misconception of the roles of the legislature by the constituents is another chal-
lenge hindering effective legislative–constituency relations. Many Nigerians expect 
their legislators to construct roads and build schools and other infrastructures in 
their respective constituencies, against the constitutional roles of lawmaking. The 
failure to provide these infrastructural facilities makes them to be seen as ineffective 
and irresponsive. This to a large extent deters most legislators from visiting their 
constituencies. The erroneous belief that legislators receive funding for constitu-
ency projects is also an issue. Any attempts by the legislators to clarify these 
 misconceptions are usually met with stiff rebuff from the constituents, leading to 
hostile relationship between both parties.
Out of all elected officials in Nigeria, legislators are most proximate to the peo-
ple. Thus, most people believe that the legislators can help them to solve individual 
problems. This leads to enormous constituent requests from the legislators beyond 
their financial capability. The easy accessibility to constituency offices prompts 
people to flood the office with direct assistance requests ranging from jobs, 
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community development appeals, financial support requests and letters of recom-
mendation to the embassies for visa application and workplace for employment 
consideration, among others. The inability of most legislators to develop strategies 
to filter or cope with the enormous request encourages them to sever the legislative–
constituency ties.
The overbearing influences of political lords/gladiators on legislators also con-
tribute immensely to ineffective legislative–constituent relations. Nigerian politics 
is such that popular support of the people is inferior to the support of the few power-
ful political lords. An average legislator seeking re-election prefers the support of 
the political overlords than those of the people or electorates. This is because the 
powerful lords mostly determine who the party’s flag-bearer is, and who also wins 
the general election not minding the direction of vote cast by the people. However, 
the introduction of electronic card reader appeared to have reduced direct falsifica-
tion of election results. Vote buying has assumed a dangerous dimension in Nigeria, 
especially under the APC-led federal government. This is to make up for the check 
imposed on politicians by the electronic card reader. To this end, the legislators 
Table 2 Breakdown of Nigerian legislators’ salaries and allowances
Senators (N) House of Representatives (N)
Annual
Basic salary 2,026,400.00 1,986,212.50
Vehicle fuelling/maintenance 1,520,000.00 1,489,000.00
Constituency 5,000,000.00 1,985,000.00
Domestic staff 1,519,000.00 1,488,000.00





House maintenance 101,320.00 99,260.00
Wardrobe 506,600.00 496,303.00
Estacode $950.00a $900.00a





Vehicle loan 8,000,000.00 7,940,000.00
Furniture 6,000,000.00 5,956,000.00
Severance gratuity 6,090,000.00 5,956,000.00
TOTAL 24,090,000.00 23,822,000.00
Source: NILS 2015 (as reproduced from Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
–RMAFC’s website http://www.rmafc.gov.ng/)
aNot added to total. The exchange rate is $1 = 360 naira
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prefer to use their resources to secure the anointment of the political overlords and 
sever the legislative–constituency relationship.
Supremacy of political party’s interest over that of the people does negatively 
affect the legislative–constituency relations. In a situation where the interest of the 
constituency clashes with that of the political party, the latter supersedes. This is 
because legislators cannot afford to have an acrimonious relationship with the party 
chiefs as they need the party platform to run for re-election. Since the Nigerian elec-
toral system does not recognize independent candidature, an average legislator will 
sever the legislative–constituency relations to satisfy his or her party’s interest.
 Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis, there is no doubt that legislative–constituency rela-
tions are an important aspect of the democratic process. This is premised on the fact 
that effective legislative–constituency relations contribute to democratic survival by 
incorporating the people in the governance of their own affairs. Governance with 
the input of the people during decision-making process not only ascribes legitimacy 
to the government but also gives the citizens a sense of belonging. However, legisla-
tive–constituency relations in Nigeria is marred by enormous challenges including 
resource constraints, time constraints, misconception of the roles of the legislature 
by the constituents, enormous needs of constituents, overbearing influence of politi-
cal lords, political party’s interest and legislators’ personal interest, among others. 
These challenges make constituent relations one of the most daunting and difficult 
aspects of legislative job. Any action or inaction of the legislators to sever the con-
stituent relations will have a catastrophic effect on democracy. This is because it 
will cut the link between the people and government; as Polsby (1975) describes the 
legislatures are the “nerve endings” of the polity due to their proximity to the people 
than other public officials.
No matter how experienced a legislator is, it is practically impossible for him or 
her to satisfy the needs of all constituents. In view of the fact that effective legisla-
tive–constituent relation is a problem facing all Nigerian legislators, a number of 
recommendations are offered to assist in this regard. First, the management of the 
National Assembly should embark on continuous public sensitization and reorienta-
tion on the constitutional role of the legislature. This will correct the impression of 
the people about the expectation of materialistic dividends of democracy and per-
haps reduce the degree of requests that legislators face in the constituents.
Second, no matter the extent of public sensitization, there is possibility that many 
people will continue to approach the legislators for assistance to cater to their needs. 
In view of this, more funding should be made available to the legislators especially 
as constituency allowances to take care of the people’s needs. By so doing, efforts 
should also be made to monitor them and ensure that the money is used for its pur-
pose. The need to submit annual financial report to this effect may be ideal, and the 
management should cause such report to be made public for accountability. 
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This will enable the people to know how much their legislators collected, how such 
monies are expended and verify the genuineness of the spending. This will further 
open up the legislature to public scrutiny which will in turn make the people to have 
a sense of belonging in legislative activities.
Since there will always be limited money, time and other resources, each legisla-
tor is expected to develop strategies to manage his or her relationship with the con-
stituents based on the specificity of the sociopolitical and economic circumstances 
prevailing in each area. The strategy developed by NDI (2006, p. 11) may be con-
sidered. This contains a five-point step: defining goals, establishing objectives to fit 
goals, determining priorities, developing goal-oriented action plans and evaluating 
the plan regularly.
Other ways by which the legislative–constituency relations can be improved 
include mandating the legislators to breathe life into their constituency offices to 
gather information and harvest opinions of the constituents on national issues, adop-
tion of reciprocal or two-way channel of communication to strengthen public appre-
ciation of legislative activities, encouraging constituents’ participation in public 
hearings especially on bills of interest to them, strengthening of civil society orga-
nizations to have the capacity to serve as watchdogs to the activities of their legisla-
tors and mobilize support for the promotion of their interest and, above all, improving 
the capacity of the legislators to attach importance to the performance of their duties 
including giving priority to effective legislative–constituency relations.
Conclusively, effective legislative–constituency relations will enable the legisla-
tors to impact positively on the lives of their constituents and also open up legisla-
tive activities to the people for proper appreciation. By this, Nigerians will 
understand the scope of the roles of the legislature and also see it as a true institution 
representing their interests, thereby making them to have trust in the democratic 
institution.
References
Akinderu-Fatai, M. (2016). Interview with Hon. Moruf Akinderu-Fatai (Oshodi-Isolo Federal 
Constituency I, Lagos State), House Member (2007-2011) and Chairman, House Committee 
on Legislative Compliance (2011-2015) in his Oshodi, Lagos residence on February 18.
Amaefule, E. (2015). Senators’ Allowances Nine Times Higher than Basic Pay. The Punch. June 
23.
Anyaegbunam, E. O. (2000). Assembly Handbook: A Legislator’s Companion. Lagos: FEF.
Blondel, J. (1973). Comparative Legislatures. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Bogaards, M. (2007). Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes: A Critique with African 
Data, Comparative Political Studies, 40(10):1211-1237.
Bogdanor, V. (1991). The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.
Cain, B., John, F., and Morris, F. (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral 
Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Constituency–Legislature Relations in Nigeria
88
Carey, J. M. (2006). Legislative Organisation. In R. A.W Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
pp:431–454.
CID. (n.d.). The Legislature and Constituency Relations. Available on line at http://www.cid.suny.
edu/publication1/Legialture%20Constituency%20Relations.pdf (Accessed on February 25, 
2017).
Davies, A.  E. (2004). The Role of the Legislature in Fostering an Efficient System of Public 
Finance. In Taiwo I. O. and Fajengbesi (eds.), Fiscal Federalism and Democratic Governance 
in Nigeria. Ibadan: NACEMA/ACBF
Edigheji, O. (2006) Political Representation in Africa: Towards a Conceptual Framework. African 
Development, XXXI(3):93-119.
Edosa, E. and Azelama, J. (1995). Institutions of Government. In Ikelegbe, A. O. (ed.), Politics and 
Government: An Introductory and Comparative Perspective. Benin City: Uri Publishing Ltd.
Esebagbon, R. (2005) The Nigerian Legislative Process; Bills, Budgetary Control and Committee 
System. Abuja: Law-Link Consult.
Eulau, Heinz, and Paul D. Karps. (1977). The puzzle of representation: Specifying Components of 
Responsiveness. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2(3): 233–54.
Fairlie, J.  A., (1940). The Nature of Political Representation. The American Political Science 
Review, 34(2): 236-248.
Fashagba, J. Y. (2009). Legislative Oversight under the Nigerian Presidential System. The Journal 
of Legislative Studies, 15(4): 439-459.
Goodman, A. E. (1975). Correlates of Legislative Constituency Service in South Vietnam. In G. R. 
Boynton and Cong Lim Kim, (eds.), Legislative Systems in Developing Countries. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.
Hopkins, R. F. (1970). The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania. American Political Science Review, 64: 
754-771.
Jahan, R. (1976). Members of Parliament in Bangladesh. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1: 355-370.
Janzekovic, J. (2010). Global Democratic Governance: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. Social 
Alternatives, 29(2).
Jewell, M. E. (1997) Legislature. In The Encyclopedia Americana International (ed.) Volume 17. 
Connecticut: Grolier incorporated.
Kim, C.  L., Barkan, J.  D., Turan, I. and Jewell, M.  E. (1983). The Legislative Connection: 
The Representative and the Represented in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Kornberg, A. and Mishler, W. (1976). Influence in Parliament: Canada. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Lafenwa, S.  A. (2009). “The Legislature and the Challenges of Democratic Governance in 
Africa: The Nigerian Case.” A seminar paper delivered at a conference on Governance and 
Development on Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and Future, Prospects, held on 
December 4-5, at University of Leeds, United Kingdom.
Loewenberg, G. (1995). Legislatures and Parliament, in Encyclopedia of Democracy U.S.A.
Loewenberg, G. and Patterson S. G. (1979). Comparing Legislatures. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Maheshwari, S. (1976). Constituency Linkage of National Legislators in India. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 1: 331-354.
Mansbridge, J. (2003). Rethinking Representation. The American Political Science Review, 97(4): 
515-528.
Mill, J.S. (1861). Considerations on representative government, p. 104.
Muhammad, A. A. (2007). Legislative Corruption and the Challenge of Democratic Sustenance 
in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007. In Aina, Ayandiji Daniel (eds.) Corruption and Challenge of Human 
Development. Ilishan: School of Management and Social Sciences, Babcock University.
Murana, A. O. (2018). Membership Turnover and Legislative Performance in Nigeria: A Study of 
Kogi and Osun States, 1999 – 2015, Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC, p. 21.
A. O. Murana and A. R. Bakare
89
Musolf, L. D. and Springer, J. F. (1979). Malaysia’s Parliamentary System: Representative Politics 
and Policymaking in a Divided Society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Narain, I. and Puri, S. L. (1976). Legislators in an Indian State: A Study of Role, Images and the 
Pattern of Constituency Linkages. Legislative Studies Quarterly 1: 315–330.
National Democratic Institute  - NDI (2008). Constituent Relations: A Guide to Best Practices. 
Available on line at http://leg.mt.gov/content/For-Legislators/orientation/constituent-relations- 
ndi.pdf (Accessed February 25, 2017).
NDI, (2006). Toward the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures. 
Washington DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
National Institute for Legislative Studies [NILS] (2015). Legislators’ Salaries and Allowances: 
A Cross-Country Comparison. Available on line at http://nils.gov.ng/docs/legislators-salaries- 
and-allowances.pdf (accessed August 23, 2016)
Nijzink, L., Mozaffar, S., and Azevedo, E. (2006). Can Parliament Enhance the Quality of 
Democracy on the Continent?: An Analysis of the Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions. 
Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) Working paper, No 160.
Okoosi-Simbine, A. T. (2010). Understanding the Role of the Legislature in the Fourth Republic: 
The Case of Oyo State House of Assembly. Nigeria Journal of Legislative Affairs, 3(1 & 2).
Okurounmu, F. (2009). Nigeria: Constituency Project Fund - for Lawmakers or Their Constituents? 
Daily Independent, April 1. 2.
Omotola, J. S. (2014). The Legislature in Democratic Theory: Nigeria in Comparative Perspective. 
In Ojo. E. O. and Omotola, J. S. (eds.), The Legislature and Governance in Nigeria Volume 1. 
Ibadan: John Archers Ltd.
Ong, M. (1976). The Member of Parliament and his Constituency: The Malaysian Case. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 1: 405422.
Oni, S. (2013). The Legislature and Constituency Representation in the Fourth Republic of 
Nigeria’s Democratic Governance. Ife Psychologia, 21(2): 232-242.
Polsby, N. W. (1975). Legislatures. In F. Greenstein and N. Polsby eds., Handbook of Political 
Science: Government Institutions and Processes. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Poteete, A. (2010). Renegotiation of Executive Powers and Executive -Legislative Relations in 
Botswana. Montreal: Concordia University Press
Saliu, H.  A. and Bakare, A.  R. (2016). An Assessment of the performance of the 7th National 
Assembly in Nigeria. Paper presented at the National Conference on the Dynamics of 
Democratic Practice in Nigeria, 1999-2015, organized by Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic 
Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano on November 9-10.
Sisson, R. and Shrader, L. L. (1977). Social Representation and Political Integration in an Indian 
State: The Legislative Dimension. In Albert F. Eldridge, (ed.), Legislatures in Plural Societies. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Smith, G. (1980). Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (3rd ed.), London: 
Heinemann Educational Books.
Turaki, A. H. (2015). Nigeria: One sitting to go, 506 Bills Pending in the Senate. Daily Trust, May 
28.
Udefuna, P. N., Jumare, F. and Adebayo, F. O. (2013). Legislative Constituency Project in Nigeria: 
Implication for National Development. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(6): 
647-653.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. (1977). The Legislator as Intermediary: Integration of the Center and 
Periphery in Afghanistan. In Albert G.  Eldridge, (ed.), Legislatures in Plural Societies. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Yaqub, N. (2004). The Military, Democratic Transitions and the 1999 Elections. In Olurode, 
L and Anifowoshe R. (eds.) Issues in Nigeria’s 1999 General Elections. Lagos: John West 
Publications Ltd and Reboniks Publications Ltd
Constituency–Legislature Relations in Nigeria
91© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 
J. Y. Fashagba et al. (eds.), The Nigerian National Assembly,  
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11905-8_6




The institution of the legislature is an important arm of government in democracies 
given that it is an assemblage of citizen’s representatives. As a cardinal democratic 
institution, the legislature is saddled with enormous task, the most significant being 
that of lawmaking, representation, oversight of state activities, budgeting and other 
constituency-related tasks. Being the representative of the people, the legislature in 
democracies is expected to be the embodiment of popular will. The institution of the 
legislature is expected not only to represent the general will but also to articulate, 
advance and promote the will, interest and welfare of the citizen from which mem-
bers of the legislature derive their mandate. The legislature is the most representa-
tive of the arms of government and institutions of the state in democracies given that 
the chamber(s) members are elected to represent constituencies and that each mem-
ber draw votes across social strata (religious, race/ethnicity, gender, ideology, 
wealth) identifiable within their constituencies. With the exception of political par-
ties, the legislature provides the most comprehensive and inclusive avenue for popu-
lar participation in politics and governance in modern democratic states (Omotola 
2014, p. 3).
From historical antecedents, Nigeria adopted the bicameral structure of legisla-
tive organisational arrangement even before the attainment of political indepen-
dence. The Nigerian legislature, whether under the parliamentary system of the First 
Republic or the presidential system of the Second Republic, aborted Third Republic 
and the present Fourth Republic, are composed of two chambers: the lower chamber 
(House of Representatives) and the upper chamber (Senate). The bicameralism that 
have characterised the institutional and structural working of the legislative arms of 
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government at the federal level in Nigeria comes with peculiar advantages and 
 challenges especially as it relates to legislative–executive relations and relationship 
between the two chambers of the legislature. This becomes feasible within the con-
text of the peculiarities that characterised executive–legislative relationship under 
parliamentary and presidential systems of government. Under the parliamentary 
system as practiced by Nigeria during the First Republic, the prime minister that 
serves as the chief executive and head of government of the Federation is first and 
foremost an elected member of the lower chamber of the legislature (the House of 
Representatives) as some, if not all, of the members of the executive. Under the 
system, the executive is collectively responsible to the legislature especially the 
House of Representatives. With the adoption of the presidential system of govern-
ment, there comes significant alteration to the working relationship between the 
arms of government and institutions of the state given the precept of separation of 
power that forms the bedrock of the presidential system (Fashagba 2014, 
pp. 163–164).
As was the case in the Second Republic and aborted Third Republic, the organ-
isation of the legislature in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic followed not only the bicam-
eral structural arrangement but was also guided by the principle of separation of 
power that is a core foundational issue in presidential system. The legislature has 
two chambers (House of Representatives and Senate) that are saddled with the task 
of lawmaking, representation and oversight of the running of the state. The two 
chambers of the legislature complement each other in the discharge of their consti-
tutionally assigned legislative responsibilities especially as it relates to lawmaking 
and oversight of the executive arms and affiliated institutions/agencies of the state. 
However, as Fashagba (2014, p.  164) notes, there are notable difference in both 
chambers’ approach to the discharge of their responsibilities. The difference in 
approach can be said to be informed by number of factors of which composition, 
internal institutional structure, difference in rules and challenges of operation and 
experience are but significant.
Arising from this premise, this chapter engages in an examination of the Nigerian 
House of Representatives under the Fourth Republic. Utilising data drawn mainly 
from secondary sources and adopting thematic and explanatory approach, this chap-
ter discusses the politics of the House of Representatives within the context of func-
tions and power, leadership selection procedures, turnover and performance. It 
discusses the theoretical basis of bicameralism in legislative literature and the his-
tory of the House of Representatives in Nigeria’s democratic evolution. The chapter 
discusses the constitutional provisions on the House of Representatives within the 
context of power and function of the lower chamber, elections of members, legisla-
tive turnover, and politics within the chamber especially as it relates to tussle for 
leadership positions. The chapter also examines the performance of the House of 
Representatives in the Fourth Republic using the chamber’s constitutionally 
assigned functions as stipulated in the Nigeria’s 1999 constitution as amended as 
point of reference. Within the context of the discussion of the issues highlighted 
above, the chapter draws an appropriate conclusion.
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 Theoretical Basis of Bicameralism
The concept of legislature has different definition depending on the standpoint view 
of the definer. Despite the variations in its definitions, there seems to be a point of 
convergence that it is an arm/organ of government saddled with the responsibility of 
making laws for the good governance of the polity. To this end, many scholars and 
practitioners define it on the basis of its lawmaking function and institutional com-
position. Ihedioha (2012) defined it as an assemblage of the representatives of the 
people elected under a legal framework to make laws for the good health of the 
society. It is also defined as “the institutional body responsible for making laws for 
a nation and one through which the collective will of the people or part of it is 
articulated, expressed and implemented” (Okoosi-Simbine 2010, p.  1). In this 
regard, we talk about it as the representative assembly of persons statutorily empow-
ered to make laws at local, state or country level.
Since the advent of the legislature in representative democracies, it takes different 
forms depending on the specificity of the country especially in respect of how 
homogenous or heterogeneous the country is. There are basically two forms: uni-
cameral and bicameral legislature. However, events in the political history of some 
countries had brought about other forms, unpopular in the modern political environ-
ment. These are “tricameral and tetracameral” legislature. However, this chapter is 
interested in the bicameral type as it is the one adopted by the country (Nigeria) 
under review. Countries like Nigeria and the USA, among others, adopt bicameral-
ism to satisfy dual desires. The first is to create a chamber that guarantees equal 
representation of the states regardless of size and population. The second is to satisfy 
equity and justice by creating another chamber to guarantee proportional representa-
tion of the population. For better understanding, it is necessary that we briefly dis-
cuss all the typology in order to appreciate the basis of the bicameral legislature.
The etymology of unicameral legislature is traced to two Latin words: “uni” 
meaning “one” and “camera” meaning “chamber”. This implies the assembly of 
legislators in one house to debate and make laws for good governance of the coun-
try. This form of legislature is used in countries that are homogeneous in nature and 
more often in unitary countries with weak regional identities. Examples are: Angola, 
Togo, Egypt and Croatia, among others. In some situations, some countries changed 
to unicameralism after having a stint of dual legislative chambers. Examples are: 
New Zealand and Denmark that abolished one of their two chambers. In the case of 
Sweden, the country changed to unicameralism after the merger of its two chambers 
into a single one. Approximately, half of the world democracies are presently using 
this system including the world most populous state, China; and the least populous 
state, that is, Vatican City (Wikipedia 2016a). The major advantage of this system 
stems out of the fact that it makes lawmaking more efficient and less likely to lead 
to the possibility of legislative deadlock. However, the system could be criticised on 
the ground that it can lead to tyranny especially in parliamentary system where the 
parliamentary majority dominate the executive arm of government (Saliu and 
Bakare 2016).
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On the other hand, bicameral legislature also emerged from two Latin words: 
“bi” meaning “two” and “camera” meaning “chamber”. It is a system by which the 
legislature comprises of two chambers. One is regarded as the upper/senior cham-
ber, while the other is regarded as the lower/junior chamber. The membership 
requirement of the two chambers varies from country to another but in most cases 
that of the upper chamber is more stringent given that it is usually the most powerful 
house except in Britain and some other Westminster systems where the lower cham-
ber is more powerful than the upper chamber. This system is mostly used in plural-
istic societies to give voices to the different tribes. Examples are Nigeria, the USA, 
Brazil, France, Japan and the UK among others. As at 2015, a little less than half of 
the world’s democracies were using bicameralism (Inter-Parliamentary Union 
2016). One of its merits is that it gives voices to all and makes debate more robust. 
However, the major demerits are that it can easily lead to legislative deadlock and it 
is expensive to run (Saliu and Bakare 2016).
The third form is tricameral legislature derived from the Latin words “tri” mean-
ing “three” and “camera” meaning “chamber”. It is a situation where the legislature 
has three chambers. This system was used in South Africa under the apartheid 
regime as enshrined in the South African Constitution of 1983. It consisted of three 
race-based chambers: House of Assembly with 178 members reserved for whites, 
House of Representatives with 85 members for Coloured or mixed-race people and 
House of Delegates with 45 members reserved for Indians (Wikipedia 2016b). This 
is advantageous because it is more inclusive than bicameralism. However, it is also 
more expensive and can create legislative deadlock than bicameralism. The fourth, 
tetracameral legislature was coined from the merger of a Greek word “tetra” mean-
ing “four” and a Latin word “camera” meaning “chamber”. It is a system where the 
legislature has four chambers. This system is not currently in use by any country but 
was previously used by Sweden and Finland until 1906 when it was replaced with 
unicameral legislature (Wikipedia 2016c).
Institutional legislative composition is based on the form adopted by a country. 
It may be unicameral or bicameral. Whichever is adopted, the country is at liberty 
to name it as it preferred. This is why the name of some unicameral legislature is the 
same as the upper or lower chamber of the bicameral legislature. In some cases, the 
compound name of both chambers in a country can be the name of either the lower 
or upper house of another country. For example, the Senate and House of 
Representatives of Nigeria are jointly called “National Assembly” but the lower 
house of French legislature is called “National Assembly” with upper house called 
“Senate”. However, both houses are jointly called “France Parliament”. While all 
these names are globally recognised in the annals of legislative studies, some coun-
tries use names that are peculiar to their culture (e.g. Saeima of Latvia, Riigikogu of 
Estonia, Golaha Wakiilada and Golaha Guurtida of Somaliland; and Masharano 
Jirga and Wolesi Jirga of Afghanistan, among others). The membership composi-
tion of the legislature varies along the specificity of each country so is the constitu-
tional electoral qualification, voting system and term span, among others. In 
addition, the number of people entitled to a representation in the lower chamber 
(population per seat or seat size) also varies depending on the population size of the 
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country and the total number of legislators the country wishes to have in the upper 
chamber (that is usually equal for all states, provinces or regions). It should be noted 
that countries with smaller population sizes adopt unicameral legislature while 
those with large population sizes adopt bicameral legislature. Although Austria, 
South Africa and Sudan have smaller populations, they adopted bicameralism as a 
result of their political environment and heterogeneous nature of their countries. 
The seat sizes of the upper chambers of most countries are smaller than that of the 
lower chambers. This is as a result of the fact that the composition of lower cham-
bers is premised on population while that of the upper chambers is on equality 
(Saliu and Bakare 2016).
 Nigerian House of Representatives in Historical Perspective
The historical emergence of the Nigerian House of Representatives is best discussed 
under three epochs. The first epoch was during the colonial era when the legislature 
was created as an avenue to accommodate Africans in the governance process. The 
history of the Nigerian House of Representatives dates back to January 1, 1947 
when the Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order in-Council came into effect. Prior to 
this period, there were several agitations for increased participation of Africans in 
the determination of their own affairs which prompted Sir Arthur Frederick Richard 
to submit constitutional proposal to this effect to the Secretary of State for the colo-
nies in December 1944 (Nwosu et al. 1998, p. 25). The British government approved 
the proposal which led to the emergence of the Richard constitution. The constitu-
tion makes provision for the creation of the Legislative Council made up of 45 
members with the governor as its president. The members include 16 official mem-
bers (13 ex officio and 3 nominated members) and 28 unofficial members (4 directly 
elected and 24 indirectly elected or nominated). The Legislative Council was inau-
gurated in 1947 by Sir Arthur Richard and vested with the power to make laws for 
the whole country (National Assembly 2010). The Legislative Council has Sir 
Richard as its president, Chief S.  Ade Ojo as the clerk, assisted by Mr. B.  A. 
Manuwa, with Mr. E. A. Mensah as the sergeant-at-arms.
The John Stuart Macpherson’s constitution of 1951 retained the structure of the 
Legislative Council but with expanded membership. However, the Oliver Lyttleton 
Constitution of 1954 established the Federal House of Representatives with 92 
members from the North, 42 from the West, 42 from the East, 6 from Southern 
Cameroons and 2 from Lagos; all directly elected (Nwosu et al. 1998). The constitu-
tion granted “independence” to the legislature by creating the office of the speaker. 
Premised on this, Sir E. A. Fellows was appointed as the first speaker of the Federal 
House of Representatives (Nnamani 2006, p. 3).
The second epoch of the development of the Nigerian House of Representatives 
began when parliamentary system of government was introduced in preparation for 
political independence. On August 30, 1957, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a rank-
ing member of the Legislative Council since 1947, was made the prime minister 
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with Sir Fredrick Metcalfe retaining his post as the speaker of the House of 
Representatives since 1955 till 1960 (National Assembly 2010). Though, the intro-
duction of the Senate Council in 1959 brought about bicameralism in Nigeria but 
did not take away the power of the House. Immediately after independence, the 
Nigerian House of Representatives had its first Nigerian speaker, Rt. Hon. Dr. Jaja 
Amicha Nwachukwu (from Afikpo North constituency of the Eastern region). This 
parliamentary arrangement was sustained after independence and throughout the 
first republic until January 15, 1966 when the military struck.
After 13 years of military rule, power was transited to democratic administration 
in 1979 with the introduction of presidential system of government. This signalled 
the third epoch in the historical development of the Nigerian House of Representatives. 
The executive became totally separated from the legislature as it is directly elected 
as against the parliamentary system where it emerged from the House of 
Representatives. During this epoch, the nature of the bicameral legislature changed 
as the Senate is given more power compared to its power during the independence 
era. Consequently, the Senate became the upper chamber with more constitutional 
powers and functions than the House of Representatives. The subsequent 1983 mili-
tary intervention and return of democratic governance in 1999 did not change the 
legislative status as the Nigerian House of Representatives maintained its lower- 
chamber status till date.
 Constitutional Provisions on House of Representatives
The Nigerian House of Representatives was expressly established by the chapter V, 
Part I of the 1999 constitution (as amended), as a wing of the National Assembly as 
provided for in Section 47. Its composition is stated in Section 49 as thus:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall consist of 
three hundred and sixty members representing constituencies of nearly equal population as 
far as possible, provided that no constituency shall fall within more than one State (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999).
Section 50(1)b requested the members of the Nigerian House of Representatives to 
elect a speaker and a deputy speaker among themselves who will be responsible for 
steering the affairs of the House and preside over the sittings (see Section 53[1]b). 
However, Section 53(2)a empowers the speaker to preside over the joint sitting of 
the Senate and House of Representatives (National Assembly) only in the absence 
of the senate president.
In term of structure, Section 62 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) allows the 
House of Representatives to appoint committees to make the performances of its 
duties effective and efficient. Section 63 and 64 mandated the House to sit for a 
period not less than 181 days in a year and stand dissolved at the expiration of a 
period of 4 years commencing from the date of the first sitting of the House. Section 
65 limits the qualification for membership of the House to Nigerian citizens who 
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have attained the age of 30 years, with minimum school certificate and with mem-
bership of a political party that sponsored such persons. Section 66 places restric-
tions on the qualification for membership of the House. The restrictions range from 
voluntary acquisition of citizenship of another country and have made declaration 
of allegiance to such country, or under sentence of death or imprisonment, or are 
declared bankrupt among others.
The constitution also expressly states the conditions by which a member of the 
House of Representatives could lose his/her seat. Section 68 provides that:
A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in 
the House of which he is a member if
 (a) he becomes a member of another legislative house;
 (b) any other circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the Senate or the 
House of Representatives, would cause him to be disqualified for election as a 
member;
 (c) he ceases to be a citizen of Nigeria;
 (d) he becomes president, vice-president, governor, deputy governor or a minister 
of the government of the Federation or a commissioner of a state or a special 
adviser;
 (e) save as otherwise prescribed by this Constitution, he becomes a member of a 
commission or other body established by this Constitution or by any other law;
 (f) without just cause he is absent from meetings of the House of which he is a 
member for a period amounting in the aggregate to more than one-third of the 
total number of days during which the House meets in any 1 year;
 (g) being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, 
he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the 
period for which that House was elected; Provided that his membership of the 
latter political party is not as a result of a division in the political party of which 
he was previously a member or of a merger of two or more political parties or 
factions by one of which he was previously sponsored; or
 (h) the president of the Senate or, as the case may be, the speaker of the House of 
Representatives receives a certificate under the hand of the chairman of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission stating that the provisions of sec-
tion 69 of this Constitution have been complied with in respect of the recall of 
that member (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999)
In addition to the above, Section 69 makes provision for recall by the constituents 
should they lose confidence in such member. Other constitutional provisions on the 
House of Representatives include Section 70 that deals with remuneration of mem-
bers, Sections 71–78 that deal with election of members to the House and Sections 
79–83 that give powers to the House (together with the Senate), among others.
The fact that the provisions of the 1999 constitution (as amended) is not suffice 
to regulate the affairs of the House of Representatives, Section 60 allows the House 
to enact for itself other rules and regulations necessary to regulate its own proce-
dure. This led to the enactment of the “Standing Order” and other regulations used 
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in directing the institutional affairs, proceedings and members conduct without 
prejudice to the provisions of the constitution.
 Power and Function
The National Secretariat of Nigerian Legislatures (2011) classified the legislative 
power of the National Assembly into three:
 1. Expressed powers by the constitution
 2. Implied powers arising from extensions of the provisions of the constitution;
 3. Assumed powers as a result of lacunae in the constitutional provisions
Premised on these, the power of the House of Representatives (and the National 
Assembly in general) in relation to the four cardinal functions and the specifics ones 
is expressly stated in the 1999 constitution (as amended). Chapter V, Part I, Sections 
47–64 established the National Assembly as the federal legislature. Sections 88–89 
expressly state the powers granted to the legislature. However, the scope of the 
power of the National Assembly is stated in the Second Schedule, Part I and II, that 
is, exclusive and concurrent lists on which the National Assembly can legislate upon.
Aside its four cardinal functions: lawmaking, representation, oversight and bud-
geting, the legislature also performs other important constitutional functions which 
are intended to promote good governance and development. As enshrined in the 
1999 constitution of Nigeria (as amended), the legislature performs other functions 
aimed at engendering democracy. For instance, Section 88 of the 1999 Constitution 
(as amended) spells out the investigative responsibility of the legislature. The 
Nigerian House of Representatives is constitutionally empowered to conduct inves-
tigations into any agency of government with a view to exposing corruption and 
correcting any lapses in the conduct of public affairs. In carrying out its investiga-
tive roles, the House can summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any 
place or produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, 
and examine him as a witness. It also has the constitutional mandate to receive and 
enquire into Public Petitions and Complaints brought to its attention, through its 
Committees on Public Petitions. By the power, Nigerians can approach the House 
of Representatives on any complaint bothering on issues such as illegal termination 
of appointment, maltreatment of workers, regularisation of promotion, unpaid sala-
ries and wages, and retirement benefits, among others. Ihedioha (2012, p. 16) noted 
that since 1999, many of such petitions and complaints have been received and 
conclusively addressed by the two chambers of the National Assembly. The House 
also has the Power of Appropriation conferred on it by Section 81 of the Constitution 
as amended; which states that “no money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund or other public funds of the Federation without the authorization of 
the National Assembly”.
In addition, there are other laws that empower the House of Representatives (and 
the National Assembly by extension) on specific functions. For example, the 
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Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004. This Act declare and define certain powers, privileges and immunities of the 
National Assembly and of the members of the two legislative Houses; to regulate 
the conduct of members and other persons connected with the proceedings thereof 
and other matters of concern. It grants the House several powers ranging from 
immunity from proceedings, power of committee to order attendance of witnesses, 
power to issue warrant to compel attendance, power of arrest, courts not to exercise 
jurisdiction over acts of president, speaker or officer, civil process not to be served 
in Chamber or precincts, and restriction on prosecutions, among others.
 Election of Members
Section 65 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) makes provision for the qualifica-
tions for membership of the House of Representatives. It states that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 66 of this Constitution, a person shall be 
qualified for election as a member of:
(b) the House of Representatives, if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has attained the 
age of 30 years;
(2) A person shall be qualified for election under subsection (1) of this section if:
(a) he has been educated up to at least School Certificate level or its equivalent; and
(b) he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party  (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999).
From the above provisions, it became evident that independent candidacy is prohib-
ited in Nigeria as a member of the House can only emerge on the platform of a 
political party. This shows the indispensability of political parties in legislative poli-
tics and Nigeria’s democratic process in general.
In order to implement this, the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) is constitutionally empowered in Section 76 to fix date for and conduct elec-
tion to fill the 360 seats in the House. It is on this ground that the fourth republic 
National Assembly emerged from the 1999 general elections that ushered in demo-
cratic rule after a 16-year military rule that lasted from 1983 to 1999. Hundreds of 
candidates under different political parties contested for the coveted 360 Nigerian 
House of Representatives’ seats in an election conducted by INEC on February 20, 
1999. Since then, the electoral management body INEC has been conducting elec-
tions every 4 years as established in Section 64(1):
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each stand dissolved at the expiration of 
a period of four years commencing from the date of the first sitting of the House.
On districting, Sections 71–74 state that:
71. Subject to the provisions of section 72 of this Constitution, the Independent 
National Electoral Commission shall –
The Nigerian House of Representatives, 1999–2016
100
(b) subject to the provisions of section 49 of this Constitution, divide the Federation 
into 360 Federal constituencies for purposes of elections to the House of 
Representatives.
72. No Senatorial district or Federal constituency shall fall within more than one 
State, and the boundaries of each district or constituency shall be as contiguous 
as possible and be such that the number of inhabitants thereof is as nearly equal 
to the population quota as is reasonably practicable.
73. (1) The Independent National Electoral Commission shall review the division of 
States and of the Federation into Senatorial districts and Federal constituencies 
at intervals of not less than 10 years, and may alter the districts or constituencies 
in accordance with the provisions of this section to such extent as it may consider 
desirable in the light of the review.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the Independent National 
Electoral Commission may at any time carry out such a review and alter the dis-
tricts or constituencies in accordance with the provisions of this section to such 
extent as it considers necessary, in consequence of any amendment to Section 3 
of this Constitution or any provision replacing that section, or by reason of the 
holding of a census of the population, or pursuant to an Act of the National 
Assembly.
74. Where the boundaries of any Senatorial district or Federal constituency estab-
lished under Section 71 of this Constitution are altered in accordance with the 
provisions Section 73 hereof, that alteration shall come into effect after it has 
been approved by each House of the National Assembly and after the current life 
of the Senate (in the case of an alteration to the boundaries of a Senatorial dis-
trict) or the House of Representatives (in the case of an alteration to the boundar-
ies of a Federal constituency) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
It is worthy to note that the Independent National Electoral Commission is yet to 
trigger the implementation of these provisions on redistricting. However, INEC’s 
action or inaction on this did not violate the constitution as it is prerogative power 
and not a mandatory directive. The choice of the use of the wordings: “may at any 
time carry out such a review and alter the districts or constituencies in accordance 
with the provisions of this section to such extent as it considers necessary” gives 
INEC an open blanket to decide whether or not to carry out redistricting. The sec-
ond condition which could makes redistricting a mandatory exercise is yet to take 
place. It is stated that “in consequence of any amendment to section 3 of this 
Constitution or any provision replacing that section”. This means that if one or 
more States is created, thus, it becomes mandatory on INEC to embark on redistrict-
ing exercise. The 360 seat size of the House in use since 1999 is a product of the 
INEC districting. Table 1 below shows the states and their corresponding seat allo-
cation based on their population size.
INEC can be faulted in the districting outcome. A close look at the table shows 
some deficiencies and lopsidedness in the distribution of legislative seats in the 
House of Representatives. For instance, nine seats are given to Ogun State with a 
population of 3,751,140 while its contemporaries like Akwa Ibom and Sokoto in 
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% of total House Of 
Representative seats
1 Kano 9,401,288 6.69 24 6.67
2 Lagos 9,113,605 6.49 24 6.67
3 Kaduna 6,113,503 4.35 16 4.44
4 Katsina 5,801,584 4.13 15 4.17
5 Oyo 5,580,894 3.97 14 3.89
6 Rivers 5,198,716 3.70 13 3.62
7 Bauchi 4,653,066 3.31 12 3.33
8 Jigawa 4,361,002 3.11 11 3.06
9 Benue 4,253,641 3.03 11 3.06
10 Anambra 4,177,828 2.97 10 2.78
11 Bornu 4,171,104 2.97 10 2.78
12 Delta 4,112,445 2.93 10 2.78
13 Niger 3,954,772 2.82 10 2.78
14 Imo 3,927,563 2.80 10 2.78
15 Akwa 
Ibom
3,902,051 2.78 11 3.06
16 Ogun 3,751,140 2.67 9 2.50
17 Sokoto 3,702,676 2.64 11 3.06
18 Ondo 3,460,877 2.46 9 2.50
19 Osun 3,416,959 2.43 9 2.50
20 Kogi 3,314,043 2.36 9 2.50
21 Zamfara 3,278,873 2.33 7 1.94
22 Enugu 3,267,837 2.33 8 2.22
23 Kebbi 3,256,541 2.32 8 2.22
24 Edo 3,233,366 2.31 9 2.50
25 Plateau 3,206,531 2.28 8 2.22
26 Adamawa 3,178,950 2.26 8 2.22
27 Cross 
River
2,892,988 2.06 8 2.22
28 Abia 2,845,380 2.03 8 2.22
29 Ekiti 2,398,957 1.71 6 1.67
30 Kwara 2,365,353 1.68 6 1.67
31 Gombe 2,365,040 1.68 6 1.67
32 Yobe 2,321,339 1.65 6 1.67
33 Taraba 2,294,800 1.63 6 1.67
34 Ebonyi 2,176,947 1.55 6 1.67
35 Nasarawa 1,869,377 1.33 5 1.39
36 Bayelsa 1,704,515 1.21 5 1.39
37 FCT 1,406,239 1.00 2 0.56
Total 140,431,790 100 360 100
Source: Extracted from Bakare (2014)
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terms of population size with 3,902,051 and 3,702,676 respectively have eleven 
(11) seats each. Also, Zamfara state with the population size of 3,278,873 people is 
allocated seven seats while those with lower population such as Enugu with 
3,267,837 people and Kebbi with 3,256,541 inhabitants are given eight seats each 
and above all Edo state with 3,233,366 residents has nine seats. The injustice meted 
on Ogun and Zamfara among others like Anambra, Bornu and Delta can also be 
seen in the allocation of ten seats to Niger and Imo with 3,954,772 and 3,927,563 
people respectively as against the same allocation to Anambra, Bornu and Delta 
states with a whopping one million people higher. The same trajectory is observed 
in the FCT’s two seats compared to five given to Nasarawa and Bayelsa with a simi-
lar population range (Bakare 2014).
 Committees
The large membership composition of legislatures make it difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to meticulously engage in legislative activities. This made the introduction of 
committee system inevitable in the legislature. Members are distributed into groups 
known as committees to carry out specific tasks and report back to the whole house 
for onward decision-making. Its significance is seen in its conceptualization by the 
National Democratic Institute (2006) that “committees are a small group of legisla-
tors who are assigned, on either temporary or permanent basis, to examine matters 
more closely than could the full chamber”. Section 62 of the 1999 constitution (as 
amended) makes prerogative provision for the establishment of special or general 
purpose committees and delegate power to such in accordance with the resolution 
of each chamber. In light of this, Order 18 of the Standing Order (Ninth Edition) of 
the House of Representatives makes provision for the establishment and jurisdiction 
of committees. It makes provision for the creation of specific special and standing 
committees with the power to also create special ad hoc committees to perform 
special duties as the need arise (see Rule 9). Rule 1 mandates the House to consti-
tute the membership of the Special Committees within the first 30 days (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 2016). The following are the names of the Special and Standing 
Committees as stated in Order 18, Rule 1–99.
Special Committees
 1. Selection
 2. Rules and Business
 3. House Services
 4. Public Petitions
 5. Public Accounts
 6. Ethics and Privileges
 7. Media and Public Affairs
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Standing Committees
 1. Agricultural Colleges and Institutions
 2. Agricultural Production and Services
 3. Aids, Loans and Debts Management





 9. Banking and Currency
 10. Basic Education and Services
 11. Capital Market and Institutions
 12. Civil Societies and Development Partners
 13. Climate Change
 14. Co-operation and Integration In Africa
 15. Commerce
 16. Constituency Outreach
 17. Culture and Tourism
 18. Customs and Excise
 19. Defence
 20. Delegated Legislation
 21. Diaspora Matters
 22. Drugs and Narcotics
 23. Electoral Matters and Political Party Matters
 24. Emergency and Disaster Preparedness
 25. Environment and Habitat
 26. FCT Area Councils and Ancillary Matters
 27. FCT Judiciary
 28. Federal Capital Territory
 29. Federal Character
 30. Federal Judiciary
 31. Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC)
 32. Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA)
 33. Finance
 34. Financial Crimes
 35. FOI (Reform of Government Institutions)
 36. Foreign Affairs
 37. Gas Resources
 38. Governmental Affairs
 39. Health Institutions
 40. Healthcare Services
 41. HIV, AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Control
 42. Housing
 43. Human Rights
 44. IDPs, Refugees and Initiatives on North East
 45. Industry
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 46. Information National Orientation, Ethics and Values
 47. Information Technology
 48. Insurance and Actuarial Matters
 49. Inter-parliamentary Relations
 50. Interior
 51. Justice
 52. Labour, Employment and Productivity
 53. Lake Chad
 54. Land Transport
 55. Legislative Budget and Research
 56. Legislative Compliance
 57. Local Content
 58. Maritime Safety, Education and Administration
 59. National Planning and Economic Development
 60. Navy
 61. Niger Delta Affairs
 62. Niger Delta Development Commission
 63. Pensions
 64. Petroleum Resources (Downstream)
 65. Petroleum Resources (Upstream)
 66. Police Affairs
 67. Population
 68. Ports, Harbours and Waterways
 69. Poverty Alleviation
 70. Power
 71. Privatization and Commercialization
 72. Public Procurement
 73. Public Safety and Intelligence
 74. Public Service Matters
 75. Rural Development
 76. Science and Technology
 77. Solid Minerals
 78. Special Duties
 79. Sports
 80. Steel
 81. Sustainable Development Goals
 82. Telecommunications
 83. Tertiary Education and Services
 84. Treaties, Protocols and Agreements
 85. Urban Development and Regional Planning
 86. Water Resources
 87. Women Affairs and Social Development
 88. Women in Parliament
 89. Works
 90. Youth Development
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Order 17, Rule 1(1 & 2) confers the power to nominate and appoint members of 
these committees with Committee on Selection. It further limits the membership 
size of these committees to 30 except the Committees on Appropriation, Constituency 
Outreach, FCT, Federal Character, Public Petitions, Niger Delta Development 
Commission, House Services, Public Accounts and Internally Displaced Persons, 
Refugees and Initiatives on North-East Zone each of which has a maximum of 40 
members. Rule 3 of the Order 17 stipulates that the Committees shall be guided by 
the rules of the House except in connection with the motion of high privileges (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 2016). This is because the committee system is an extension of 
the House. Anytime the committees are meeting, it is assumed that the House is 
meeting and all committees’ activities are regarded as legislative activities.
The powers and jurisdictions of the Committees are clearly stated in the Order 17 
and 18 of the Standing Order. These range from fixing of meeting days, organising 
public hearings, calling and interrogating witnesses, enforcing House rules and 
making recommendations to the House among others. The provisions also make 
room for the creation of sub-committees as may be required. However, despite the 
enormous powers granted the Committees, it places an express limitation to the 
powers of the Committees. Order 17, Rule 10 states that:
The House shall not delegate to any Committee the power to decide whether a bill shall be 
passed into law or to determine any matter which it is empowered to determine by resolu-
tion under these Rules. A Committee may, however, be authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the House on any such matter (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2016).
It is pertinent to note that the politics that goes into the nomination and selection of 
the committee members is enormous. The politics is heightened at the level of 
appointing the chairmen of the committees. The speaker wields enormous influence 
being the statutory chairman of the Committee on Selection. The fact that the prin-
cipal officers of the House make up the members of the Selection Committee makes 
the committee to be the most important and powerful committee in the House. The 
principal officers use the committee to check the perceive excesses or punish any 
member that is not on the same page with the House authority. For instance, Hon. 
Abdulmumin Jibrin was removed as the chairman of the House Committee on 
Appropriation of the eighth Assembly on July 20, 2016 by the speaker (Ogundipe 
2016). The speaker enjoyed the unanimous support of other principal officers who 
are members of the Selection Committee to dispose him and replace him with Hon. 
Mustapha Bala Dawaki (Odunsi 2016). Though, the situation led to a legislative 
mess of 2016 budget padding where the ousted chairman (Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin) 
raised several allegations against the principal officers and indicting all members 
including himself of corruption. The consequent of which is the House Committee 
on Ethics and Privileges triggering its powers as stipulated in Order 18, Rule 7 to 
recommend him for suspension which was approved by the House.
The oversight function of the House is carried out through the Committees. Each 
committee oversees the activities of the MDAs to ensure conformity to their statu-
tory mandates and budgetary provisions. However, this often creates confrontations 
between the two arms of government. While the legislature sees it as constitutional 
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role, the executive sees it as antagonistic venture. This trajectory is highly respon-
sible to the underperformance of this function by the National Assembly. The com-
mittees’ ineffectiveness is borne out of the hindrances facing the oversight functions. 
This includes executive resistance, institutional constraints, material resource con-
straints and composition of staff of Committees, among others (Hammalai 2010).
 House of Representatives Leadership
Section 50(1)b of the 1999 constitution (as amended) makes provision for the mem-
bers of the Nigerian House of Representatives to elect a speaker and a deputy 
speaker among themselves. However, this directive is not as easy as stated. The poli-
tics and power tussle that go into the implementation of the constitutional provision 
is enormous. Since 1999, the House of Representatives seldom experienced easy 
and smooth elections and appointments of its leaderships. At a point, the democratic 
project is put at a brink of collapse and at other points, the image of the legislature 
is soil beyond imagination; all because of the political tussle in electing the leader-
ship. Upon the inauguration of the chamber on June 3, 1999, the election its princi-
pal officers were characterised by political dynamics within the major parties 
(majority and minority parties). Hon. Salisu Buhari emerged as the speaker of the 
House of Representatives in an election somewhat peaceful on the surface but full 
of calumny behind the scene. However, he did not survive the muddy politics as he 
barely served for a year when the truth about his certificate forgery was unravelled 
which not only cost him his speakership but also signalled his end in Nigerian poli-
tics. He was replaced by Hon. Ghali Umar Na’Abba making the fourth House to 
have two speakers in 4 years. The fifth House witnessed a stable Assembly with 
very minimal controversy on the election and selections of the principal officers.
The disturbing trend continued in the sixth House when Hon. Patricia Etteh was 
removed in what is today known as Ettehgate in Nigerian politics that also claimed 
the life of a member. The emergence of Rt. Hon. Dimeji Bankole against the wish 
of the ruling party opened a new trend in the election of principal officers in the 
House. The members who belong to opposition parties in the House united to elect 
a member of the ruling party against the wish of the ruling party leaders. This also 
played out in the emergence of Rt. Hon. Aminu Tambuwal against the PDP leader-
ship choice: Hon. Mulikat Akande. The PDP opposition also paid the ruling APC in 
its own coin when Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara was elected against the choice of Hon. 
Femi Gbajabiamila.
This trajectory made the speakers to be powerful and have disregard for party 
directives. Their loyalties are usually to the internal caucus which sometimes led to 
internal power struggle during Committees allocation. The presiding officers 
 sometimes remove chairmen of committees and other principal officers in contro-
versial circumstances devoid of due process even against party’s directive. Example 
is the removal of Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin (chairman, House Committee on 
Appropriation) which led to a budget padding allegation. The trajectory of the 
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elections and the intrigues that follows earned the legislature to be nicknamed 
“National Assembly of Drama”. Ever since, the reoccurrence of drama in the pro-
cess of electing principal officers of the institution has become a tradition (as wit-
nessed in the Bankoleism, Tambuwalism and Dogaraism, among others). The 
elections of the principal officers have been enmeshed in controversy, desperation 
and bitter politicking portraying the institution negatively at the point of take-off of 
each Assembly. This is mostly responsible for why people score the institution very 
low even before been assessed. It is noted that this is not limited to the house but is 
more brutal in the Senate. As a result, the National Assembly as the central legisla-
ture is seen as the “indispensable bad egg” among the three arms of government.
Whether good or bad, the House of Representatives has produced 14 speakers 
since its inception including the seven speakers of the fourth republic since 1999. 
Their names and period of reign is shown in Table 2 below:
 Performance
Nigeria’s fourth republic has witnessed 18 years uninterrupted legislative politics 
and governance. This period registered the inauguration and dissolution of four 
House of Representatives assemblies, that is, fourth assembly (1999–2003), fifth 
assembly (2003–2007), sixth assembly (2007–2011), seventh assembly (2011–
2015) while the eighth assembly was inaugurated in June 2015 with the timeline 
spanning till 2019. Since 1999, the House of Representatives as a lower chamber 
has been performing its legislative functions of lawmaking, representation, over-
sight, budgeting among other functions assigned to it by the 1999 constitution (as 
Table 2 Chronological presentation of speakers of the Nigerian House of Representatives
S/No. Name Period of reign
1. Sir E. A. Fellows 1952–1955
2. Sir Fredrick Metcalfe 1955–1960
3. Rt. Hon. Dr. Jaja Amicha Nwachukwu 1960–1964
4. Rt. Hon. Ibrahim Jalo Waziri 1964–1966
5. Rt. Hon. Edwin Ume-Ezeoke 1979–1983
6. Rt. Hon. Benjamin Chaha Oct. 1983–Dec. 1983
7. Rt. Hon. Agunwa Anaekwe 1992–1993
8. Rt. Hon. Ibrahim Salisu Buhari June 3–July 22, 1999
9. Rt. Hon.Ghali Umar Na’Abba July 22–2003
10. Rt. Hon. Aminu Bello Masari 2003–2007
11. Rt. Hon. Patricia Olubunmi Etteh June – October 2007
12. Rt. Hon. Dimeji Sabur Bankole Oct. 2007–2011
13. Rt. Hon. Aminu Waziri Tambuwal 2011–2015
14. Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara June 2015 to date
Source: Authors computation from different sources
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amended). It is worthy of note that general assessment of the performance of the 
chamber with regard to these functions is impossible in a discourse of this nature, 
given the constraint of time and space, we decided to examine only lawmaking per-
formance in a comparative and exploratory perspective. This is premised on the fact 
that lawmaking is the primary duty expected of the legislature. Lawmaking is often 
used to define the legislature (as a lawmaking organ of government). Out of the four 
cardinal legislative functions, only bill making seems tangible and measurable in 
terms of number, content and impact. Perhaps, this accounted for why many legisla-
tive scholars adopted bill sponsorship to assess legislative effectiveness (see Ekor 
et al. 2014; Cox and William 2008; Miquel and Snyder 2006; Volden and Wiseman 
2009, 2013; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hall 1992, 1996; Wilson and Young 1997; 
Adler et al. 2003; Adler and Wilkerson 2005; Krutz 2005; Adler et al. 2005 among 
others). Other functions are difficult to measure especially with the peculiar nature 
of developing democracies like that of Nigeria. For instance, how representative is 
the legislature in the context of where the loyalty of members lies? Is it to the god-
fathers who determine electoral candidates or the electorates whose choices are 
limited? Furthermore, it is often difficult to assess legislative effectiveness in terms 
of budgeting because the legislature has power to appropriate fund but lack the abil-
ity to ensure its implementation. Finally, the legislators are often preoccupied with 
much legislative workload in the chambers and their constituencies which resulted 
in having less time and adequate resources for oversight function coupled with frus-
tration of the exercise by the executive and civil servants.
The fourth Assembly of the House of Representatives spanned from June 6, 1999 
to May 28, 2003. Throughout the 4-year tenure, it received 325 bills. Out of these, 
225 bills were sponsored by the legislators while the remaining 100 bills were 
Executive bills. The fourth House of Representatives was able to pass 103 bills with 
222 bills not passed. This put the performance level at 31.7% while 68.3% of the 
received bills were never passed. The fifth Assembly turned the table as 168 bills 
were passed out of the 343 bills received. The performance level rose geometrically 
to 49% (almost half of the received bills), though 175 bills (accounting for 51%) 
were not passed. It should be noted that the number of bills sponsored by the execu-
tive also rose to 146 with the legislators sponsoring 197 bills. The sixth Assembly 
received 503 bills, comprising 383 members’ bills and 120 executive bills. Out of 
the 503 bills, only 152 bills (30.2%) were passed with 351 bills not passed (69.8%). 
The seventh Assembly recorded a geometric increase in the number of bills received. 
The seventh House processed 755 bills out of which 679 were initiated by members 
with 70 sponsored by the Goodluck Jonathan-led executive. The remaining 6 were 
sent by the Senate for concurrent passage. The House was able to pass 123 of these 
bills making 16.3% performance level. Table  3 below gives a snapshot of the 
analysis.
In all, the House of Representatives introduced 1926 bills between 1999 and 
2015 (fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh assemblies) out of which 546 were passed. A 
number of these bills were passed with different gestation periods. However, while 
some were killed during debates, others met automatic death by virtue of the wind-
ing up of the Assembly in which they were introduced. This is because, once an 
L. Saka and A. R. Bakare
109
Assembly winds up, all its activities are terminated making the succeeding Assembly 
to begin afresh. The accumulated performance level is put at 28.3% as only 546 
bills were passed out of the 1926 bills received over the period under review. 
Judgmentally, the House of Representatives can be said to be ineffective in bill 
pushing giving the enormous number of bills killed. However, one should be careful 
in over flogging this conclusion as this trajectory may also confirm the fact the 
House is meticulous in its lawmaking function to ensure that only good laws are 
made for the good of the people and development of the country. Figure 1 below 
graphically shows the lawmaking performance trend of the fourth, fifth, sixth and 
seventh House of Representatives for comparative understanding.
The above Fig. 1 shows a contradictory performance trend. While the number of 
bills received by the House of Representatives increased continuous, the bill pas-
sage only increased during the fifth assembly but keeps diminishing thereof. The 
curiosity of unravel the causal factor(s) of this conflicting trajectory prompted our 
interaction with the lawmakers. This trajectory is attributed to the fact that legisla-
tors of the fourth assembly were relatively new to the system and lawmaking 
Table 3 Summary presentation of bills received and processed in the fourth, fifth, sixth and 
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procedure but gradually developed capacity to initiate and process bills overtime. 
However, the high turnover rate that characterised the transition election of 2007 
affected the National Assembly as most experienced legislators were not returned 
(Interview with Ahman-Pategi 2016; Akinderu-Fatai 2016; Oritsegbumi 2016). This 
was chiefly as a result of the notion of two-term maximum syndrome applicable to 
the executive but extrapolated to the legislature. Most people believe that after two 
terms, it is the turn of another person to take charge especially in line with consen-
sus agreement among several communities that make up a constituency on power 
rotation (Akinderu-Fatai 2016). This mostly leads to institutional memory loss and 
dearth of experienced lawmakers that ought to have facilitated the bill pushing 
beyond what was recorded.
 Conclusion
The HORs as a distinct chamber of the Nigerian National Assembly has witnessed 
18 years of uninterrupted legislative existence. Given that the legislature is often the 
first and the most significant casualty of the interruption of democratic processes 
arising from incessant military coups that characterised Nigeria’s political history, 
these years are no mean feat. While it might be misleading to argue that the 
Legislature as an institution and the House of Representatives as part of a whole 
have achieved institutionalisation in the Nigerian democratic context, the consis-
tency of legislative business since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in May 
1999 and experiences learned over the life span of four houses (fourth, fifth, sixth 
and seventh) had been significant in solidifying and strengthening the Nigerian 
National Assembly as a core pillar of the democratisation project in Nigeria.
As discussed in this study, the Nigerian House of Representatives is vested with 
enormous power and responsibilities by the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended. 
The most significant of these powers and responsibilities span core areas of law-
making, representation, oversight and budgeting. Given the low level of institution-
alisation of the legislature in Nigeria, it might be difficult to contextualise and gauge 
the performance of the House of Representatives on many of the functions and 
responsibilities as assigned by the constitution with the exception of lawmaking. 
Using lawmaking as the yardstick to measure performance this study put the accu-
mulated performance level of the House of Representatives at 28.3% as only 546 
bills were passed out of the 1926 bills received over the period under review. Thus, 
it can be safe to deduce that performance level of the House of Representatives is 
low when taking into consideration the numbers of bills received against those 
passed in the 18 years period spanning fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh House of 
Representatives. However, it is important to put this in context of the many chal-
lenges confronting the House of Representatives as a distinct chamber within the 
legislative institution in Nigeria.
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Leadership is key to every enterprise. Organizational behaviour is largely a function 
of the context and content of leadership at different levels. To a great extent, the 
success (or otherwise) of any institution is dependent on the quality of its leader-
ship, notably the vision, personality, goals and strategies of pursuing them.
The Nigerian Senate is no exception. It can be safely argued that since the incep-
tion of the current democratic process in 1999, activities at the upper legislative 
chamber have been determined by factors related to its leadership structure. The 
scenario is such that the Senate have spent substantial part of its tenure on leader-
ship tussles and the attendant debilitating impact of rapid leadership turn over on 
their legislative business.
This chapter analyses the leadership of the Senate from 1999 to date. It high-
lights the background to the emergence of successive leaders and issues that neces-
sitated their removal. The personality profile and decision making styles of these 
leaders are also examined vis-a-vis their larger implications for legislative-executive 
relations in Nigerian politics.
 Leadership and Personality
Plato outline three dominant elements found in every individual that determines his 
personality and role in the society. These are; reason located in head, courage or 
spirit located in the breast and desire which is located in the stomach. He concluded 
that it is only those individuals who are dominated by reason that should lead 
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(Anifowose and Enemuo 1999, p. 63). Thus as pointed out by Eze (2002) leadership 
is the most important factor that determines whether a nation can or will develop, 
and that a leadership that is free, brave, patriotic, people-oriented, destination- 
bound, understands the psychology of leading and applies it to the development of 
the people must be at the affairs of men.
Ayodele (2006, cited in Ebegbulem 2012, p. 222) defines a leader as an individ-
ual appointed to a job with authority, and accountability to accomplish the goals and 
objectives of the society. He asserts that a leader must be a good manager as well as 
an individual who is able to effectively coordinate the activities of followers or a 
team towards pre-agreed or pre-defined goal or objectives within the limits of avail-
able resources. A leader must be astute with both man and material. A leader must 
possess the ability to create in the followers the necessary enthusiasm/motivation to 
put in every necessary effort to deliver on set goals. The ability not only to conceive 
but also to communicate a vision or idea is of utmost importance as an attribute of 
leadership. Above all, a leader must first and foremost be a member of his own team, 
internalize their feelings and galvanize their potentials towards reaching the goal 
(Cited in Ebegbulem 2012, p. 222). Personality and trait-based approaches to lead-
ership argue that certain individuals have innate characteristics that make them ide-
ally suited for leadership, and these traits or characteristics are what differentiate 
these leaders from everyone else (Michelle 2011, p. 639).
Early approaches in this genre included the great man theories, which were 
based on the assumption that the capacity for leadership is inherent; that great lead-
ers are born, not made or developed. These theories often portrayed great leaders as 
heroic, mythical, and uniquely destined to rise to leadership when their skills were 
needed. The term “great man” reflects an assumption of these early theories that 
leadership was a predominantly male quality, especially in the domains of political 
and military leadership. One of the first systematic attempts to understand leader-
ship in the twenty-first century, the great man theory evolved into personality or 
trait based approaches as more modern research revealed that leadership was not 
inherently male-dominated and that leadership could be found and studied in more 
common settings rather than at the highest levels of organizations or nations. More 
than a century of research has been conducted on the traits that have been associated 
to a greater or lesser degree with leadership, and some traits have received consis-
tent support while others have emerged in some studies but not in others (Michelle 
2011, p. 639).
Researchers over the years have examined the relationship between Personality 
and Leadership with a strong focus on what is called the “Big Five” dimension. The 
Big Five personality factors are conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, 
openness, and extraversion, which some researchers have labelled the CANOE per-
sonality model as an easy aid to remembering each factor (Atamanik 2013, p. 1).
Conscientiousness is defined as an individual’s tendency to be organized, thor-
ough, controlled, decisive, and dependable. Of the Big Five factors, it is the person-
ality factor that has been related to leadership second most strongly (after 
extraversion) in previous research. Agreeableness or an individual’s tendency to be 
trusting, nurturing, conforming, and accepting, has been only weakly associated 
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with leadership. Neuroticism or the tendency to be anxious, hostile, depressed, vul-
nerable, and insecure, has been moderately and negatively related to leadership, 
suggesting that most leaders tend to be low in neuroticism. Openness is sometimes 
referred to as openness to experience, refers to an individual’s tendency to be curi-
ous, creative, insightful, and informed. Openness has been moderately related to 
leadership, suggesting that leaders tend to be somewhat higher in openness than 
non-leaders. Lastly, Extraversion is the personality factor that has been most 
strongly associated with leadership. Defined as the tendency to be sociable, asser-
tive, and have positive energy, extraversion has been described as the most impor-
tant personality trait of effective leaders.
 The Senate Leadership: Constitutional Provisions
Chapter five of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, 
clearly outlines the composition of the Senate and the procedure for the emergence 
its leadership. Sections 47 and 48 of the Chapter stipulate that:
• There shall be a National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a 
Senate and a House of Representatives; and that
• The Senate shall consist of three Senators from each state and one from the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
On the leadership of the Senate, Section 50 provides that;
 1. There shall be a President and a Deputy President of the Senate, who shall be 
elected by the members of that House from among themselves, and
 2. The President or Deputy President of the Senate or the Speaker or Deputy 
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall vacate his office-
 a. If he ceases to be a member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, 
as the case may be, otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the Senate or 
the House of Representatives; or
 b. When the House of which he was a member first sits after any dissolution of 
that House; or
 c. If he is removed from office by a resolution of the Senate or of the House of 
Representatives, as the case may be, by the votes of not less than two-thirds 
majority of the members of that House. (The 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria).
 Senate Leadership in Historical Perspective
The history of Senate in particular is as old as the institution itself in Nigeria. At the 
time of independence Nigeria chose to experiment with the Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy at the national level (Banjo 2013, p.  137), though the 
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system was ingrained with some characteristics of the American presidential 
system.
There was a House of Representatives (called the House of Commons in Great 
Britain), which was popularly elected in single-member districts that generally cor-
responded to ethnic divisions. Consistent with the Westminster model, the Nigerian 
House of Representatives elected the Prime Minister and Cabinet from its own 
members. There was also a senate that was patterned after the British House of 
Lords (Paul 2005, p. 13). Within this period, Nigeria had three Senate Presidents; 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dennis Osadebay and Nwafor Orizu. Osadebay succeeded 
Azikwe when the latter moved on to become the nation’s ceremonial president.
The First Republic was followed by a thirteen-year military interregnum, which 
came to an end on September 30, 1979. The new Second Republican Constitution 
for a bicameral legislature which comprised a 450-member House of Representatives 
and a 95-member Senate, jointly referred to as the National Assembly. Within this 
period, the Senate was headed by Dr. Joseph Wayas.
Again, the Second Republic was truncated by another 16 years of military inter-
vention between 1983 and 1999. Attempt at democratization in 1993 under the 
General Ibrahim Babangida transition programme was aborted with the annulment 
of the 1993 Presidential Elections by the military rulers. Within the transition to 
civil rule agenda were elections into the parliament. The inauguration of the Senate, 
brief as its tenure was, produced two presidents for the upper chamber, Dr Iyorchia 
Ayu and Ameh Ebute (Banjo 2013, p. 138).
The structure of the parliament in the Fourth Republic was not different from 
what had existed under the previous Republics. Consequently, the 1999 Constitution 
provided for a 360-member House of Representatives and a 109-member Senate.
Between 1999 and the current regime, the leadership of the Senate had changed 
seven times. Chief Evan Enwerem who was elected the president of the Senate in 
1999 was succeeded 5 months after by Dr. Chuba Okadigbo. Okadigbo’s tenure was 
also short-lived as he was impeached alongside the Deputy President of Senate 
Haruna Abubakar on August 10, 2000. Senator Anyim Pius Anyim succeeded Dr. 
Okadigbo and served in that capacity till the end of the regime in 2003.
Following the general election in 2003, Senator Adolphus Wabara emerged as 
the Senate President, but he was forced to resign by his colleagues on the 5th of 
April 2005, and was replaced by Senator Ken Nnamani who led the Senate till the 
end of the Second Senate on 29 May, 2007.
Between 2007 and 2015, the Senate leadership witnessed a relatively greater 
stability, with the election of Senator David Mark as its President. He was not only 
the first Senate President to complete his tenure, but was re-elected for another four 
year term in same capacity. In fact he was determined to retain same position for a 
third term but for the defeat suffered by his party, People Democratic Party (PDP) 
in the 2015 general elections, a development that led to the emergence of Senator 
Bokula Saraki of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC), as new Senate 
President.
In all the changes in leadership, certain issues become germane and are worth con-
sidering. Firstly, the national government in the period under review, May 1999–2015 
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was led by or single political party, the PDP. Similarly the party had the majority of 
members in both the Senate and House of Representative for the different legislative 
assemblies within the period. Consequently, it is safe to argue that the crises that 
engendered the rapid leadership turn over within this period were more intra than 
inter-party in nature, some bothering on one or a combination of the following factors: 
Personality clashes among political gladiators, financial irregularities and administra-
tive lapses in leadership, and meddleness of the executive in the affairs of the legisla-
ture and the attendant frosty relationship between the executive and legislature, 
institutions controlled by the same party at the national level. Subsequent sections 
further analyze these issues in details.
 Factors Affecting Leadership Change in Senate
As earlier pointed out, Evan Enwerem tenure as the president of the First Senate in 
1999 was brief. This was occasioned majorly by the events leading to his ascension 
to leadership, especially the squabbles within the ruling PDP on the choice between 
groups routing for the Senate President and his main challenger, Dr Chuba Okadigbo. 
The voting pattern in the election to the Senate Presidency is equally instructive. 
With 64 to 41 votes in favour of Enwerem, it shows ab initio, a house divided 
against itself, especially that Okadigbo was able to rally the support of the PDP 
members in the Senate against the choice of his party, while the Presidency success-
fully mobilized the opposition parties against the move by PDP members against 
the Enwerem’s candidacy. With the election over, the barrage of attacks against the 
office and personality of the Senate President began.
Firstly, Enwerem was labelled a stooge of the Executive, especially President 
Olusegun Obasanjo. Secondly, the Senate President’s style of leadership came 
under intense criticism. He was considered too slow and uninspiring in his approach 
to legislative business. To Banjo (2013, p. 138) Enwerem was simply “uncharis-
matic, lacklustre and without direction” such that only 16 bills and same number of 
motions were presented in Senate during his 5-month tenure.
Similar attacks on Enwerem’s personality were centred on his actual educational 
qualifications, age and even the overtly ridiculous, his real name. Aspersion were 
cast in these directions with a view to damaging his integrity and by extension his 
leadership quality. Never in the history of the Nigerian Senate did we witness a 
leadership so ridiculed, maligned and disgraced by his colleagues.
The opposition to his leadership eventually reverberated in the Second Chamber, 
the House of Representatives, which also saw Enwerem as an extension of the exec-
utive arm of government. The animosity led the House to commence a boycott of all 
joint sessions of parliament at which Enwerem would preside.
The climax of the intrigue was a motion by opposition Senator Arthur Nzeribe, 
calling for the impeachment of the Senate President. His grounds could be summa-
rized as follow: the decimation of the legislature under Enwerem’s leadership by a 
dictatorial executive arm of government; The erosion of the moral authority and 
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 confidence of the Senate arising the aforementioned issues bothering on the integ-
rity of the person of the Senate President, Enwerem was consequently impeached 
by a vote of 92 to 2, and his main challenger, Dr Okadigbo was elected in his stead. 
It was obvious from the background to his emergence that Okadigbo’s tenure would 
re- define the legislature-executive relationship, especially with the humiliation of 
the preferred candidate of the presidency by his colleagues.
To be sure, Dr Okadigbo ascended the position with a rich political and academic 
pedigree. Unlike Enwerem whose major political antecedents were his chairman-
ship of the Nigeria Airports Authority between 1980 and 1983 under the Shagari 
administration and his brief spell as Governor of Imo State (1991–1993), Okadigbo 
was not only a Professor of Political Philosophy, he was a gifted orator who served 
the Shagari government as Political Adviser to the President. Also he was in the 
limelight in the various political alignments and constitutional conference that pre-
ceded the return to civil rule in 1999, with his active membership of the late Shehu 
Yar’Adua Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM). The PDM was a formidable ally 
in the formation of the PDP and its members including Atiku Abubakar, the Vice 
President held major positions during the Obasanjo’s tenure as President.
Therefore, it was obvious from the fierceness of the jostling for the Senate 
Presidency that Okadigbo saw the position as his natural possession for reasons not 
unconnected with the aforementioned personal attributes and political base. But by 
twist of fate, the same factors that propelled his leadership in Senate also became 
Okadigbo’s major undoing. For no sooner had he emerged the president that allega-
tions bothering on intellectual arrogance and disdain for his colleagues emerged 
against Okadigbo. Alienation of his supporters in Senate became a major spring 
board of the executive arm which exploited the internal dissatisfaction in Senate to 
launch a major tirade against Okadigbo and his office. Attempts by Okadigbo to re- 
assert the independence of the legislature, compromised by his predecessor, were 
seen as legislative rascality and deliberate attempts to undermine the executive. We 
saw an example of this in the controversy that attended the late passage of the 2000 
Appropriate Bill, which the presidency interpreted as part of Okadigbo’s grand 
design to frustrate its efforts and programmes.
The fear of the Executive was heightened when the Senate President permitted 
Senator Nzeribe to move a motion detailing alleged “impeachable” infractions of 
the president. It was obvious from that period that whatever basis of trust existed 
between the two arms of government had been permanently destroyed by this sin-
gular legislative episode. The presidency not only became suspicious of Okadigbo, 
the rights of his office and person were violated with impunity. An instance was 
when the police raided his home ostensibly in search of the maze allegedly “stolen” 
by the Senate President. This was followed by series of attack on Okadigbo’s moral 
platform with allegations of financial misappropriation, indiscipline and corruption. 
The presidency apparently succeeded in undermining his office by capitalizing on 
the rising disenchantment of his colleagues who had begun to perceive Okadigbo’s 
flamboyance and rising natural prominence as deliberate alienation bothering on 
intellectual arrogance. The highpoint of the intrigues was the setting up of the 
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Senator Idris Kuta committee by the Senate Presidency to investigate allegations 
bothering on the following issues:
 1. Inflation of electrification contracts from a 55 million naira estimated to over 150 
million naira.
 2. Disregard of the tendering process, and nepotism.
 3. Award of contracts to unregistered companies.
 4. Recklessness in expenditure particularly with respect to expenses on Christian 
and Moslem festivals.
 5. Lack of proper recording of physical movement of properties by Senate 
officials.
The committee found Okadigbo culpable, and following the adoption of the 
committee report, the Senate removed him on August 8, 2000, and elected Senator 
Pius Anyim as its new President. The coming on board of Pius Anyim as Senate 
President was greeted with mixed feelings both in the parliament and larger society, 
and the reasons are not far-fetched. Firstly, compared to his predecessors, at 39 years 
of age, he was considered young for the exalted position of the Senate Presidency. 
Secondly by his political trajectory, he was seen as politically inexperienced. His 
foray into active national politics was in 1998 when he became a member of the 
United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), and became a Senator a year later under the 
platform of the PDP. Consequently, not a few were apprehensive on his ability to 
handle the volatile political manoeuvrings, polarization and factionalization associ-
ated with the Senate.
But Pius Anyim soon proved his critics wrong not only by the way he handled its 
affairs, but by the relative peace that characterized his Senate Presidency. Part of his 
strategies was to strive at maintaining the independence of the legislature while at 
the same time cultivating a harmonious working relationship with the executive 
arm. Even though some of his colleagues felt uncomfortable with his non- 
confrontational approach to matters relating to the executive, the approach at least 
ensured for him a smooth sail with an obviously cantankerous presidency.
However, that relative peaceful executive-legislative relationship was shattered 
with the new attempt at impeaching President Obasanjo in August 2002. Particularly, 
for the Senate President, the event marked another turning point in his relationship 
with the embattled president who found him culpable in the motion moved by 
Senator Idris Mohammed calling for the resignation or impeachment of the presi-
dent. Consequently, counter attempts at removing the Senate president began simul-
taneously with Senator Arthur Nzeribe again as the arrow head. His grounds were 
not different from his earlier adventures in the Enwerem’s and Okadigbo’s saga.
Nzeribe had accused Anyim of financial corruption in handling the impeachment 
move against President Obasanjo. Specifically he charged Anyim of appropriating 
60 million of the 300 million bribe money allegedly doled by the Presidency to 
Senators in order to for stall the impeachment moves. However the tension gener-
ated in the senate by both events soon abated as both the President and Senate 
President successfully completed their tenure in May 2003.
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Following the 2003 general elections, Senator Adolphus succeeded Anyim in 
spite opposition from two prominent Senators, Arthur Nzeribe and Ifeanyi Ararume. 
As a two-time Senator, Nwabara came on board the Senate leadership more experi-
enced in legislative business than Pius Anyim. But his tenure was also not spared the 
intrigues that brought down his predecessors. Firstly, his re-election to Senate was 
marred in controversy following the legal challenge instituted by his main rival 
Elder Dan Imo of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) against his victory. It took 
the ruling of an Abuja High Court to seal his place in Senate, a victory that became 
an object of ridicule among his opponents even in Senate (some referred to it as a 
“Black Market” court order). This was followed by two bribe scandals involving the 
Senate President and the key members of government. Nwabara was alleged to have 
received a 54 million and another 55 million bribe to facilitate an upward review of 
budgets of the Federal Ministry of Education and the National Universities 
Commission. The crisis led to the resignation of the Senate President on April 25, 
2005, <2 years in the saddle.
However, to some, these were more than meet the eye in the removal of Nwabara. 
This was particularly so given his overt resistance to what has become the “third 
term bid” of President Obasanjo through an amendment to the 1999 constitution, 
which clearly stipulates a maximum two-term for the President. Allegations against 
Nwabara were therefore seen more as “the voice of Jacob but the hand of Esau”, as 
some perceived his eventual removal as clearly instigated by the executive.
Senator Ken Nnamani was thereafter elected the Senate President and he led the 
Senate until the inauguration of a new legislature following 2007 general elections. 
His tenure was relatively peaceful and his handling of the Constitutional Amendment 
Bill especially the controversial provision on tenure extension for the President was 
suggestive of his high level maturity and leadership qualities. The open debate, 
consideration and voting on various provisions of the bill no doubt endeared the 
Senate under Nnamani’s leadership to the Nigerian public, who have come to view 
the leadership and decisions of the upper house with disdain and suspicious of 
financial inducement from the executive. For public opinion was manifestly against 
presidential tenure elongation and Nnamani became an instant hero of that struggle 
by popular forces including organised labour, students and civil society groups.
Senate David Mark succeeded Nnamani and became the first and only President 
of the Senate to complete a two-term of four years each in spite the vigorous intra 
and inter party opposition and schemings against his candidature. First was the chal-
lenge to his election as Senator by the rival candidate of the ANPP, which he scaled 
over at the election tribunals. Secondly was the opposition from his base, Benue 
State, particularly Joseph Waku a former Senator who spared no opportunity to 
castigate and ridicule David Mark. He fingered the immediate past President 
Olusegun Obasanjo as the major force behind the emergence of Mark as Senate 
President, and saw that only as further attempts at deepening the subservient role of 
parliament to the executive, but also entrench the domineering influence of Obasanjo 
on the new government.
David Mark’s tenure as Senate President was in structure in several respects. He 
was the most stable compared with his predecessors. Though there were various 
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parliamentary rows, none threatened his position as the President. Perhaps this 
could be attributed to his mature and bi-partisan disposition to issues. For instance, 
the political engineering of the Senate in promulgating the doctrine of necessity as 
a platform for then Vice President Good luck Jonathan to assume the role of an 
Acting President saved the nation from an obvious major political crisis following 
the medical challenge that incapacitated the tenure of Musa Yar’Adua. It is to 
Senator Mark’s credit that under his leadership, the Senate witnessed more harmo-
nious relationship with the executive. Even the amendments to the constitution 
passed by the National Assembly and to which the President withheld his assent 
could not jeopardise the established bond between the two organs of government.
Similarly, his handling of the intra-PDP crisis that led to the cross-carpeting of 
some members of the party to the opposition APC reflected his dexterity in manage-
ment of parliamentary affairs. By refusing to declare vacant the seats of defecting 
Senators, even against the wish of his party, Mark was able to command the bi- 
partisan loyalty of the Senate till the end of his tenure. This becomes more instruc-
tive when the rancorous nature of the House of Representatives occasioned by a 
similar circumstance is compared with the serenity of the Senate.
On other issues involving the executive such as the non-implementation of 
appropriation bills by the executives, allegations of corruption against ministers and 
agencies of government especially the Aviation and Petroleum ministers, other 
oversight responsibilities, the non-conflictual manner they were handled vis-a-vis 
the House of Representatives again pointed to the positive aspects of David Mark 
leadership style as Senate President.
Also, it should be noted that Mark’s tenure did not witness the allegations of 
bribery, corruption, fraud and misappropriation of funds, especially in the award of 
contracts that characterized his predecessors. Perhaps his long years in Senate as a 
witness to the rise and fall of its leaders became useful lessons in leadership for 
Senator Mark. It was obvious from the facts on ground that but for the defeat of his 
party in the 2015 general elections, Mark would have served an unprecedented third 
term as Nigeria’s Senate President.
The defeat of the PDP and the rise to power of the opposition All Progressive 
Congress (APC) in 2015 produced a new set of Senate leadership. But the crisis 
within the emergent ruling party led to new forms of power relations and coalition 
within the Senate. On one side was an amalgam of PDP members now in the minor-
ity and some APC members made up of mainly former PDP members who left for 
the APC at the height of the intra-party crisis that preceded the 2015 elections. This 
group was loyal to the candidature of Abubakar Bukola Saraki. Others were the 
APC members routing for the adopted party candidate Ahmed Lawal. Saraki, not 
only contested the Senate Presidency against his party directive, but also emerged 
victorious. But much more interesting was the emergence a Deputy Senate President, 
Ike Ekweremadu from the flocks of the opposition Peoples Democratic Party.
This did not only open a new chapter in Nigeria’s legislative business as a new 
Senate leadership from two different parties emerged, but also triggered a resur-
gence of intra and inter-party acrimony that characterized the pre-David Mark 
Senate. Similarly, this new development threatened the harmony that was 
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 successfully established between the legislature and executive under the leadership 
of David Mark.
Today, the greatest critics of the Senate President are members of his own party, 
who are yet to come to terms with the reality of his affront against the position of 
the party on the choice of leadership of Senate. Saraki’s alliance with the PDP to 
elect him and a member of the opposition PDP as his Deputy has continued to dis-
please a cross-section of his party who have used every available platform to call for 
their removal. All efforts at ensuring this have failed, including the use of state 
machinery to prosecute the Senate President and his wife at the Code of Conduct 
Tribunal (CCT) for alleged false declaration of assets when the former was a gover-
nor of one of the states in Nigeria, Kwara, between 2003 and 2011. Many are wont 
to ascribe some ulterior motives to the prosecution coming four years after the crime 
was allegedly committed and just on the heels of Saraki’s confrontation with his 
party on the Senate Presidency. But while Saraki was eventually acquitted at the 
tribunal, another criminal case linking him with sponsorship of a dreaded armed 
robbery gang in his state was hung on his neck by the Police authorities. These were 
in addition to the Police barricade of the residences of both Saraki and his Deputy, 
and the National Assembly by personnel of the Directorate of State Services at dif-
ferent times, in what were seen as deliberate ploys by the security agencies, acting 
in concert with the Presidency, to prevent the two leaders from attending plenary 
where plans by opponents to remove them from their offices were already con-
cluded. The climax of the acrimony was the defection of Saraki and other members 
of the ruling party in the National Assembly to the opposition PDP. With the gale of 
defections effectively altering the numerical strength to the disadvantage of the rul-
ing party in the Senate, it effectively put paid to any move at constitutionally effect-
ing any change in the Senate presidency as it appeared difficult for the APC to 
muster the required two-thirds vote to execute such plans. Thus, it became more 
obvious that the tenure of Saraki’s Presidency was intricately tied to how long he 
was able to sustain the coalition with the PDP members and the motley of his former 
APC sympathizers in the Senate, especially their capacity to withstand, ignore or 
resist the intimidation, cajoling, and incorporation strategies of the ruling party.
 Conclusion
To be sure, the Senate of the Fourth Republic recorded the rise and fall of several 
leaders, 7 in 16 years. As this chapter explains, the instability in the leadership of the 
Senate was occasioned by number of factors, including administrative corruption, 
personality clash, leadership style, intra and inter-party politics, as well as unhealthy 
relationship between the executive and legislative arms. The only exemption was 
under David Mark between 2007 and 2015 when the Upper House witnessed a rela-
tive stability in its leadership and conduct of legislative business.
O. M. Ajayi and A. Muawiyya
123
References
Anifowose, R & Enemuo, F. (1999), Element of Politics, Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publication.
Atamanik, C. (2013), The Introverted Leader: Examining the Role of Personality and Environment, 
FIU Centre for Leadership.
Banjo, A. (2013), Leadership Crisis in the Parliament of Nigeria: The Case of the Senate in the 
Fourth Republic, Journal of African Studies and Development, Vol, 5(6).
Ebegbulem, J.E. (2012), Corruption and Leadership Crisis in Africa, Nigeria in Focus: International 
Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol, 3. N0, 11.
Eze, N. (2002), Leadership Psychology in National Development. Paper presented at the National 
Conference on the Challenges of Democratization in Nigeria organized by the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Lagos, July 2002.
Michelle, B.C. (2011), Personality Theories of Leadership: Encyclopaedia of Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations (2009), SAGE publication.
Paul, J.K. (2005), Comparative Government and Politics: Nigeria Briefing Paper College Board 
Advanced Placement Program, University of Pennsylvania.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Government Printing.
News Papers
The Guardian, November 25, 2015.
The Naira Land Forum, May 9, 2015.
The Post Nigeria, June 9, 2015.
The Premium Times, April 7, 2015.
The Source, February 17, 2014. Vol, 34. N0, 18.
The Sun, November 25, 2015.
This Day Live, October 24, 2015.
The Vanguard, November 24, 2015.
Web Sites
www.senatorbukolasarakiupdate.2015
Senate Leadership in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999 to Date
125© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 
J. Y. Fashagba et al. (eds.), The Nigerian National Assembly,  
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11905-8_8
Inter-Chamber Relations in Nigeria’s 
Presidential System in the Fourth Republic
Omololu Fagbadebo
 Introduction
In recent times, some bicameral legislatures are proposing the eradication of their 
second chambers. In March, 2017, Mauritanian president, Mohamed Ould Abdel 
Aziz, announced that a referendum would take place to determine whether or not 
the senate would be abolished (NEWS24 2017). The constitutional amendment 
process, which started in 1991, reached a stalemate when a majority member of the 
senate voted against the proposal. In Canada, opinion polls indicated that a major-
ity of the citizens supported either the reform or abolition of the senate (Kennedy 
2015; Trimble 2014). In 2012, the Senegalese senate was abolished (Allison 2012; 
Magaji 2016).
The demand to reform or abolish the second chambers has led to a series of 
works on the decline of the second chamber (Coakley 2013, 2014; Bochel and Defty 
2012). This consideration has been hinged on the notion that the second chamber is 
nothing other than mere talking shops and waste of resources. The Senegalese 
decision, for instance, was ‘intended to curb government spending, and will provide 
the cash needed to help the victims of the yearly rains which have left thousands 
homeless and killed at least 13 people’ (Magaji 2016). The government claimed that 
the 100-member Senate would save the country of about $15 million.
This is not surprising. In 2014, out of the 192 legislatures in the data base of the 
Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), 113 (59%) were unicameral while 79 (41.15%) 
were bicameral (Drexhage 2015). Out of these countries, however, Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Oman, Slovenia, categorised as bicameral, are functionally unicameral because 
their second chambers, the senate, play mere advisory role. Countries like Botswana, 
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Iran, and Indonesia that are declared unicameral in the IPU data base were consid-
ered in the literature to be bicameral systems, because two decision-making assem-
blies are involved in passing legislation (Russell 2013). Nevertheless, Coakley 
(2014) has discovered that there was a resurgence after the initial decline of the 
second chamber.
In bicameral legislature, the relationship between the two chambers is usually 
regulated by extant constitutional provisions. This is essential because of the need 
for boundaries of operation since the primary function of the legislative branch of 
the government is to represent the totality of the interest of the citizens. Essentially, 
bicameralism is a measure to prevent misuse of law-making power of the legislature. 
As the custodian of the general will of the society, the legislature is the conscience 
of the population. The purpose of its establishment is to serve as the approving 
authority for the necessary ‘measures that will form the law of the land’ (Norton 
2013, p. 1).
In parliamentary systems, the legislature has the power to make, break or main-
tain the government (Martin et al. 2014). With the fusion of the executive and legis-
lative power, the majority leadership has a monopoly of control of legislative 
process, to determine the agenda of the government. In other words, the legislatures 
in presidential systems lack the autonomy to operate without executive interference. 
On the contrary, the legislatures in presidential systems operate as independent 
institutions with agenda-setting power for the executive. Thus, the executive requires 
the cooperation of the legislature for policy process. In other words, the policy 
influence of the legislatures in presidential system is significant.
 Perspectives on Inter-Chambers Relations
There are two major perspectives to explain the establishment of bicameral legisla-
ture. The first perspective incorporates Montesquieu’s position on the danger of 
concentration of the power of the government in a single individual or institution 
(Shell 2001; Coakley 2013, 2014). In other words, while it is good to enforce 
separation of powers among the three branches of the government, it was also right 
to ensure that legislative power is not domicile in only one group. The argument is 
that such arrangement could provide avenue for abuse and misuse of power. As 
such, it would be expedient to have a ‘blend or mixtures sources which contribute to 
the authority exercised by government’ (Shell 2001, p.  5). Thus, the theory that 
underlies the establishment of bicameral legislature is rooted in the notion of checks 
and balances.
The justification for this perspective stemmed from the works of classical politi-
cal philosophers on the need to protect the citizens against the oppression of the 
rulers. The Aristotelian conception of a mixed constitution sought for the combina-
tion of the elements enshrined in the monarchical, aristocratic and democratic prin-
ciples with a view to preventing tyranny and abuse of public power (Drexhage 
2015). The central focus is the need to exercise power in a manner that would cater 
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for the interest of the public. Thus, the concept of separation of powers among the 
institutions of government, as championed by Montesquieu, was informed by the 
need to safeguard the political freedoms and interests of the citizens (Drexhage 
2015).
In England, as of the time Montesquieu propounded his theory of separation of 
power, the English monarch was the custodian of power in a unicameral parliament. 
The advent of a two-chamber parliament in England decentralized the political 
power of the state. And the interest of the people ‘were best safeguarded, because 
the political power there was divided between the King, who had the executive 
power, and two legislative assemblies in which the various estates were represented’ 
(Drexhage 2015, p. 7).
Montesquieu has noted
In such a state there are always persons distinguished by their birth, riches, or honours: but 
were they to be confounded with the common people, and to have only the weight of a 
single vote like the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and they would have no 
interest in supporting it, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The 
share they have, therefore, in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other 
advantages in the state; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to check 
the licentiousness of the people, as the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of 
theirs. The legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the nobles, and to that 
which represents the people, each having their assemblies and deliberation apart, each their 
separate views and interests (Montesquieu 1752 (2006), pp. 153–154).
The second perspective has to do with the need for a multiple source of wisdom in 
the administration of the power of the people. The notion is that counsels from 
various sources would energise the government, especially when special attention is 
‘given to the wise, the experienced, the distinguished, the elderly and the 
meretricious’ (Shell 2001, p. 6). As Shell (2001, p. 6) has noted, ‘government is not 
simply about the exercise of power; it is also about sound judgement and persuasion 
based on reasoned argument’. James Madison in the Federalist Papers No 63, rose 
in the defence of the senate on this ground.
Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be 
sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number 
so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the 
portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the 
pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and 
prosperity of the community (Madison 1788 [2008]).
This argument has its root in the ideas of the ancient political philosophers. Aristotle 
was an advocate of the composition of the elders, who, with their experience and 
wisdom, reinvigorate decision making in the government (Tesebelis and Money 
1997). Ancient advocates of aristocratic government were motivated not by a self- 
seeking desire in the system but by the fact that the few educated class of people at 
the time when education opportunities were limited, would bring their wealth of 
knowledge and wisdom into the improvement of the government. Thus, the idea of 
a second chamber was based on the assumption that the wisdom of the senate would 
ensure better political outcomes.
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Speaking further, Madison acknowledged the importance of the popular will but 
pointed out the danger of a rash decision engendered by passion. Thus, to him, a 
second chamber was ‘necessary as a defense to the people against their own 
temporary errors and delusions’ (Madison 1788[2008]).
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually 
will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are 
particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, 
or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may 
call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate 
and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the 
blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain 
their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens 
have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the 
tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible 
reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next 
(Madison, 1788[2008]).
Tesebelis and Money (1997) have posited that efficient bicameral legislatures are 
capable of producing both better legislation and stable political outcomes. They 
argue that the concurrence voting requirement from the two chambers for the 
passage of major legislations would eliminate the potential tendency of majoritarian 
autocracy of a unicameral legislature. The concurrent majority is an instrument 
designed to reduce ‘corruption and slowing the legislative process’ (Tesebelis and 
Money 1997, p. 40).
The collusion of the opinion of more individuals in two separate institutions is 
essential to provide a safety avenue for second thoughts on public policy. Thus, the 
delay in legislative process arising from the presence of a second chamber is a 
healthy strategy to ensure the outcome of an efficient and enduring legislation. 
Essentially, the second chamber affords the polity of an institution of quality control 
in decision making process though the practice of second opinion in decision- 
making process (Tesebelis and Money 1997).
Quality control rests on two ideas. The first is preventive: knowing that some else will 
examine the product makes the producer more careful initially. Second, there is a system to 
discover mistakes after they have been made been committed. A second chamber, regardless 
of its level of expertise and wisdom, constitutes such a quality-control mechanism (Tesebelis 
and Money 1997, p. 40).
In other words, the practice of checks and balances in legislative process is neces-
sary to ensure quality control of legislative decisions. The authors of the Federalist 
Papers, especially Hamilton and Madison, were concerned about the necessity of 
averting the tyranny of a single chamber in policy process. They were more 
interested in a constitutional safeguard in order to cater for the error arising from the 
individuals who might forget their obligations to their constituents (Tesebelis and 
Money 1997; Coakley 2013, 2014). To them, the second chamber would serve as 
measure to double the security of the interest of the people because of the concurring 
requirements of bicameral legislature in legislative decisions.
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 Evolution of Inter-Chamber Relations
The bicameral legislative structure evolved as part of the developments in the legis-
lative institution. Primarily, the legislature became recognised structure of the gov-
ernment in order to serve as an avenue of consultation for the kings in the medieval 
Europe (Shell 2001). Bicameralism emerged ‘because different forms of consulta-
tion were deemed appropriate with different sections or orders of society’ (Shell 
2001, p. 5). It evolved, more or less by chance, in different forms and period in 
England and the United States (Drexhage 2015). As Drexhage (2015, p.  7) has 
noted, its evolution ‘was not underpinned by a carefully thought-out philosophy 
about the institutional design of state government’. The second chamber was created 
in the English parliament in the fourteenth century (Shell 2001, p. 5). The essence 
of its creation was to ensure separate representation for the nobles and the church, 
and the ‘remainder of society’. The House of Lords represents the interests of the 
feudal lords, spiritual and temporal, and the House of Common represents the 
interests of the citizens, the commoners (Drexhage 2015; Shell 2001).
The bicameral parliament in the British political system has grown in power 
above the king and ‘became an enduring institution in which both chambers could 
develop their own right to exist and their own legitimacy’ (Drexhage 2015, p. 7).
Thus the intellectual roots of bicameralism do not lie simply in the need for the different 
classes of society, or different estates of the realm, to be separately represented in different 
parliamentary chambers. Instead they lie in much more ancient notions going back to the 
dawn of government as a rational endeavour of the human mind and spirit (Shell 2001, 
p. 5).
In the United States, the idea of a second chamber, the senate, was a compromise of 
the two competing opinions over the representative institution. During the confederal 
period in American politics, there was a single congress composed of one member 
each of the thirteen British Colonies of North America (Drexhage 2015; Wood 
1998). The drafters of the constitution however opted for a bicameral legislative 
structure to comprise the Senate, where all the states will have equal representation, 
and the Congress, with membership drawn in proportion to the population size of 
each state. Unlike the British system, the bicameral legislature in the United States 
was based on territorial interest rather than the interests of different estates or social 
classes (Wood 1998). This territorial representation is congruent with the principle 
of federalism in a plural society. In America, there was the notion that a second 
chamber was a necessity to serve as a bridge between the power of the people 
expressed in the House of Representatives, and the power of the executive, domicile 
in the presidency.
Inter-Chamber Relations in Nigeria’s Presidential System in the Fourth Republic
130
 Bicameral Legislature in the Nigerian Presidential System
In Nigeria, the adoption of a presidential system of government in the Second 
Republic heralded the era of separation of powers between the legislature and the 
executive arms of the government. The parliamentary system of the First Republic 
operated on the principle of fusion of the executive and legislative powers 
(MAMSER 1987). The choice of a bicameral legislature at the centre did rest on the 
principle of federalism; the need to balance the interests of the component units. 
With varied population of the states, the House of Representatives would not be able 
to achieve the need for equal representation of the varied interests of the people in 
the policy making process in an ethnically differentiated federal state (MAMSER 
1987).
The thinking of the drafters of the constitution was that a bicameral legislature in 
the Nigeria’s presidential system would provide equal voice to all sections of the 
country in the policy making process. Aside from this, a second chamber in the 
legislature would also provide an opportunity for a second opinion in the policy 
making process.
The Political Bureau that was set up in 1986 to fashion an appropriate system of 
government for the country however recommended a unicameral legislature for the 
then impending Third Republic (MAMSER 1987). One of the arguments against a 
bicameral legislature at the National Assembly was that it was expensive for the 
country, and that it was a conflict prone legislative arrangement capable of slowing 
down the machinery of the government (MAMSER 1987). The Political Bureau 
specifically states:
We are of the view that a second chamber either at the state or federal level is superfluous. 
We therefore, recommend unicameral legislatures of both state and federal levels. This, in 
our view, does not diminish the role that a legislature has to play in sustaining the democratic 
system. In a presidential form of government, such as we have recommended, we are 
persuaded that the unicameral legislature should not only make laws but also be informed 
of the way in which those laws are executed. In our situation, a unicameral assembly is 
probably more able to fulfil the function of a vigilant check on presidential powers than a 
bicameral one. Finally, in recommending a unicameral legislature the Bureau is guided also 
by the expressed wishes of the Nigerian peoples to minimize the cost of government 
(MAMSER 1987, p. 80).
This insight indicates the two perspectives upon which the Nigerian society views 
the appropriateness of a bicameral legislature. Nevertheless, the acceptance of a 
bicameral legislature, in theory, might have been informed by the need to uphold the 
federal principle (Mba 2014; Oni 2013; Lafenwa 2009; Awotokun 1998; Oyediran 
2007; Nwabueze 1982).
This position was succinctly puts thus:
The rationale for the establishment of bicameral legislature in Nigeria was based on issues 
of ethnic suspicion, fear of political and economic domination at federal and state levels and 
uneven access to wealth among others. Consequently, the National Assembly was created 
with the wisdom of the great compromise…The compromised arrangement that put the 
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National Assembly in place in 1999 envisaged an assembly with diverse interest and views 
which make conflict and disagreement inevitable (Mba 2014, p. 678).
The Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, like the Second Republic and the aborted Third 
Republic, operates on a bicameral legislature at the national level with constitutional 
requisites for the performance of a collaborative legislative activities.
 Constitutional Provisions on Inter-Chambers Relations 
in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
The National Assembly is composed of two chambers: the Senate, the upper cham-
ber, and the House of Representatives, the lower chamber. Sections 48 and 49 of the 
constitution stipulate the composition of the membership of each of the chambers. 
The Senate consists of 109 members elected on the basis of three senators per state 
and one from the Federal Capital Territory (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). The House of Representatives, on the other hand, is composed of 
‘three hundred and sixty members representing constituencies of nearly equal popu-
lation as far as possible, provided that no constituency shall fall within more than 
one state’ (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
The legislative power of the country is domicile in the National Assembly. 
Section 4 (1–5) of the constitution vests the National Assembly with the ‘power to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List…’ This 
power is to be shared by the two chambers of the National Assembly. Section 58 (1) 
of the constitution states: ‘The power of the National Assembly to make laws shall 
be exercised by bills passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives…’ 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
This law-making power of the National Assembly is guided by the constitutional 
collaborative procedures on specific matters. Section 59 limits this collaborative 
power to the money bills. The section states that the provisions of section 58 are 
applicable to:
 a. An appropriation bill or a supplementary appropriation bill, including any other 
bill for the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
or any other public fund of the Federation of any money charged thereon or any 
alteration in the amount of such a payment, issue or withdrawal; and
 b. A bill for the imposition of or increase in any tax, duty or fee or any reduction, 
withdrawal or cancellation thereof.
The constitution does not provide for a rigid interaction in case of any gridlock. 
Rather, the provisions make rooms for the application of second and diverse 
opinions. Where the two chambers could not agree on a particular bill ‘within a 
period of 2 months from the commencement of a financial year, the President of the 
Senate shall within 14 days thereafter arrange for and convene a meeting of the joint 
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finance committee to examine the bill with a view to resolving the differences 
between the two Houses’ (Section 59 (2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). The section states further that in case the joint finance committed 
could not resolve the differences, ‘then the bill shall be presented to the National 
Assembly sitting at a joint meeting, and if the bill is passed at such joint meeting, it 
shall be presented to the President for assent’ (Section 59 (3), Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The drafters of the constitution also pushed the 
collaborative imperative further even if the president withheld his assent to the bill. 
Section 59 (4) of the Constitution states:
Where the President, within thirty days after the presentation of the bill to him, fails to 
signify his assent or where he withholds assent, then the bill shall again be presented to the 
National Assembly sitting at a joint meeting, and if passed by two-thirds majority of 
members of both houses at such joint meeting, the bill shall become law and the assent of 
the President shall not be required (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
The essence of these provisions was to present a holistic and unified legislature in 
the process of the passage of fiscal bills. The process is more of collaboration rather 
than independent activities that are prone to gridlock.
In term of protocol, the Senate is superior to the House of Representatives. 
Section 53 (2) (a–b) affirms the seniority of the Senate over the House of 
Representatives, as indicated in the case of a joint sitting of the two chambers. It 
states:
At any joint sitting of the Senate and House of Representatives:
 (a) The President of Senate shall preside, and in his absence the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives shall preside; and
 (b) In the absence of the persons mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection, 
the Deputy President of the Senate shall preside, and in his absence the 
Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives shall preside.
By the order of protocols, the Senate President, is the head of the National 
Assembly while the Speaker of the House of Representatives is the deputy. Each of 
the chambers has its rules and order that guides its legislative activities. Section 60 
of the constitution states each of the chamber has the power ‘to regulate its own 
procedure, including the procedure for summoning and recess of the House’ 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). This means that each of the 
chambers has its own measure of freedom in a coordinated relationship.
Another area of legislative collaboration is in respect of the removal of the 
President and or his deputy. Section 143 provides elaborate procedures to be 
followed by the collaborative decisions of the two chambers of the National 
Assembly. Section 143 (2) makes the Senate president, the presiding officer, and the 
recipient of the written allegation ‘signed by not less than one-third of the members 
of the National Assembly’ stating that the holder of the office of President or Vice- 
President is guilty of gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his 
office’ (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Subsequent 
legislative processes are to be coordinated by the Senate President. The resolution 
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to confirm the commencement of the investigation of the allegations is expected to 
be the outcome of a motion ‘supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds 
majority of all the members of each House of the National Assembly’ (Section 143 
(3–4). Section 143 (8–9) of the Constitution stresses further the collaborative 
imperative of the two chambers of the National Assembly on this sensitive political 
decision thus:
Where the Panel reports to each House of the National Assembly that the allegation has not 
been proved, no further proceedings shall be taken in respect of the matter. Where the report 
of the Panel is that the allegation against the holder of the office has been proved, then 
within fourteen days of the receipt of the report at the House the National Assembly shall 
consider the report, and if by a resolution of each House of the National Assembly supported 
by not less than two-thirds majority of all its members, the report of the Panel is adopted, 
then the holder of the office shall stand removed from office as from the date of the adoption 
of the report (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
This constitutional provision strengthens the primacy of the second opinion and 
enforces the collaboration of the two chambers of the National Assembly in arriving 
at a decision on such a sensitive but political issue.
The constitutional amendment procedure is another area where the two cham-
bers of the National Assembly have to collaborate. Section 9 of the constitution 
empowers the National Assembly to carry out amendment of the constitution. 
Indeed, this constitutional responsibility goes beyond the domain of the National 
Assembly. Since it has to do with the alteration of the laws of the nation, the consti-
tution also involves the input of the state houses of assembly with specificity. The 
proposal would emanate. Section 9 (3) of the constitution states:
An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose of altering the provisions of this sec-
tion,… shall not be passed by either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is 
approved by the votes of not less than four-fifths majority of all the members of each House, 
and also approved by resolution of the House of Assembly of not less than two-third of all 
States (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
The implication of this is that constitutional amendment in Nigeria is a collaborative 
legislative action by the legislatures at the state levels and the two chambers of the 
National Assembly.
Aside from these provisions on specific issues, there are other areas where legis-
lation or other national legislative actions require the concurrent activities of the two 
chambers of the National Assembly. For instance, section 8 (1–2) of the constitution 
makes provisions for the creation of additional and adjustment of boundaries for the 
existing states of the federations based on an act of the National Assembly 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The process for this legisla-
tive action is similar to the procedure for the amendment of the constitution. State 
creation and boundary adjustment exercises involve the concurrent legislative 
actions of the legislatures in the concerned states, and the two chambers of the 
National Assembly, with specificity of votes.
The constitution also makes provisions for other collaborative legislative actions 
by the two chambers of the National Assembly on the issue of treaty. Section 12 (1) 
stipulates that ‘No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have 
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the force of law to extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the 
National Assembly’ (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Section 
12 (2–3) empowers the National Assembly to ‘make laws for the Federation or any 
part thereof with respect to matters not included in the he Exclusive Legislative List 
for the purpose of implementing a treaty’ provided ‘it is ratified by a majority of all 
the House of Assembly in the Federation’ (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999).
The intendment of the drafters of the constitution for these collaborative legisla-
tive activities is to enable the National Assembly exercises its power of making 
‘laws for the peace, order and good government’ of the country (Section 4 (2), 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The import of this is for the 
realization of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
contained in part II of the constitution. Section 12–24 of the constitution itemised 
these fundamental issues directed towards the improvement of the quality of life of 
the Nigerian citizens. These provisions are expected to energise the oversight power 
of the legislature in a manner that would be enable efficient political outcomes of 
public policy.
It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs of government, and of all authorities and 
persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and 
apply the provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution (Section 13, Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
Events since the beginning of the Fourth Republic have not shown adherence to the 
intendment of these collaborative legislative actions in the National Assembly.
 Inter-Chambers Relations and the Conduct of Legislative 
Activities in the National Assembly
Essentially, the constitutional design of bicameral legislature, especially in presi-
dential systems, is to promote collaboration rather than competition in policy pro-
cess (Shell 2001; Tesebelis and Money 1997). The two chambers are expected to 
work together as a single legislative body for the promotion of good governance 
through effective legislative process. Thus, the idea of supremacy struggle does not 
arise. The two chambers are usually equal partners in the legislative process with 
specific responsibilities defined by the constitution. The assumption is that the 
activities of modern government are becoming more complex and there was the 
need to balance diverse views (Shell 2001). The imperatives of good governance, 
therefore, requires mobilisation in the area of supports and cooperation from diverse 
views and opinions rather than competition among the institutions and structures of 
government.
The design of the Nigerian presidential constitution rests on this assumption. 
Section 4 of the constitution vests the legislative power of the country in the National 
Assembly which is composed of the senate and the House of Representatives. 
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Except in the order of protocols, both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
have specific collaborative and complimentary roles. Thus, in policy process and 
role specification, there is no provision for supremacy. Requisite constitutional 
provisions as identified in the immediate section provide the avenue for the Senate 
and the House of Representatives to work together in harmony (Mba 2014). 
Nevertheless, there have been a series of struggles between the Senate and House of 
Representative on certain issues. Two major issues have generated supremacy row 
between the \senate and the House of Representatives: Budget and amendment of 
the constitutions.
 Row Over the Presentation of the 2010 Appropriation Bill
Section 81 (1) of the constitution mandates the President to present the fiscal plan 
of the year for legislative authorisation. The sections states:
The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National 
Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of 
the Federation for the next following financial year (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999).
This provision does not specify the mode of the presentation neither does it stipulate 
where the presentation should take place. Conventionally, since 1999, the president 
usually presents the Appropriation Bill at a joint sitting of the Senate and the House 
of Representatives (Majebi 2009; Sam-Tsokwa and Ngara 2016). Since these are 
not constitutional matters, the considerations were usually treated as mere 
administrative issues. Nevertheless, this administrative matter became a major 
political issue in the presentation of the 2010 Appropriation bill.
The President, Alhaji Musa Yar‘Adua had agreed to present the bill to the joint 
sitting of the Senate and the House of Representatives in November 23, 2009 
(Onuorah et al. 2009; Mba 2014; Majebi 2009). The problem was the choice of the 
venue for the joint sitting of the national Assembly for the presentation of the bill by 
the president. The House of Representatives insisted that the presentation must be 
done in the Green Chamber, the official venue of the sitting of the House of 
Representatives. The position is that the chamber is more spacious than the Red 
Chamber of the Senate (Majebi 2009; Mba 2014).
The leadership of the two chambers disagreed on the appropriate venue for the 
joint sitting for the purpose of presentation of the bill. Conventionally, the venue for 
the joint sitting of the two chambers of the National Assembly is the House of 
Representatives chamber because of space. In view of this conflict, the 2010 budget 
was presented separately to the Senates and the House of Representatives (Onuorah 
et al. 2009). Mba (2014, p. 687) attribute this to the ‘personal interest and ego’ of 
the members of the House of Representatives who trivialized ‘little issues of no 
importance’. The conflict was celebrated and drew public attention to the conduct of 
the members of the National Assembly. While there was great public expectation of 
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positive political outcomes from their representatives, the entire machinery of 
government was thrown into confusion (Mba 2014; Majebi 2009).
Legislative action over the appropriation bill is a crucial instrument for the pro-
motion of good governance in the Nigerian presidential system. The executive can-
not execute any project without legislative authorisation. Sections 80-89 of the 
constitution empower the National Assembly to have a grip control over public 
funds. The practice in accordance to the constitution is that all government revenues 
are expected to be paid into the ‘Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation’ 
(Section 80 (1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation 
except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the fund by this Constitution or where the 
issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Appropriation Act, Supplementary 
Appropriation Act or an Act passed in pursuance of section 81 of this Constitution. No 
moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the Federation, other than the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been 
authorised by an Act of the National Assembly. No moneys shall be withdrawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in the 
manner prescribed by the National Assembly (Section 81 (2–4), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999).
By virtue of these provisions, no public project could be executed by the executive 
branch of the government without legislative authorisation. This constitutional 
imperative makes consideration of appropriation bill a matter of national importance 
(Sam-Tsokwa and Ngara 2016; Mba 2014). The drafters of the constitution envisage 
that appropriation bill should be prepared and approved before the commencement 
of the fiscal year. Section 81 (1) of the constitution states:
The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National 
Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of 
the Federation for the next following financial year (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999).
With the exception of the 2007, none of the appropriation bills since 2000 was 
approved before the commencement of the fiscal year. Table  1 below shows the 
presentation and approved periods of appropriation bills from 2003 to 2015.
The drafters of the constitution realised the feasibility of delay in the approval of 
the appropriation bill. Section 82 of the constitution states:
If the Appropriation Bill in respect of any financial year has not been passed into law by the 
beginning of the financial year, the President may authorise the withdrawal of moneys in the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation for the purpose of meeting expenditure 
necessary to carry on the services of the Government of the Federation for a period not 
exceeding months or until the coming into operation of the Appropriate Act, whichever is 
the earlier: Provided that the withdrawal in respect of any such period shall not exceed the 
amount authorised to be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation 
under the provisions of the Appropriation Act passed by the National Assembly for the 
corresponding period in the immediately preceding financial year, being an amount 
proportionate to the total amount so authorised for the immediately preceding financial year 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
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The implication of this is that the legislature might not have the opportunity of scru-
tinising the projects that government intended to execute since there is no provision 
for authorisation before the withdrawal from the CRF. Thus, late approval of the 
fiscal policy often leads to distortion and haphazard implementation (Sam- Tsokwa 
and Ngara 2016). Over the years, ‘government budget has generally not met the 
expectation of quality economic growth, poverty reduction, high level of employ-
ment, first grade infrastructure’ (Obadan 2014, p. 15). Consequently, governance 
crisis could not be abated, as the general improvement in the quality life of the citi-
zens depreciates. Effectively, budget process in Nigeria has been reduced to mere 
political and administrative rituals.
 Disagreement Over the Amendment of the Constitution
Another issue that had generated conflict between the Senate and the House of 
Representatives was the furore over constitutional amendment. In 2009, a process 
of the amendment of the constitution generated conflict between the House of 
Representatives and the Senate (Ajani and Aziken 2009). The Deputy Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, Alhaji Usman Bayero Nafada, led 43 other members 
of the House of in Representatives in the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review 
(JCCR) to walk out of the retreat, held at Minna, Niger State, organized for in 
preparation for the amendment of the constitution (Mba 2014; Onuorah et al. 2009; 
Majebi 2009).
The reason for the boycott by the legislators was simply because the Deputy 
Speaker of the House was designated as the Deputy Chairman of the Committee 
Table 1 Presentation and enactment of federal appropriation acts 2003–2015 fiscal years
Fiscal 
year
Date bill presented 
to the
national assembly
Date bill sent to the president 
for assent
Date bill assented by the 
president
2003 20-11-2002 11-03-2003 10-04-2003
2004 18-12-2003 20-04-2004 21-04-2004
2005 12-10-2004 18-03-2005 12-04-2005
2006 06-12-2005 21-02-2006 22-02-2006
2007 11-10-2006 22-12-2006 22-12-2006
2008 08-11-2007 27-03-2008 14-04-2008
2009 02-12-2008 03-02-2009 10-03-2009
2010 23-11-2009 25-03-2010 22-04-2010
2011 15-12-2010 25-05-2011 26-05-2011
2012 15-12-2011 21-03-2012 13-04-2012
2013 10-10-2012 30-01-2013 26-02-2013
2014 19-12-2013 22-04-2014 21-05-2014
2015 17-12-2014 06-05-2015 06-05-2015
Source: Adapted from Obadan (2014)
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(Ajani and Aziken 2009; Nwabueze 2009). Rather, they wanted him to be designated 
as Co-Chairman. The Deputy Senate President, Ike Ekwerenmadu, was the 
Chairman of the Committee. The justification for their demand was that as 
co-chairman, the House of Representatives would have equal role and input into the 
decisions of the committee (Majebi 2009; Mba 2014). In other words, the members 
of the House were requesting equality with the Senate, thinking that parliamentary 
leadership is an executive position. In reality, parliamentary leadership at any level 
is a presiding position meant to direct the affairs of the legislative deliberations 
(Mba 2014; Zwingina 2009).
The action of the legislators from the House of Representatives was interpreted 
to mean a deliberate ploy to frustrate the amendment of the constitutions which 
would invariable affected the interest of some key political elites (Ajani and Aziken 
2009; Nwabueze 2009; Onuorah et al. 2009). Contentious issue such as the removal 
of immunity of the state governor was slated for amendment. Section 308 of the 
constitution shields the elected leadership of the executive branch of government at 
the state and federal level against prosecution while in office. The section states in 
part:
…no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom 
this section applies during his period of office; a person to whom this section applies shall 
not be arrested or imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any 
court or otherwise; and no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of 
a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued:…This section applies 
to a person holding the office of President or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy Governor; 
and the reference in this section to “period of office” is a reference to the period during 
which the person holding such office is required to perform the functions of the office 
(Section 30891-3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
Popularly known as the immunity clause, this provision has remained an opportu-
nity for sitting elected leadership of the executive to engage in sleaze without pros-
ecution in the absence of an effective legislative oversight (Fagbadebo 2016; Bashir 
and Nwanesi 2016). There have been debates over the desirability of retaining the 
clause in the constitution (Ekott 2013; Bashir and Nwanesi 2016; Azu 2015). While 
this is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is pertinent to point out that the call for 
the amendment of the provisions, relation to the immunity of the elected members 
of the executive branch of the government was not necessary if there are effective 
legislative institutions that were willing to exercise their requisite oversight powers. 
Thus, a possibility of frustrating the constitutional amendment partly because of the 
plausibility of removing the immunity clause was a demonstration of a failed 
institution of governance.
The issue of the leadership of the JCCR should not have generated any conflict. 
Section 53 (2) of the constitution is clear about the leadership of joint sitting of two 
chambers of the National Assembly. The idea of co-chairman is strange to 
parliamentary proceeding of such because in the absence of the chairman, the 
deputy presides with the same power. Ego with the pursuit of pecuniary gain rather 
than the pursuit of public good was responsible for the wrangling (Mba 2014). The 
motivation for the wrangling was the need to protect the welfare interest of the 
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members. As Mba (2014, p.  685) has noted, ‘the House members of the Joint 
Committee are more interested in the perquisites of a co-chairman—allowance, 
jeeps, luxury hotel suite and such other privilege befitting the dignity of a 
co-chairman of the committee—than in delivering to the Nigerians a reformed 
constitution better suited to their needs for good governance’.
 Conclusion
The two cases of internal wrangling in the National Assembly were not based on 
disagreement over policy. A majority of the Nigerian citizens do not see the 
usefulness of their representatives other than as a set of people feeding on the 
resources of the nation (Oladesu 2016). The activities of the National Assembly 
since inception in 1999 have been shrouded with scandals, a development that has 
impaired its image. The issues of the pursuit of their pecuniary interest at the 
expense of the public good have created integrity problem for the legislative houses 
in Nigeria. Budget padding, outrageous salaries and emoluments, money-for budget 
syndrome, constituency projects, among other ethical issues, coupled with spiralling 
governance crisis, have eroded public sympathy and support for the legislature. The 
scourge of corruption and gross abuse of power by elected and appointed government 
officials is a reflection of a failed intuition bereft of the importance of its oversight 
power (Fagbadebo 2016). Rather than appropriate the requisite constitutional 
provisions to ensure sanity in the political system, the Nigerian legislators bicker 
over pecuniary issues through the manipulation of statutes to settle personal political 
scores.
The initiators of bicameral legislature did not envisage internal wrangling over 
pecuniary issues. The two-chamber parliament in England was a design to protect 
the interest of the commoners against the decision of the nobles who constituted the 
unicameral parliament. ‘The legislative power is therefore committed to the body of 
the nobles, and to that which represents the people, each having their assemblies 
and deliberation apart, each their separate views and interests’ (Montesquieu 1748, 
cf. Drexhage 2015, p. 8). In other words, the second chamber prevented ‘the voice 
of the minority, which differed from the masses through birth, wealth or merit’ from 
being lost to the overriding power of the nobles in the English unicameral system 
(Drexhage 2015, p. 8).
In essence, collaborative legislative activities enshrined in bicameralism are a 
design to strengthen governance institutions for effective political outcomes. In the 
Nigerian political system, since the First Republic, the legislative institution has 
remained an ineffective governing institution that has failed to proof its usefulness 
in the political process. The design of the institution as well as the constitutional 
provisions for its functionality is realisable only if the actors that empowered to 
administer the institution are responsible. Collaboration and cooperation in a 
presidential system is a measure to arouse consciousness of the need for a national 
community in a diversified polity through meaningful political outcomes. While 
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this chapter is not advocating for the scrapping of the legislative institution in the 
Nigerian political system, the position is the need for a reform that will make it less 
attractive to looters who seek powers for the promotion of pecuniary gains.
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Executive-Legislature Relations: Evidence 
from Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
Yahaya T. Baba
 Introduction and General Background
Relations between and among arms of government, particularly executive- 
legislature, is discussed within the context of democratic system of governance. 
This is because in other forms of government, the three arms of government are 
hardly separated. In non-democratic governments, executive and legislative func-
tions and powers are mostly fused and interlocked. In other words, the powers of the 
arms of government, particularly the executive and legislature are mostly exercised 
by one institution, be it the king (in an absolute monarchy), the military ruler (in a 
military regime) or even members of the communist party (in a socialist regime). 
This is not however, to suggest that all forms of democracies guarantee separation 
of executive and legislative functions and powers. Essentially, some democratic sys-
tems of government also fuse the executive and legislative functions and powers as 
well as the personnel of government. The parliamentary system of government, for 
instance, typically assigns overlapping and concurrent functions to both the execu-
tive and the legislature. More so that members of the executive can also serve as 
legislators concurrently. This kind of arrangement, it is argued, does not institution-
alize checks and balances required for accountability, transparency and probity in 
the management of public affairs.
It is largely on this account that Montesquieu (1750) argues that the essence of 
democracy is to institutionalize accountability and transparency in the process of 
governance. He stressed that democracy as a form of government evolves and inter-
nalizes some mechanisms of restraints in ways which powers of government would 
be separated and balanced. He, therefore, argued on the need to institute mecha-
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nisms for checks and balances among the three major arms of government—notably 
the executive, legislature and the judiciary. Accordingly, the need to separate the 
functions of the three arms of government and restrain the actions of public office 
holders is essential. This is particularly so, if the electorates are to exercise tremen-
dous influence over their elected leaders and representatives. This is because; 
according to him, “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” The 
publication of Montesquieu had considerable influence on framers of American 
constitution. Thus, the presidential system of government, which is widely prac-
ticed, separates the powers, functions and the personnel of the three arms of govern-
ment in addition to providing mechanisms for the arms of government to checkmate 
one another. This is recognized as the most efficient system of democracy that guar-
antees horizontal accountability across governmental agencies and to some extent 
downward accountability to the people. The essence is to prevent tyranny and abuse 
of powers by individuals, groups or even institutions that hold power in trust on 
behalf of the people.
Consistent with this line of thought, developed two working hypotheses, which 
mirrored a political order that could either entrench or distort the practice of democ-
racy as a system of government, particularly the principles of accountability, trans-
parency and probity. The first hypothesis is stated thus: if unrestrained by external 
checks, any given individual or groups of individuals will tyrannize over other. 
External checks are application of reward and penalties, or the expectation that they 
will be applied, by same source other than the given individual himself; Hypothesis 
II suggests thus: the accumulation of all powers- legislative, executive and judiciary 
in the same hands implies the elimination of external checks (empirical generaliza-
tion). From these assumptions, two other propositions are also developed: (1) if 
unrestrained by external checks, a minority of individuals will tyrannize over a 
majority of individuals; (2) if unrestrained by external checks a majority of individu-
als will tyrannize over a minority of individuals. Madison’s argument logically sug-
gests that “give all powers to the many they will oppress the few. Similarly, give all 
powers to the few they will oppress the many. Madison’s arguments published in the 
Federalist (1788) to a large extent influenced the ratification of the American consti-
tution which adopted a republican government (Dahl 1956).
Accordingly, democratic frameworks of governance evolve not only as a mecha-
nism to facilitate popular participation, equality, freedom but also as a strategy to 
guarantee the accountability of leaders to the governed. This can be understood from 
the context of power structure of the institutions of governments, particularly the 
three arms of government, and the nature of relations between and among them in the 
discharge of governmental functions. Executive-legislature relations, therefore sug-
gest the nature and dimensions of intra-governmental interactions between the exec-
utive and the legislature as prescribed by the constitution and the laws of the state. In 
some constitutions and as provided by the laws of some democratic societies, powers 
and functions of the arms of government may be interlocking, overlapping or clearly 
separated. Depending on the system of democracy in place, executive-legislative 
relations determine the quality of democracy and governance in the state.
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In Nigeria, the tensions and crises that characterized executive-legislature rela-
tions, in the previous republics, destabilized and derailed the democratic government. 
Indeed, the acrimonious inter-organ relations in those republics partly accounted for 
the truncation of the previous constitutional governments by the military. The 
entrenched culture of military rule in Nigeria, which robbed the system of the needed 
democratic and legislative cultures, is cited as one of the major sources of persistent 
conflicts between the executive and legislature in various democratic regimes in 
Nigeria. The hangover of executive dominance and/or absent of a distinct legislative 
institution under the military has made it difficult for checks and balances to be insti-
tutionalized or even powers of government to be actually separated in the aftermath 
of democratic transition. In spite of the various constitutional clauses that specify the 
functions and powers of the three arms of government and the role of each arm in 
checkmating one another, the culture of executive dominance prevail in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic. Thus, executive dominance and arrogance defined the nature and 
character of executive-legislature relations. Although, the legislature at different 
occasions have been assertive in its relations with the executive, it cannot be said that 
the former has provided the needed checks on the latter.
The nature of executive-legislature relations is mostly discussed in the contexts 
of three governmental functions of law/policy making, oversight and representation. 
In these three domains, the two arms of government are required to cooperate and 
compromise with one another in the face of conflicting demands, interests and prej-
udices. Consequently, while conflicts are inevitable in the interactions between the 
executive and the legislature in a democracy, yet, both institutions are expected to 
be subject to and be guided by the prevailing laws and regulations in the process of 
law/policy making, oversight and representation. Disagreements over the substance 
and procedures of law/policy making, oversight and representation between the two 
arms of government is necessary for quality democratic governance. Perpetual con-
flicts between the executive and the legislature may however lead to instability, poor 
public welfare, insecurity, bad governance and government shut down. In Nigeria, 
the pattern of executive-legislature relations in the Fourth Republic has been very 
acrimonious. This has affected the quality of laws and policies, and undermines 
public accountability as well as weakens representation. This chapter, therefore, 
examined some of the issues and events that defined the nature and character of 
executive-legislature relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This will, however be 
preceded by a background of the constitutional powers and functions of the legisla-
ture and the executive under the Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution.
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 Powers and Functions of the Legislature and Executive: 
Evidence from 1999 Constitution of Nigeria
Across modern democratic societies, legislatures perform basically three conven-
tional functions of representation, law-making and oversight responsibilities. The 
Nigerian National Legislature is no exception. The 1999 Constitution has provided 
in different sections, the powers to perform these functions.
In the context of representation for instance, the Constitution provided for delin-
eation of constituencies in which different groups of people are represented in the 
legislative institution, on the basis of their population size and/or state of origin. 
Sections 48 and 49 of the Constitution states that:
The Senate shall consist of three Senators from each state and one from the Federal Capital 
Territory Abuja and subject to the provisions of this constitution, the House of 
Representatives shall consist of three hundred and sixty members representing constituen-
cies of nearly equal population as far as possible provided that no constituency shall fall 
within more than one state.
Therefore, based on the Senatorial Districts and Federal constituencies created by 
the constitution, people vote to elect their representatives to the National Assembly. 
The elected Representatives are required to interact with the electorate and as much 
as possible reflect the interests of their constituents in their general conduct and 
activities. Thus, constituency offices are established by Representatives in both the 
Senate and the House in their respective constituencies to facilitate contacts and 
collate the input of the electorate on voting issues. It is against this backdrop that 
Esebagbon (2005) argues that:
In a modern democracy today, the legislature evokes the idea of representative democracy, 
more than any other branch of government. Thus, democracy can only be sustained when 
legislatures have the will, ability and information to make decisions that reflect the interests 
and needs of the society. Similarly, the governed must have the will, ability and information 
to transmit their needs and interests to their legislators and to evaluate the performance of 
the legislators and the various parties and to reward or sanction their actions (Esebagbon 
2005, p. 3).
This assertion is a true reflection of the function of a legislature as a representative 
institution of governance in a democracy.
The idea of representation and the development legislative institution is neces-
sitated by the complexity of human societies, which ruled out the possibility of 
direct democracy. It is in this context that representative assemblies evolved, whose 
members are elected within defined constituencies to represent their people in gov-
ernment. In the case of Nigeria, the central legislature also performs these functions, 
however not without challenges. This is because in Nigeria, legislators are hardly 
held accountable for their actions. Even when elections are to serve as mechanism 
for reward and sanctions on incumbent legislators, representatives sometimes rig 
their ways into offices. This often affects the quality of representation and the level 
of participation of the electorate in governance.
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Secondly, the legislature in Nigeria, like their counterparts in other modern 
democracies, is empowered by the constitution to make laws. Law making function 
is perhaps what distinguishes a legislative institution from other organs of govern-
ment. The 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to make laws. This 
is contained in Section 58 (1) of the constitution which state thus: “The power of the 
National Assembly to make laws shall be exercised through bills passed by both the 
Senate or House of Representatives and, except as otherwise provided by sub- 
section (5) of this section, assented to by the President.” Sub-section (2) on the other 
hand, states that: “A bill may originate in either the Senate or House of Representatives 
and shall not become law unless it has been passed and, except as otherwise pro-
vided by this section and section 59 of this constitution, assented to in accordance 
with the provisions of this section.”
Subsection (3) on the other hand, stipulates that: Where a bill has been passed by 
the House in which it originated, it shall be sent to the other House, and it shall be 
presented to the President for assent when it has been passed by that other House 
and agreement has been reached between the Houses on any amendments made on 
it.1 Furthermore, sub-section (4) states that: Where a bill is presented to the President 
for assent, he shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that he with-
holds assent.2 Accordingly, sub-section (5) stipulates that: Where the President 
withholds his assent and the bill is again passed by each House by two-thirds major-
ity, the bill shall become law and the assent of the President shall not be required.3
To this end, the legislature has overriding powers in law-making. It is in this 
context that the institution is often called the law-making body of government. In 
making laws, therefore, the internal complexity of the legislature, its interaction 
with external environment and the extent to which it adopts universal procedures of 
conducting business to a great extent bear on the quality of laws it makes and influ-
ences its institutionalisation.
The law-making function of a legislative institution is of paramount importance. 
It is in light of this that Esebagbon (2005) argues that:
The principal function of the legislature under the 1999 Constitution is to make laws. It is 
in the exercise of this function that legislative assemblies acquire this distinctive character 
and take their rightful place within the structure of government. It is this law—making 
power that places the legislature as an independent organ of government that is of coordi-
nate status with the Executive and the Judiciary. The legislature exercises its main constitu-
tional functions through legislation (Esebagbon 2005, p. 5).
Thirdly, the oversight function of the legislature is also another traditional function 
of a legislative institution. Sections 80 to 89 of the said constitution stated in cate-
gorical terms the powers of the National Assembly to supervise and control the 
activities of the other branches of government. However, section 88 of the 
constitution which confers on the National Assembly the power to conduct investi-
gation, illustrates the oversight functions of the legislature clearly.It states thus:
1 See 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Section 58 (3).
2 Ibid Section 58(4).
3 Ibid Section 58(5).
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 (1) Subject to the provision of this constitution, each House of the National 
Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its Journal or in the offi-
cial gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed 
of investigation into:
• any matter or anything with respect to which it has power to make laws; and
• the conduct of affairs of any persons/authority, ministry or government 
department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsi-
bility for:-
• Executing or administering laws enacted by the National Assembly; and
• Disbursing or administering money appropriated or to be appropriated by the 
National Assembly.
 (2) The powers conferred on the National Assembly under provisions of this sec-
tion are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to:
• make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and 
correct any defects in existing laws; and
• exposes corruption, inefficiency or wastes in the execution or administration 
of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or admin-
istration of funds appropriated by it.
This function is adjudged to be the most routine and engaging activity of a legis-
lative institution. Iwuanyanwu (1998, p. 7) argues that:
The legislature therefore, carries out surveillance over the activities of the executive. To 
achieve this, the legislature has several standing committees. Virtually every Government 
Agency or Ministry has an overseeing standing committee. It is the responsibility of any 
particular standing committee to report to the full House the activities of the agency or 
ministry it supervises. The Committee members apply whatever legitimate means to moni-
tor the activities of the Agency or Ministry. These include visits to the departments, inter-
rogation of their staff, occasional assessment of plan implementation, holding of inquiries, 
encouragements and suggestions for improvement … and exploring easy ways of improv-
ing and bettering the services of the departments for the general good and wellbeing of the 
society (Iwuanyanwu 1998, p. 7)
This broad range of activities encapsulates the legislative function of oversight. The 
function of oversight given to the legislature by the constitution is to enhance 
accountability, transparency and probity in the conduct of public affairs, particularly 
in the management of public resources. These functions are performed by various 
legislative committees who report the findings of their investigations to the commit-
tee of the whole (plenary) for further legislative deliberations and necessary actions 
as may be deemed appropriate. The oversight functions of the legislature reveal its 
powers with regards to supervision and control of other government agencies. This 
function of the legislature, particularly in Nigeria, exposes the institution into per-
petual conflict with the executive arm of government. This is so because routine 
checks by the legislature of the executive expose corruption, which dents the image 
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of holders of executive positions. As a result, the executive, particularly the presi-
dency, often seeks to resist legislative scrutiny or investigation. In other instances, 
the executive tries to manipulate the process and outcomes of legislative investiga-
tions. However, the efficient conduct of oversight functions by the legislature is a 
function of its level of autonomy, commitment, political will and the degree of its 
internal complexity occasioned by autonomy of standing committees
On the other hand, Section 130 of the 1999 Constitution provided for the estab-
lishment of office of the President. Sub-section (1) states thus: “there shall be for the 
Federation a President. Sub-section (2) further clarifies that: “the President shall be 
the Head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation.” Given this status, the president is 
empowered to perform executive functions relating to the administration, gover-
nance, maintenance of law and order and the security of the state. As the chief 
executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and executive head of all 
security outfits, the president is responsible for the welfare and security of the peo-
ple of Nigeria.
In addition to the office of the President, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria also 
provides for the establishment of the offices of Ministers. Section 147 (1) states that: 
there shall be such offices of ministers of the Government of the Federation as may 
be established by the President. Sub-section (2) added that: “Any appointment to the 
office of the Minister of the Government of the Federation shall, if the nomination 
of any person to such office is confirmed by the Senate, be made by the President”. 
These provisions suggest that the President is responsible for the coordination and 
management of Nigeria’s public affairs. He is to be assisted by Ministers whom he 
appoints with the approval of the Senate. It is in this regard that Section 148 (2) of 
the 1999 Constitution states that: “the President shall hold regular meetings with the 
Vice President and all the Ministers of the Government of the Federation for the 
purposes of:
 (a) determining the general direction of domestic and foreign policies of the 
Government of the Federation;
 (b) co-ordinating the activities of the President, the Vice President and the Ministers 
of the Government of the Federation and the discharge of their executive 
responsibilities; and
 (c) advising the President generally in the discharge of his executive functions 
other than those functions with respect to which he is required by this 
Constitution to seek the advise or act on the recommendation of any other per-
son or body.
Given these powers and functions, the executive, traditionally is seen as having 
enormous powers and responsibilities compared to other arms of government. The 
executive arm of government is responsible for policies, programmes and projects 
that are expected to impact on the welfare and security of the people in the state. 
Because of these enormous powers, the institution in a democracy provides some 
limitations, which control the conduct of the executive to prevent abuse of power and 
tyranny. In Nigeria, these limitations are embedded in the various powers and respon-
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sibilities of the legislature, as provided for by the constitution. The functions of law 
making and oversights empowered the legislature to exercise tremendous control 
over the executive. This, however, is being resisted and contested by the executive, 
which constitute the dynamics of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. The next 
section examines the issues and perspectives of executive- legislature relations in 
Nigeria.
 Executive-Legislature Relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: 
Issues and Perspectives
In the first place, as obtains in typical African democracies, where legislatures are 
relegated to mere ‘rubber stamps’ of the executive, and rendered to an ‘order of 
executive dominance,’ Nigeria is no exception. Thus, at the inception of democracy 
in Nigeria in 1999, the executive was not oblivious of the constitutional and institu-
tional mechanisms of restraints to its powers and functions, largely from the legis-
lature. These institutional restraints are mostly construed by the executive as 
insubordination, given the entrenched culture of executive dominance under previ-
ous military regime. Therefore, the first attempt at ensuring executive dominance in 
Nigeria’s fourth republic was the executive bid to install pliant legislators as legisla-
tive leaders. This singular act did not go down well with the members of both cham-
bers and triggered internal crisis in both chambers. The legislators saw the executive 
interference as an affront on the institution and therefore engaged the executive in 
acrimony that has since 1999 defined executive-legislature relations in Nigeria.
Although the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) captured power and formed gov-
ernment at the centre and captured majority in both chambers of the national assem-
bly, the legislature saw the executive as working to make the legislative institution 
subservient to it. The power tussles between the executive and members of the leg-
islature in Nigeria in the determination of who occupy various leadership positions 
contributed to the intensity of the crises and lack of confidence between the two 
arms of government at the inception of democracy in 1999. In some instances, the 
executive acted under the guise of party supremacy and attempt to coerce members 
into accepting the proposals of the executive as the position of the party. This has 
accounted for series of serious tensions, instability and crises in the national assem-
bly since 1999. Most often, the members are divided between pro and anti-executive 
groups in the legislature. This was evident under the administrations of Obasanjo 
(1999–2007), Jonathan (2010–2015) and Buhari (2015 to date).
This point was stressed by Salisu Buhari, when he argues that:
The greatest challenges of Nigeria’s democracy since 1999 is how to get the executive arm 
of government appreciate the place and role of the legislature in the governance process. 
The fight by the legislature to ward-off executive interference and dictatorship in the affairs 
of the House started under my regime but received a great boost under my successor 
(Thisday, 6 June, 2009).
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Thus regardless of whether or not the executive succeeded in its bid at imposing 
leaders on the legislature, leadership tussle has always been a source of instability 
within the legislature and between the executive and the legislature. Where the exec-
utive succeeds, members who are opposed to the emergence of such executive 
imposed leaders continue to antagonise the legislative leadership with a view to 
pulling it down or undermine it. In 1999 (House and Senate), 2000 (Senate), 2005 
(Senate), 2007 (House) under the PDP controlled government and legislature and 
2015 (House and Senate) under the All Progressive Congress (APC) this played out. 
The inter or intra-chamber crises instigated by executive interference accounted for 
the high turnover of legislative leadership between 1999 and 2007 (Fashagba 2009). 
At the extreme of such opposition, members, especially those from the ruling PDP 
(1999 to 2015) took different positions from the party. This further complicated the 
crisis. According to Ume-Ezeoke4 excessive executive interference in the activities 
of the legislature, particularly in the determination of its leaders, was largely respon-
sible for the leadership crisis and instability in the legislature. He contends that, his 
tenure as Speaker in the Second Republic was more stable because the executive 
and indeed the parties were more focused and disciplined. He further stressed that:
The suspension of the NASS during the military resulted in the stunted growth of the legis-
lative arm of government in relations to the executive and judiciary, which may explain the 
reasons for the incessant leadership crisis in the institution (Thisday, 6 June 2009).
In the second scenario is where the executive did not succeed in imposing leaders 
on the legislature. Sometimes, various means are often employed by the executive 
to stifle legislative activities or undermine the freely elected leaders. These include 
financing some members to initiate and champion the course of impeachment and/
or harassing them through the use of security agents, party and anti-corruption 
agencies such as EFCC and 1CPC. This was very common under both Presidents 
Obasanjo and Buhari. Co-incidentally, the two leaders are former military head of 
state and retired Generals. Their approach to governance appeared to be influenced 
by the command system of their military backgrounds. One of the the consequences 
of excessive executive interference, especially from 1999 to 2007 (under Presidents 
Obasanjo and Yar’Adua) was high leadership turnover in National Assembly. It suf-
fice to note that membership turnover has been very high also because of the ten-
dency of the executive, either the president or state governor, to work against and 
block the attempt of incumbent members considered antagonistic from re-election. 
Aminu Bello Masari argues along this line when he opined that:
The high level of leadership turnover in the legislature and indeed the turnover of members 
in the institution is attributable to the desire by the executive and other extraneous political 
forces to pull out of parliament those they termed trouble makers who would not succumb 
to the dictatorial tendencies of the executive (Thisday, 6 June, 2009).
4 Eme-Ezeoke, Edwin was the Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Second Republic, 
Vice President of the ANPP Presidential flag bearer in the 2007 elections and the chairman of the 
party.
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Accordingly, the legislature is always a subject of ridicule by the executive. One of 
the tactics of subordinating the legislature to the whims and caprices of the  executive 
in Nigeria is the imposition of leaders on members. This has accounted for the high 
leadership turnover in the institution. Anyanwu (2007) argues that:
One of the defining characteristics of eight years of legislative practice was the struggle for 
supremacy between the executive and legislature. Behind the downfall of repeated leaders 
of both arms of NASS have been disagreements over control and independence of the leg-
islature. Checks and balances were taken to mean opposition to the executive branch and 
attempts to show the independence of NASS were dubbed disloyalty to the President and 
the party. Each presiding officer across time and session adopted different ways to cope 
with the situation (Anyanwu 2007, p. 4).
As a consequence, the incumbent leaders’ re-election bids were truncated, espe-
cially if the candidates in question did not enjoy the support of the presidency. For 
instance, from 1999 to 2007, none of the leaders of the legislature returned to the 
legislature. Some of them were forced not to seek for re-election or sabotaged by the 
party (PDP). Similarly, others who perceived the plot against them by the party and 
the executive refused to seek for re-election. However, for Ghali Umar Na’Abba, 
who won primary elections to return to the House in 2003, he lost out in the elec-
tions to an All Nigerian People’s Party’s (ANPP) candidate in his constituency.
In the case of Pius Anyim5 and Aminu Bello Masari, although the president was 
instrumental to their emergence, but they fell apart along the line. In both cases, they 
were believed to be ‘anointed’ by the executive, but resisted attempts by the execu-
tive to influence their actions in the conduct of the legislative business. For instance, 
the refusal of Pius Anyim Pius to manipulate the proposed Electoral Bill 2002 and 
ensure its passage as presented by the executive was partly responsible for the face- 
off between the presidency and the then leadership of the Senate. In the case of 
Aminu Bello Masari, the failure of his leadership to manipulate legislative pro-
cesses and ensure the endorsement of the third term deepened the rift between his 
leadership and the Obasanjo’s led presidency. In both cases, the presidency in col-
laboration with the state PDP leadership punished the two leaders by denying them 
return ticket in their respective states.
Accordingly, divergent sources of information confirmed the excessive interfer-
ence of the executive in the affairs of the legislature particularly, the choice and 
removal of its leaders (Hotline, 5 September, 1999, Faruk Lawan,6 Ghali Umar 
Na’Abba, Leadership, 1 June, 2007, Anyanwu 2007. p. 2).
In spite of the crisis that is associated with the imposition of legislative leader-
ship, the trend has continued. For instance, on the eve of leaving office, the former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, in a meeting of the PDP caucus held at Presidential 
villa on the 30th May, 2007, endorsed the candidature of David Mark and Patricia 
5 Pius Anyim Pius was the Senate President from 2000 to 2003. He succeeded Senator Chuba 
Okadigbo after the latter’s impeachment on the account of financial misappropriation.
6 Faruk Lawan is member is one of the longest serving members of the House of Representatives 
in the Fourth Republic. He was first elected in 1999 and re-elected in the 2003 and 2007 elections. 
He is currently the Chairman House Committee on Education.
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Etteh as Senate President and Speaker, respectively. Speaking in defence of the 
action by the presidency and the PDP, Mahmud Kanti Bello,7 states that:
It is not a question whether I support or reject whatever, we are party people and the party 
did not just do this alone, we are the people who accepted it this way. The party gave 
reasons and it should be so for everyone who supports the ranking policy in the Senate 
rules. The rule is very clear, it should be ranking Senators and if the party in its wisdom 
decided to zone these things and advised, then why is somebody complaining? (Thisday, 
31 May, 2007).
This imposition came in the wake of a call on the executive and the PDP to desist 
from imposing leaders on NASS by Nnamani. In his valedictory speech, the Senate 
President made veiled reference to the instability of the Senate, which he attributed 
to the executive meddlesomeness in the emergence of its leadership and its conduct 
generally (Leadership 1 June, 2007). Nnamani’s position was corroborated by 
David Mark, a former Senate President, who averred that:
I believe that if I check from 1999 to 2007, I think some of the changes in the leadership that 
happened between 1999 and 2007 were totally unnecessary. They destabilized the Senate. 
Within that time, I believe the Senate Presidents were leaving their houses for National 
Assembly, not sure whether they will come back as Senate Presidents. That is not good 
enough for a leader (Daily Trust, 28 May, 2009).
In spite of the relative stability enjoyed in NASS in the aftermath of Obasanjo 
Presidency, the politics of imposition of legislative leadership continued. The ruling 
party under the strong influence of the executive always suggested favourite mem-
bers of the Senate and House of Representatives for various leadership positions. 
After the 2011 General elections, the then ruling PDP proposed a candidate unfa-
vourable to the majority of the members. Eventually, members of the House of 
Representatives elected a speaker of their choice contrary to the proposal of the 
executive and the ruling party. In particular, the ruling party and the presidency 
proposed the seat of the Speaker be zoned to the South-west, but majority of mem-
bers settled for a member from the North-west zone. Members of the House of 
Representatives therefore defied the proposal of the executive and elected Hon. 
Aminu Waziri Tambuwal as the Speaker, who served from 2011 to 2015. The deci-
sion of the House of Representatives on the choice of its Speaker affected its rela-
tions with the executive. Many issues dealing with the law and policy making as 
well as oversights during this period were hardly agreed upon by these important 
institutions of democracy. Budget proposals of the executive were unduly delayed, 
non-implementation of budgets by the executive were also not sanctioned. The 
House of Representatives was particularly uncomfortable with the presidency, 
largely on account of the disagreement over legislative leadership. During this 
period, the House initiated investigation into one of the most reckless embezzlement 
of public funds through fuel subsidy. The investigation was very revealing but its 
outcomes were never implemented. The chairperson of the legislative committee 
7 Mahmud Kanti Bello is a Senator and currently the Majority Chief Whip of the Senate.
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was eventually indicted and currently being prosecuted on allegation of graft pur-
portedly requested and received from one of those being investigated.
This trend also continued after the 2015 General Elections. In spite of the expec-
tation that the power alternation resulting in the emergence of a new party in govern-
ment and the national assembly should improve and stabilise inter-organ relations, 
executive-legislative acrimony has remained a major issues. To be sure, the defeat of 
the PDP by the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) did not seem to change 
the intrigues that characterized the determination of leadership positions in the 
National Assembly. The crack within the ruling APC began to emerge early in the 
life of the administration in 2015 over who should be Senate President and Speaker 
of House of Representatives and more broadly which of the six Geopolitical zones 
should produce the candidates for these positions. The party had its proposals, 
which were turned down by both the Senate and House of Representatives. The 
National Assembly elected Senator Bukola Saraki from North- central as Senate 
President and Yakubu Dogara as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respec-
tively. This decision precipitated serious internal crisis in both chambers of the cen-
tral legislature and within the ruling APC. Even when formal letters were written by 
the leadership of the APC to revert to the proposal of the party, the two Houses 
remained defiant and stood their grounds. This further strained relations between the 
executive and the legislature. For failing to heed the call to resign as Senate President, 
Senator Saraki was harassed, intimidated and, charged to Code of Conduct Tribunal 
and subsequently to High Court for false declaration of assets and for forgery of 
Senate Rules. These actions and intrigues undermine the spirit of cooperation and 
partnership between the two arms of government. The strained relations became 
clear in the budget scrutiny as accusations and counter accusations by both arms of 
government unnecessarily prolonged the 2016 budget. This in effect affected the 
timely implementation of the budget.
The executive agencies were employed to persecute national assembly members 
and leaders considered ‘disloyal’ to both the APC and the President. Disloyalty was 
interpreted to mean not allowing the party and the presidency to determine who 
presides over the national assembly. Ultimately, the party became factionalised, 
fragmented, destabilised and crisis ridden. Government policy and law-making suf-
fered as a result of the inter-organ acrimonies. The two organs related under com-
plete lack of trust for each other. The change that the new government promised to 
bring was lost to the crises and economic hardship, while the poverty level became 
intensified. The irreconcilable conflict that the disagreement over the choice of lead-
ership sparked in 2015 had grown so wide that by 2018 the Senate President and the 
Speaker of the House had to defect (returned) to their former party-PDP. This took 
the control of the two chambers away from the ruling APC, although it still con-
trolled majority seats in both chambers.
In the area of oversight, the executive and the legislature have also always had 
difficulty working together under a harmonious environment. From 1999 to date, 
the oversight function of the legislature has always enabled it to expose misappro-
priation and corruption in the executive agencies, ministries and department. This 
has always not gone down well with the executive organ. The PTDF investigation 
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under Obasanjo administration, the Fuel subsidy administration under Jonathan led 
government, the Maina’s Pension scam under Buhari administration are a few 
examples of how the legislature exposed corruption under different administration. 
The resolution of the Senate to investigate the ‘Tradermoni’ scheme of the APC-led 
federal government was criticised and opposed not only by the APC members in the 
Senate, especially the Majority leader, but also appeared not to go down well with 
the executive. The probe was ordered because the manner in which the government 
was disbursing the funds was considered to be lacking transparency and motivated 
by partisan. Similarly, as the Minority leader pointed out, the ‘Tradermoni’ was 
being used to induce voters by the APC as the national elections approach. The 
disbursement perhaps became suspect because it was flagged off in Ekiti state in 
August 2018, a week to the state governorship election. In addition, the Minority 
leader noted that the information that beneficiaries are expected to provide suggest 
that the funds were being disbursed to influence voters in favour of the ruling gov-
ernment. By this, each beneficiary got ten thousand naira. This amount is equivalent 
of 27.8 cent when converted. It is the same amount that the APC led government 
was given to people on the ground that the beneficiaries should start small business 
with it. The probes and scrutiny have also accounted for acrimonious executive- 
legislature relations in each instance. Recently too, the report of the Senate ad-hoc 
committee on the Presidential Committee on the North-east in 2018 indicted the 
Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) for misappropriating funds 
and influencing the award of contract to his company and recommended the removal 
and prosecution of the SGF to the President. The Presidency rejected the report and 
maintained that the committee was not fair to the SGF. It is also worthy of note that 
the Senate on two different occasions refused to confirm the nomination of the 
Presidency for the Chairman of the EFCC. Despite the rejection of the nominee, the 
president did not removed him from office. Constitutionally, an unconfirmed occu-
pant of office has to vacate the office after 6 months, but in total disregard of the 
constitution and the position of the senate, the acting chairman has occupied the 
position for over 2 years.
It can thus be argued that the enormous power given to executive by the 
Constitution is often interpreted to mean its dominance over the legislature and 
other arms of government. As such, even when other arms of government act within 
their jurisdiction in relation to the executive arm of government such actions are 
trivialized. To this end, resources and executive powers such as control over security 
agencies are often used against the legislature in a bid to ensure its subordination. 
This is done in order for the executive to perpetuate corruption and avoid being 
prudently checked by the legislature. The chaotic nature of relations between the 
executive and legislature in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has undermined the realiza-
tion of the core democratic values of accountability, transparency and probity in the 
management of public affairs.
Another dimension to the understanding of the nature of executive-legislature 
relations in Nigeria is the conduct of legislative investigations or oversight. The 
power of investigation conferred on the legislature, is often exercised by its various 
committees. It is largely on this account that standing committees are established in 
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both the Senate and House of Representatives. Thus, standing committees, espe-
cially in a presidential system of government last the life of legislature and take their 
titles after ministries, agencies or departments of government (Arab, The Law 
Maker, 2007, p. 25).
The committees are to oversee, routinely, the affairs of the relevant government 
ministries, agencies or departments for the purpose of conducting investigation with 
a view to ensuring the execution or administration of the laws enacted by it and/or 
disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by it. This 
explains the rationale behind the invitation of various heads of government minis-
tries, agencies and departments to defend their proposals and account for the monies 
appropriated them in the previous appropriation or fiscal year.
Standing committees conduct their investigations with a view to making new 
laws or amending existing ones where necessary. In addition to standing committees 
there are other categories of committees in the legislature that makes it relatively 
complex and efficient.8 Accordingly, these committees, depending largely on their 
mandates and the circumstances necessary for their establishment, deal with issues 
brought to them with greater sense of depth and responsibility. These committees 
include special committees, standing committees, joint/conference committees and 
ad-hoc committees. Tables 1 and 2 below show the committee structure in both the 
Senate and House of Representatives:
The committee structure above, show some degree of departmentalization, divi-
sion of labour and specialisation in the conduct of legislative activities. The Standing 
Committees, for instance, reflect, as much as possible, the Ministries, Departments 
and Agencies of government. The committees are catalyst to legislation, as they are 
responsible for scrutinising proposed bills and offer recommendations to the parent 
House, as appropriate. They are also central in the conduct of oversights. They con-
duct investigations, oversee the appropriation of monies to their relevant agencies 
and monitor the implementation of monies appropriated. The instrumentality of 
committees is more in the area of investigations than other engagements, essen-
tially, because of the role of legislature in the institutionalisation of accountability 
in democratic governance.
In spite of the powers conferred on committees to conduct investigations, they 
are, however, limited to making resolutions on the basis of their findings. This, 
therefore, raises serious concerns on the autonomy and instrumentality of legislative 
committees. For instance, series of investigations carried out by committees in both 
the Senate and the House were either not adopted at the plenary or manipulated out 
of agenda. For instance, Ojeifo (2008) argues that the Report of Senate Committee 
that investigated the alleged corruption in the transportation sector was never dis-
cussed in the Senate. He argues that:
8 In addition to standing committees, there are also various categories of committees in NASS 
which perform similar functions to that of standing committees. These include: special commit-
tees; joint committees; conference committees; ad-hoc committees and committee of the whole. 
For elaborate discussion of these categories of committees, see Handbook of Legislative Procedures 
and The Law Maker, vol. 8 no. 174.
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The report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee on Investigation into Nigeria’s Transportation 
Sector, which indicted some former and current public office holders for allegedly violating 
due process in payments of contract sums and recommended them for prosecution by the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), has raised serious concerns in the 
Senate. An immediate logistical problem concerns procedural precedent, in terms of which 
every senator must get a copy of the copious report (and its annexure and accompanying 
documents) before the Senate can proceed to consider it. The totality of the report, as sub-
mitted by the committee, can fill a large-sized ‘Ghana-Must-Go’ bag. The feelings are that 
this may dilate the process of expeditious consideration of the report. But that, as learnt, 
serves the purpose of the committee: which is to, according to sources, put the former and 





1. Agriculture and Rural Development 28. Information and Media
2. Air Force 29. Home Affairs
3. Appropriation 30. Inter-Party Affairs
4. Aviation 31. Judiciary, Human Rights and Legal 
Matters
5. Banking, Insurance & Other Financial 
Services
32. Employment, Labour and 
Productivity
6. Capital Market 33. Land Transport
7. Commerce 34. Local and Foreign Debts
8. Communications 35. Marine Transport
9. Cooperation and Integration 36. National Planning
10. Culture and Tourism 37. Security and Intelligence
11. Defense (Army) 38. Navy
12. Downstream Petroleum 39. Niger Delta
13. Drugs, Narcotics and Anti- Corruption 40. Upstream Petroleum
14. Education 41. Police Affairs
15. Environment and Ecology 42. Power
16. Establishment and Public Service 43. Privatization
17. Ethics and Petitions 44. Public Accounts
18. Federal Capital Territory 45. Rules and Business
19. Federal Character and Inter Governmental 
Affairs
46. Science and Technology
20. Finance 47. Selection
21. Foreign Affairs 48. Senate Services
22. Gas 49. Solid Minerals
23. Health 50. Sports
24. Housing and Urban Development 51. State and Local Governments
25. National ID Card & Population 
Commission
52. Water Resources
26. Industry 53. Women and Youth
27. Independent Electoral Commission 54. Works
Source: Anyanwu (2003a, b, 2007) and Legislative Bulletin (2008) Vol. 1 No. 15
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1. Agriculture 43. Privatization and Commercialization
2. Air Force 44. Public Accounts
3. Appropriations 45. Rules and Business
4. Aviation 46. Science and Technology
5. Banking, and Currency 47. Selection
6. Capital Market and Institutions 48. House Services
7. Commerce 49. Solid Minerals Development
8. Communications 50. Sports
9. Cooperation and Integration in Africa 51. States and Local Governments
10. Culture and Tourism 52. Water Resources
11. Army 53. Women Affairs
12. Petroleum Refineries & Product Marketing 
Resources
54. Works
13. Drugs, Narcotics and Financial Crimes 55. Anti Corruption, National Ethics and 
Values
14. Education 56. Custom and Exercise
15. Environment 57. Defense
16. Pension 58. Due Process and Procurement
17. Ethics and Privileges 59. Emergency and Disaster 
Management
18. Federal Capital Territory 60. Federal Capital Territory Councils
19. Governmental Affairs 61. HIV/AIDS & Malaria Control
20. Finance 62. Inter-Parliamentary Relations
21. Foreign Affairs 63. Judiciary
22. Gas Resources 64. Justice
23. Health 65. Millennium Development Goals
24. Housing and Habitat 66. Legislative Budget and Research
25. National Planning, Pop. and Economic 
Development
67. Youth and Social Development
26. Industries 68. Poverty Alleviation
27. Electoral Matters 69. Legislative Compliance
28. Information and National Orientation 70. Public Petitions
29. Internal Affairs 71. Media and Public Affairs
30. Inter/Intra-Party Affairs 72. Public Service
31. Human Rights 73. Rural Development
32. Employment, Labour and Productivity 74. Special Duties
33. Land Transport 75. Donor
34. Aids, Loan and Debts 76. Diaspora
35. Marine Transport 77. Constituency Outreach
36. National Planning 78. Urban Development
37. National Security and Intelligence 79. Ministry of Niger Delta




incumbent public officers allegedly indicted on the spot. Significantly, the indictment was 
not on the basis of funds embezzlement (Ojeifor 2008).
Thus, legislative committees in NASS are often criticised, for being ineffective in 
the discharge of their responsibilities. For example, the legislature in Nigeria’s fourth 
republic could not effectively hold the executive accountable for the execution of 
various Appropriation Acts. For example, the appropriation exercise in NASS is often 
unnecessarily delayed. There are also well founded allegations that chairs and mem-
bers of various legislative committees receive gratification from chief executives of 
various government agencies in order to increase their allocation and cover their inef-
ficiencies and corruption. The removal of the Chairperson of the Appropriation 
Committee in the House of Representatives after the 2016 budget and the revelations 
and accusations made by the former chairman of the committee against the leadership 
of the House and various committees show the extent of corruption and compromise 
in the executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. The 2016 budget was alleged to have 
been padded by both the executive and legislature. In spite of these allegations, no 
serious investigations were carried out with the view to punishing culprits.
Even when investigations are carried out by committees and gross misconduct 
uncovered and established, committees have no power to sanction the executive or 
the defaulting government agency. It can only report its findings and recommenda-
tions to the parent chamber for further action. In some instances, committee mem-
bers are intimidated by the leadership, especially on reports that indicts some top 
government functionaries. Confirms this assertion:
In Nigeria, an entire Senate committee probing corruption allegations against President 
Olusegun Obasanjo and his deputy, Atiku Abubakar, has resigned. Its members said they 
had been under pressure from Senate leaders. Reports say the committee had recommended 
severe sanctions against the president and vice president for alleged misuse of public funds. 
They are accused of taking money from the Petroleum Development Fund (PTDF) for their 
own use. (The two have parted ways after major policy disagreements. For one thing, they 
could not agree on a plan to amend the Constitution that would have allowed President 
Obasanjo to run for a third term.) (Offor 2007).
Similarly, the House of Representatives on the 14th July, 2009 adopted the 
Report of its Joint Committees of Finance and Appropriation that investigated the 
allegation of selective implementation of the 2009 Appropriation Act. This was 






39. Niger Delta Development Commission 81. Climate and Global Warming
40. Petroleum Resources (Upstream) 82. Lake Chad
41. Police Affairs 83. Women in Parliament
42. Power and Steel 84. Federal Character
Source: Anyanwu (2003a, b, 2007) and Legislative Bulletin (2008) Vol. 1 No. 15
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The House of Representatives yesterday frowned at the poor implementation of this year’s 
budget and resolved to invoke the provisions of Section 143 of the 1999 Constitution by 
moving against President Umar Musa YarAdua if he fails to fully implement the 2009 
Appropriation Act (Leadership, 15 July, 2009).
In the Report, the Joint Committee objected the claim that there was revenue 
shortfall, arguing that the exchange rate of Naira to dollar as appropriated was $1: 
N120, but the realities of the market shows that Dollar has appreciated over the 
Naira. The exchange rate for most of the period in 2009 was $1: N145 (Leadership, 
15 July, 2009). This has been the trend since 1999. In spite of various similar reports, 
the legislature could not sanction the executive. This shows some of the limitations 
of the activities of committees in NASS. It also shows the extent of control of legis-
lative leaders by executive. More often than not leaders of the legislature in Nigeria 
are anointed and/or bought off by the executive, particularly the presidency. This 
makes it difficult for the legislature to be assertive in its mandate to investigate and 
control the activities of the executive arm of government.
In some instances, committee reports and recommendations are rejected, regard-
less of the accuracy of the outcomes of their investigations and recommendations. 
This often dampens the morale of committee members. This affects the productivity 
of committees and by implication the legislature as a whole. An anonymous mem-
ber of the House of Representatives explains how the leadership of the House 
deferred the Report of the Committee on Power that investigated the alleged corrup-
tion by public officers and private companies in the sector. He stresses that:
We have been called all sorts of names and sincerely I am ashamed to face my constituents. 
After all the noise about our commitment to the probe and the efforts that followed during 
the public hearings, the thing was just thrown away like a disused sanitary pad. It is a 
shame, indeed a shame (Leadership, Nigeria 12 July, 2009).
The power sector probe by House committee was believed to have indicted ‘big 
names’ both within and outside the corridors power. Indeed, the government was 
unhappy with the outcome of the investigation. It was alleged that the leadership of 
the House was prevailed upon to scuttle any attempt to discuss the committee report 
at the plenary. What is more, the chairman of the Senate and House committees on 
power and three other members were charged for fraud by a Federal High Court in 
Abuja which further laid the matter to rest. It was reported that:
A senator and … three members of the House of Representatives were yesterday slammed 
with a 156-count charge of fraud and criminal breach of trust before a Federal High Court, 
Abuja, Senator Nicholas Ugbane, who is chairman Senate committee on power, along with 
his counterpart Mr. Ndudi Godwin Elumelu… were charged by the EFCC alongside House 
members Igwe Paulinus and Jibo Mohammed (Daily Trust, May 15, 2009).
Indeed, intimidation of committee members who are engaged in one form of 
investigation or another has become rampant. This is affecting the autonomy and 
importance of legislative committees in NASS. More often, committee members 
and clerks that are involved in various investigations become target of intimidation 
and victimization. In one of the incidences of such intimidation, the Senate commit-
tee on poverty alleviation was intimidated to halt its investigations on the funds 
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allocated to National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), an agency of the 
executive. The chairperson of the committee and some of the clerks received threat-
ening text messages urging them not to continue with such investigations. To make 
these threats real, some of the culprit organised thugs, who booed and sang threaten-
ing slogans to the committee chairperson during one of the visits to her 
constituency.
This is also similar to what had happen to the power probe in the House. In this 
case, some of the committee clerks had to seek for redeployment to other committees 
for security reasons. This is because, on daily basis, they were been threatened by 
anonymous persons, allegedly, government officials, contractors and other private 
individuals that had benefited in the fraud and responsible for the scandals in the sec-
tor (Yagana 2009). To this end, the instrumentality of committees in the National 
Assembly is greatly impaired. To a very large extent also, chairs and members of vari-
ous committees accept to share loots with government officers and cover up such in 
the course of their investigations. The case involving Senator Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello 
(Chairperson Senate Committee on Health) is a prime example. It was alleged that 
the officials of the Ministry of Health (Ministers, Permanent Secretary and some 
Directors) shared the unspent budget money in the Ministry in connivance with 
Senator Bello. The scandal led to the arrest and trial of two Federal Ministers of 
Health, Permanent Secretary and Directors of the ministry including the said Senator 
by the EFCC (Adisa, Nigerian Tribune, December 25, 2008).
It is important to also mention that from 1999 to date, disagreement over legisla-
tive activities over annual budget and appropriation bill submitted by the executive 
has remained a perennial source of inter-organ acrimony. The amended 1999 consti-
tution provided that the executive shall prepare and present to the national assembly 
an annual budget. The purpose of which is to ensure legislative inputs. The input 
may come inform of addition or subtraction. However, each year from Obasanjo 
regime to YarAdua to Jonathan and currently Buhari administration, the executive 
has always alleged that the legislature inflated certain figures and reduced others. 
Specifically, argument over insertion of constituency projects and unilateral legisla-
tive appropriation for the projects without executive authorisation was a major cause 
of confrontation between president Obasanjo and the national assembly in the early 
stage of the new democracy. In 2018, the constituency projects funds inserted or 
inflated by the legislators in the 2017 budget also became a serious source of 
executive- legislature acrimony. In other instances, the executive accused the legis-
lature of inflating certain heads and reducing others without recourse to the execu-
tive. This also remained a major source of inter-organ conflict. To be sure, Late 
President YarAdua had to reject the 2008 budget after passage on the ground that the 
legislature increased the capital votes by over 70%. Similarly cases have arisen 
under the administration of president Buhari. In 2016, the term budget padding was 
used to capture the inflation of some budget heads. This was deliberately used by the 
executive organ to spite the legislature in the eyes of the public. Indeed, this put the 
legislature, especially the speaker of the House of Representatives, on the spot as he 
had to be defending the actions of the chambers. Indeed, the executive never envis-
aged a situation in which the legislature would ever add or subtract from any  budgets 
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presented to it. The executive expects a rubber stamp assembly that would only read 
and approve the annual budget as presented. However, the insistence of the legisla-
ture to work within the constitutional power given to it is seen and interpreted as the 
usurpation of executive power and responsibility.
 Conclusion
The executive and legislative arms of government are central to the administration 
and governance of a state in a democracy. While the former is constitutionally 
tasked with the responsibility of policy formulation, implementation and evalua-
tion, the latter is specifically empowered by the constitution to make laws and con-
trol the activities of the former. The power of investigation conferred on the 
legislature stems from the philosophy that it is a representative of the people. Thus, 
as representatives of the electorate, it exercises powers on behalf of the people, 
which guarantees participatory representative democracy. However, power tussles 
between the two arms of government and indeed, encroachments of various sorts, 
particularly from the executive in the affairs of the legislature, has reduced the effi-
ciency of the legislature and to a large extent turned the body into an appendage of 
the executive. Evidence have shown that from 1999 to date, there have been an 
entrenched culture of executive dominance. This is largely on the account that the 
executive arm of government is uncomfortable with the mechanisms provided by 
the constitution to check its excesses. From 1999 to date, Nigeria’s democracy have 
been troubled by the incessant executive-legislature faceoff and crises of various 
magnitude. The executive is believed to be corrupt and does everything possible to 
prevent itself from being investigated and sanctioned by the legislature. The inter-
ference of the executive in the choice of legislative leaders is one of the strategies of 
controlling the legislature. Gratifications to legislative leaders, committee chairs 
and members have also been ones of the strategies of controlling the legislature. In 
essence, therefore executive-legislature relations in Nigeria are characterized by 
tension, animosity, confrontations and large scale corruption. Thus, unless the leg-
islature prove assertive by being internally transparent and prudent, the executive 
will always have an upper hand in its relations with the former.
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Nigeria is in its own internal fourth wave of democratization which started in 1999. 
Democratic governance in Nigeria tends to be consolidating even though there are 
still many rough edges that need to be smoothened. However, appreciable progress 
has been made judging by the hurdles the country has succeeded in surmounting, 
namely, successful conduct of elections (five general elections, namely, 1999, 2003, 
2007, 2011 and 2015, have been held so far), administration-to-administration 
transition and party-to-party handover. The legislature has also witnessed some 
transformations since 1999.
Earlier, the picture of the National Assembly in popular imagination was that of 
a rubber stamp legislature that unquestioningly pandered to the needs of the 
executive because as Omotoso (2016, p. 8) asserts, the legislators sacrificed their 
expected autonomy “on the altar of financial dependency, as it derives all its revenue 
from the executive arm of government”. The seeming rubber stamp nature of the 
National Assembly in the immediate post-military period was essentially as a result 
of two interrelated factors, namely, it lacked financial autonomy; and, it was cautious 
not to be accused of trying to derail the then nascent democracy. However, the 
National Assembly has changed the narrative as it has entrenched itself and is now 
financially autonomous. But the financial autonomy being enjoyed by the National 
Assembly has also created concerns of profligacy, considering that the National 
Assembly’s budget rose from N2.204 billion in 1999 (covering July to December) 
to N154.2 billion in 2010 and slightly dropped to N139.5 billion in 2018.
The relevance of legislative assemblies in modern democratic system is the 
seeming impracticability of recreating the ancient Greek model of assembling the 
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entire population to deliberate on important common issues. In other words, con-
temporary legislatures represent a compromise between the assemblage of every-
body, with the attendant confusion and danger of degeneration to mobocracy, and 
the control of government by a select few with the risk of oligarchy. It is this com-
promise that confers on the legislature the traditional four-fold tasks of being an 
agency of representation, lawmaking, oversight of the activities of other arms of 
government, not just the executive and constituency service (Barkan 2009). As has 
been pointed out by Lü et al. (2018, p. 7), “serving in the legislature provides a 
unique opportunity for individuals to access the inner circle of political power, 
where they can participate in key policy debates and network with other important 
political actors”.
The sheer impossibility of discharging its broad legislative mandates in the ple-
nary sessions informed the adoption of committee system by legislatures, that is, the 
breaking up of the legislature into manageable groups for the purpose of detailed 
treatment of issues within their competence (Igwe 2002). The role of committees 
has been variously recognized: while Woodrow Wilson described legislative 
committees as the “workshop of American Congress”, Shaw called them the 
“workhorses of legislatures” (cited in Olson 2015). As a matter of fact, no bill can 
ever transform to a legislation without passing through one form of committee 
process or another. Thus, there is no doubt about the utilitarian value of committees 
in modern legislatures.
Committees are the engine of legislative excellence, more like kitchens where 
the raw ingredients of good governance are processed and packaged for the 
consumption of the legislature. In other words, committees exist to enhance the 
efficiency of the legislature in terms of enabling it to concurrently perform numerous 
important functions that otherwise might not be attended to; providing an informal 
collegial environment that facilitates interparty compromises on small matters and 
adds to technical improvements of legislations and creating platforms for public 
hearings which allow the general public to participate in lawmaking processes 
(National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1996; Clark et  al. 2006; 
Fashagba 2009a; Olson 2015). Sections 4(2-3); 48-49; 88 of  the Nigerian 
Constitution confer on the National Assembly the  powers to: make laws for the 
peace, order and good governance of the federation with respect to any matter 
included in both the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists; represent Nigerians 
on the basis of senatorial districts and federal constituencies; and, carry out over-
sight functions (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
Nigeria’s National Assembly uses committee system in the discharge of its leg-
islative mandate. But the committee system and the powers attached to it have fol-
lowed, not only the path of clientelist politics but is also routinely deployed to the 
pursuit of rents and patronage (Lewis 2010; Baba 2011). The leaderships of the 
National Assembly use the committee system to set up intricate web of patronage 
system to ensure regime survival. For instance, after the removal of the former 
Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Honorable (Mrs) Patricia Etteh, her 
successor, Hon. Dimeji Bankole, created additional 12 new House committees. Not 
only was this administrative expansion of committees to compensate those who 
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sustained the fight that removed Etteh and, thus, paved the way for him, it was part 
of Bankole’s strategies to consolidate his position in the face of the leadership crisis 
that had characterized the National Assembly (Baba 2011). Expertise and cognate 
experience play very fringe roles in determining leadership and membership of 
committees; what appears to form the bedrock of criteria are loyalty and party 
affiliation. Thus, committees have been turned into milk cows, thereby deepening 
corruption in the polity (Sha 2008; Alabi and Fashagba 2010).
This chapter examines Nigeria’s legislative experience within the context of its 
committee system, paying particular attention to the effectiveness and contributions 
of legislative committees to the overall efficiency of Nigeria’s National Assembly 
between 1999 and 2018. The chapter evaluates the modus operandi of Nigeria’s 
legislative committee system, especially the extent to which its core mandates have 
been actualized and posits that despite the political manipulations of committees by 
successive National Assembly leaderships and the contention that leadership and 
membership of committees have been mainstreamed into the patronage system to 
reward and sustain loyalty, their original relevance has not been eroded. As a matter 
of fact, their competencies have cumulatively expanded since 1999 and this has 
helped to position the National Assembly for greater efficiency in its overall 
operations.
 Legislative Committee Systems in Comparative Perspective
The legislature plays very important role in modern governance. Across political 
systems, the legislature has evolved over time to become the engine house of 
governments saddled with the tasks of making laws, overseeing the implementation 
of such laws and representing the people generally (Clark et  al. 2006). The 
representative nature of modern legislatures derives from three related factors, 
namely, the delimitation of the polity into constituencies; the representation of these 
constituencies by elected officials on the platform of people’s electoral choices; and 
the symbolization of the legislature as the mirror of the polity because it has the 
largest number of elected officials.
The representative nature of the legislature bestows upon it the ideal task of 
ensuring that governance is directed at meeting the expectations of the people. As 
Akanle (2011, p. 110) has opined, “to be an effective organ, the legislature must 
appreciate the enormity of its tasks, imbibe a culture of service to the public, 
constantly evaluate governance processes within the frameworks of expected 
democratic criteria and make necessary contributions”. The use of committee 
system is the response of the legislature in meeting the twin challenges of effective 
representation and staying on top of issues in the face of increasing complexities of 
governance.
The global emphasis on democratization has opened up a number of countries 
and led to the institutionalization of democratic ethos. At the core of this change is 
the re-evaluation of the role of the legislature in democracy. There is no agreement 
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as to the exact origin of the legislature in governments, but it is less difficult to 
historicize the origin and processes of the legislature in individual countries. Beyme 
von (2000) traces European Parliamentary democracy to the twentieth century with 
maturation for most countries periodized after 1918. Scholars have identified four 
epochs in the democratization of regimes namely, the democratization of 
parliamentary regimes which took place from the end of the nineteenth century to 
the end of the First World War; the reconsolidation of parliamentary democracy 
after the Second World War; the third wave of democratization in the 1970s in 
southern Europe; and the fourth wave in Eastern Europe and most of the Third 
World after 1989 (Radu 2011).
Apart from sovereign states, regional and continental organizations also have 
legislatures, which serve as the fulcrum of their governance structures. It is estimated 
that about 150 countries have various forms of legislatures in place (Radu 2011). 
There is no uniformity in the composition and powers of the legislature across 
democratic systems. Scholars have identified several parameters that distinguish 
legislatures. Mezey (1979) distinguishes legislatures in terms of their policy-making 
powers and characterizes them as active, reactive and minimal legislatures. In a 
similar vein, Nelson Polsby identified two types of legislatures, namely arena and 
transformative legislatures (cited Ornstein 1992). While arena legislatures are 
formalized fora that enable the discussion of ideas and policies, transformative 
legislatures are preoccupied with actively translating ideas into laws (Ornstein 
1992). Whether a legislature is considered arena or transformative is dependent on 
the degree of openness of the political system or the type of regime in power. 
Scholars have also identified another form of legislature as authoritarian or rubber 
stamp. Legislatures that are characterized as authoritarian or rubber stamp are 
considered weak and conformist and merely exist for the purpose of legitimizing the 
policies and laws made by the ruling elite (Ornstein 1992; Barkan 2005; Truex 
2014; Lü et al. 2018).
The essence of these dichotomizations is to identify the locus of legislative power 
in the polity, especially in terms of such factors as the actors that initiate bills that 
eventually become laws, the powers which the legislature exerts in policy-making 
and the level of elite and popular support to the legislatures (Baba 2011). While the 
US Congress approximates the active and transformative legislature because of the 
elite and mass support it enjoys, the British Parliament and French National 
Assembly exhibit the characteristics of arena and reactive legislatures, considering 
that they react to what their governments bring forward. The Russian Soviet and 
Chinese National People’s Congress are examples of rubber stamp legislature. 
Minimal legislatures are found in one-party states (Radu 2011). A seeming 
characteristic of authoritarian or rubber stamp legislatures is the overall influence of 
the party. As emphasized by Truex (2014) and Lü et  al. (2018), authoritarian 
legislatures are considered rubber stamps because delegates represent primarily the 
interests of their constituents and depend on their support for political survival in 
reelections. Interestingly, the de facto constituents are not necessarily the ordinary 
citizens they supposedly represent but the ruling elites whose preferences are 
favored by the selection process.
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The relevance of committees in the legislatures is located in their utilitarian value 
in assisting the legislators to manage the demands of modern governance as well as 
in simplifying legislative duties. As has been noted by Norton (2013, p. 4), “the 
legislatures exhibiting the greatest capacity to determine policy outcomes have 
highly developed committee structures”. Committees are essential features of major 
governmental systems and their variants stand as evidence of their specialization as 
well as capacity to determine policy outcomes (Radu 2011; Norton 2013; Olson 
2015). Both the US Congress and the British Parliament perform their legislative 
duties through the instrumentality of committees. In addition to committees, the 
legislatures have built a massive network of personnel to assist them in the discharge 
of their legislative mandate. As Baba (2011, p. 92) observes,
Legislators seek to professionalize the legislature and advance their career prospects by 
demanding for more legislative staff, which not only benefits legislative leaders in their 
quest for equal standing with the executive, but also works to the advantage of individual 
legislators by giving them resources to improve their re-election bids and to become more 
assertive in policy-making process.
An important trend in the evolution of committees across governmental types is the 
responsiveness of the legislatures to new challenges in governance. Apart from 
standing committees, the legislatures have instituted sub and ad-hoc committees to 
address emerging issues. The 535-member US Congress as at the 108th Congress 
(2003–2005) had a total of 36 standing committees broken into 19 for the House 
and 17 for the Senate with over 150 subcommittees and 25,000 employees to tackle 
its workload (Radu 2011).
The British Parliament is amongst the top well-developed and entrenched legis-
latures in the world. As a result of its long existence, the British Parliament has 
well-established parliamentary rules and procedures (Norton 2013). The British 
House of Commons utilizes standing committees in the consideration of bills. As 
Radu (2011) has pointed out, the British House of Commons benefits from a high 
degree of complex organizational system, with universal rules and well-established 
procedures. Although committees are relevant in parliamentary systems, they are 
more so in presidential systems due to the dominant role that political parties play 
in policy-making (Shaw 1990; Olson and Mezey 1991).
In a study of the legislatures of seven post-communist states, namely, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, Khmelko 
(2011, p. 194) contends,
Incorporating chamber leadership, PPGs [parliamentary party groups], and committees into 
a decentralized multi-party legislature has been one of the main challenges for post- 
communist legislatures. The process of transforming a highly centralized, top down, one 
party political process of a communist state to a democratic one with majority rule and 
protected opposition rights involved changes to the power of communist parties in all 
parliaments of the region.
Post-communist legislatures also use committees to discharge their tasks (Clark 
et al. 2006). But these committees do not exactly wield powers as in parliamentary 
or presidential systems owing to their antecedents. Underscoring these antecedents, 
Khmelko (2011, p. 206) avers,
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Under the communist regime, the decision-making process was highly centralised. Soviet- 
type standing commissions had both formal and informal means of dealing with 
governmental officials. Formal means included the right to subpoena documents and 
officials and to create commissions of investigation and audit. Informal methods included 
‘co-opting’ politically reliable members of the bureaucracy into those commissions.
The entrenchment of committee system in the legislatures of these post-communist 
countries is evolving. The scenario in the second decade of post-communism is 
markedly different from the first decade. By the end of the second decade, the 
parliaments of such countries as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, 
Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine had a collegial parliamentary leadership council with 
the responsibility to set agenda, prioritize and schedule legislative activities 
(Khmelko 2011; Ilonszki and Olson 2012). In addition to this body, these parliaments 
have committees, although they wield limited powers. For instance, the Ukraine’s 
national parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, has evolved from weak legislative body to 
a more complex and powerful institution with the establishment of an effective 
standing committee system (Wise and Brown 1996; Khmelko 2011). Despite the 
limitations imposed on the initiating powers of these committees by the Ukrainian 
Constitution of 1996, they have continued to be influential in terms of playing active 
role during the three stages of the legislative process from the draft bills to the first, 
second and final (third) readings (Khmelko et al. 2010).
Like the dominant and established legislatures, post-communist parliaments use 
both standing and ad-hoc committees to discharge their parliamentary duties. Most 
post-communist states operate committee system based on established criteria: 
Russian and Lithuanian laws stipulate the number of committees for their 
parliaments, although there is a proviso for changes to this number; in Hungary, the 
system of standing committees is a product of consensus by the parliamentary party 
group; and, in Moldova and Ukraine, the parliaments establish committees for the 
term and vote on the list of chairs and membership at the beginning of each term 
(Clark et al. 2006; Khmelko et al. 2010).
 Nigeria’s Legislative Experience: Differentiating 
Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
Ideally, what differentiates legislatures across the broad spectrum of political sys-
tems is not only the name attached to them, but also the manner in which they per-
form their duties and the procedures they deploy in undertaking their core tasks. For 
instance, the term “parliament” is usually associated with British system of parlia-
mentary government; the United States names its legislature the “Congress”; Israel 
calls its legislative arm the “Knesset or Knesseth”; “Duma” is the name associated 
with the legislative assembly of Russia and some former countries of the Communist 
bloc and Nigeria’s legislative body is known as the “National Assembly”.
In actuality, whatever name that is attached to a national legislative assembly 
does not detract from its responsibilities and importance as an indispensable 
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component of the national government. According to Barkan (2009, p.  1), 
legislatures bear the responsibility of extracting both vertical and horizontal 
accountability from the rulers for the ruled. In other words, legislatures undertake 
the task of bridging the gap between the ruler and the ruled through the 
performance of certain core functions namely, particularistic representation of 
the people based on constituencies, engagement in the enactment of legislations, 
performance of oversight functions, and rendering of constituency services 
(Barkan 2009; Fashagba 2009b).
Despite the portrayal of national legislatures as ideal symbols of representation, 
they, however, differ in terms of the role, which the political system allows them to 
play. Alan Rosenthal identified changing trends such as the professionalization of 
legislative activities, increasing politicization of legislative behavior and process; 
fragmentation of legislative institutions and hostile operating environment as also 
underpinning the differences in legislatures (cited in Moncrief et al. 1996). However, 
at the core of what differentiates legislatures are the historical, cultural and 
ideological traditions of a state.
Nigeria’s legislative experience started with parliamentarianism, which was 
inherited from the British colonial system. Apart from the British-supervised general 
elections of 1959, which produced the immediate post-independence government, 
Nigeria’s ruling elite were unable to supervise a free and fair election subsequently. 
For instance, the 1964 general elections created crises of monumental proportions 
across the country that eventually sounded the death knell of Nigeria’s democratic 
experiment in parliamentarianism. Apart from the initial boycott of the elections in 
several parts of the country, especially in the Eastern Region, artificial crises were 
created and fanned, which later led to the arrest, prosecution and conviction of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo (Jakande 1983; Oduguwa 2012). In addition to the intolerance of 
opposition by the ruling elite, there was brazen manipulation of the political process 
for partisan and parochial reasons as well as suffocation of ethnic minorities (Ikpe 
2000; Elaigwu 2011). All these provided the fodder that fed the military coup d’état 
of January 15, 1966 and the death of parliamentarianism in Nigeria (Ademoyega 
1981).
Presidentialism was introduced into Nigeria’s political system in the second 
republic (1979–1983). Since then, Nigeria has continued with it. There are several 
differences between parliamentarianism and presidentialism. On top of the list is the 
concept of the supremacy of parliament. This concept is an abridgement of the 
theory of separation of powers. The supremacy of parliament is a component of 
cabinet parliamentary system and implies a number of things such as: one, that 
parliament can legislate on any matter which it pleases; two, an act of parliament 
cannot be overruled or repealed except by parliament itself; and three, the power 
exercised by the Prime Minister or any other person is delegated to them. Price 
(1975) has argued that the supremacy of parliament is becoming more and more 
illusory owing to the influence of the Prime Minister on his/her majority supporters 
in parliament and ability to advise the Queen to dissolve parliament. In presidential 
system, none of the three arms of government is expected to be superior as they are 
coordinate and interdependent. In theory, the legislature operates within the confines 
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of separation of powers and acts as a check on the excesses of the other arms but in 
practice, the influence of the president and the party attempts to obfuscate this 
division.
While the continued exercise of governmental authority in parliamentary system 
is entirely dependent on parliamentary confidence, such confidence is unnecessary 
in presidential system as the legislature is empowered constitutionally to remove the 
president through impeachment after exhausting laid down procedures. In 
parliamentary system, if a government encounters confidence crisis, its popularity 
must be tested in the polls through a general elections (Needham 2009; Barrington 
et  al. 2010). Thus, there is no security of tenure in parliamentary system, as the 
timing of elections is flexible and dependent on the leader of the majority party or 
coalition of parties (Needham 2009). In presidential system, the tenure of the 
legislature is fixed and inviolable.
Adjunct to the necessity of confidence in sustaining regimes in parliamentarian-
ism, parliamentarians play additional and conflicting roles: they balance their role 
of representation with the duty to sustain the executive in office (Needham 2009). 
Although party loyalty in presidential system entails support for the government 
and its programmes by legislators, the failure of government does not affect them 
directly, at least till the next election. Again, the difference in the bicameralism of 
parliamentary and presidential systems is that the second chamber, in the case of 
parliamentary system, is peopled with appointed personages of high ranks. The 
implication is that the appointed chamber tends to be weaker because of its lack of 
democratic legitimacy (Needham 2009). But in presidential system, memberships 
of both chambers of the legislative assembly are derived from elections.
There does not appear to be any difference in the core reasons that underpin com-
mittee system in both parliamentary and presidential systems of government. The 
difference lies more in the extant legislative rules about the upper limits in terms of 
number of committees, membership, life span and powers. Both the parliamentary 
and presidential systems operate extensive committee system differentiated in terms 
of types of committees; that is whether it is: standing, standing joint, legislative, 
special, special joint and subcommittees.
 The Committee System in the Milieu of Nigeria’s Legislative 
Politics
The committee system is an organizing strategy of the legislature to keep itself 
abreast with the tasks of legislation and governance. The increasing expansion of 
modern governments as well as their sophistication demands a composite 
deployment of necessary expertise to address governance issues. Committee system 
is the institutionalized policy of dividing legislative assembly into smaller groups 
both for the purpose of effectiveness and for appropriating the expertise of members 
in the examination of issues under the purview and competence of the legislatures. 
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In contemporary setting, a significant part of legislative work is now conducted in 
committees rather than in the parent chamber (Yamamoto 2007; Olson 2015). 
Committees afford the legislature a bouquet of advantages namely, opportunity for 
a more detailed examination of issues; development of specific expertise by 
members of the committees, facilitation of timeous performance of the diverse 
aspects of its work; expert handling of issues and broad-based consultation of 
stakeholders and other vested interest groups on issues.
Every legislature evolves its own committee system, taking into account the 
peculiarities of its internal socio-economic and political dynamics. Essentially, 
certain guidelines appear to inform and shape the formation of committees. Igwe 
(2002, p. 75) avers that “committees are of different but related types, differentiated 
according to, among others, their duration, such as ad hoc, standing, sessional, and 
annual committees”. No matter the nature of committees set up by the legislature, 
they essentially act as “a filtering device and a legislative stethoscope by which 
policy proposal and other related activities are not only scrutinized but also utilized 
to access (sic)  the desirability, feasibility, sustainability, and healthiness of 
governmental policies” (Fashagba 2009a, p. 429–430).
Apart from the constituency services and representative functions of the legisla-
tors, the aspects where the committee system has proved indispensable are in mak-
ing legislations and exercising oversight functions on ministries, extra- ministerial 
departments and agencies (MDAs). Both the Nigerian Senate and the HoR have 
committees on all the institutions of government. Oversight requirements confer on 
committees a legal ground to assess the operations of various governmental institu-
tions. Thus, oversight is the actual exercise of surveillance powers by the legislature 
through legislative committees to ensure that all governmental activities are carried 
out as stipulated in the laws (Fashagba 2009b; Kazeem 2013). Table 1 below sum-
marizes the key objectives as well as the strategies that legislative committees often 
deploy to actualize the oversight mandate of the National Assembly.
Although oversight functions are designed to further the mandate of the legisla-
ture, especially in ensuring the accountability of the government to the people, they 
have been strategically converted to a platform for neo-patrimonialism. In other 
words, members of legislative committees, by virtue, of their privileged relationship 
with these governmental offices created a complex web of patronage system (Lewis 
2009). This relationship is what underpins the corruption-related cases linked to the 
National Assembly. Figure 1 below presents a diagrammatic illustration of the key 
functions of legislative committees in the National Assembly
Nigeria’s National Assembly has constitutional authority over public funds, in 
terms of budgeting them for national expenditure, and ensuring that they are utilized 
as contained in the budget and as approved by it (see Sections 80 and 81,  The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). It is in this respect that leg-
islative committees have been quite active. The mindset of an average member of 
Nigeria’s ruling elite is that government is a route to personal wealth. For this 
reason, therefore, running for elections in the country is akin to going to battle as no 
stone is left unturned by contestants to achieve electoral victory. Thus,  political 
competition in Nigeria is more or less a grim battle, a do-or-die affair in which win-
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Table 1 Nature of oversight functions of the national assembly
Instrument of 
oversight functions Key objectives of oversight functions
Strategies for achieving oversight 
benchmarks
Various 
committees of the 
National Assembly
  • Ascertain that executive policies 
reflect public interest
  • Ensure executive compliance 
with the law
  • Improve the efficiency, economy, 
and effectiveness of governmental 
operations
  • Detect and prevent poor 
administration, waste, abuse, 
arbitrariness, illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct
  • Protect the rights of citizens
  • Collate necessary information to 
be used in enlightening both the 
government and the public
  • Evaluate the execution and 
performance of the National 
Budget
  • Committee inquiries and 
investigative hearings
  • Physical site or location visits
  • reviewing or confirming 
executive appointments
  • questioning senior government 
officials (including ministers)
  • Commissioning independent 
studies;
  • Information-sharing with 
relevant national and 
international non-governmental 
organizations
Source: Extracted from various sources (NDI (National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs) 1996; Fashagba 2009a, b; Kazeem 2013; Nwagwu 2014)
Key Tasks of 
Committees
Administrative Review
*Receive briefs from Ministries, 
Departments & Agencies (MDAs) 
and review & evaluate same
*Pay visits to MDAs & inspect 
projects
Appraise policy problems 
*Evaluate budget performance of 




*Receive and deal with public 
petitions
*Undertake screening of 
nominees to confirm suitability 
and confirm or disqualify 
nominees 
*Invite public functionaries and 









*Report bills to the House
*Take bill Referrals
*Organize interactive 
meetings to stenghthen bills
Source: Various National Assembly documents
Fig. 1 Key tasks of the legislative committees in Nigeria’s National Assembly
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ning is all important (Ake 1981; Owen and Usman 2015). Thus, getting elected into 
the National Assembly appears to be the first step in the chain of the accumulation 
process. What facilitates access to the national pie is the membership of committees. 
Table 2 captures the nature and attributes of the committee system operational in 
Nigeria’s National Assembly.
The relevance of legislative committees in the accumulation process is under-
lined by the inter-party rivalries and alliances in the distribution of their member-
ships. In allocating membership and leadership positions, considerations are paid to 
loyalists, returning members, political party lines and geopolitical divides. The need 
for the accommodation of diverse interests as well as the compensation of support-
ers has led the leaderships of Nigeria’s National Assembly to constantly expand the 
number of committees. In expanding the number of their committees, the leader-
ships of the National Assembly operated within the ambit of their constitutional 
rights to set up as many committees as are necessary to carry out their functions (see 
Section 62, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The commit-
tees perform oversight functions with regard to their designated areas of 
jurisdiction.
In the Second Republic, the inability of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to 
garner the majority in the National Assembly led to an understanding between it and 
the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP). The outcome of that understanding was the 
retention of the office of Senate President by the NPN and the ceding of the post of 
Speaker to the NPP.  This understanding also reflected in the composition of 
committees in both chambers. The achievement of majority in both chambers of the 




Not fixed or static. Section 62(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, as 
amended empowers the National Assembly to set up as many 
committees as will ensure optimal functionality. The number of 
committees varies from one legislative assembly to another
Jurisdiction of 
committees
Fixed and as outlined by their terms of reference
Tenure of committees Discretionary. The committees can be reconstituted without prior notice
Chairmanship Based on party affiliation, personal influence and connection and 
seniority
Membership The constitution grants the National Assembly the powers to determine 
membership strength of committees and terms of office in Section 
62(2). However, the composition of committees usually reflects the 
relative strengths of the different parties represented in the full 
legislature
Scope of activity Legislation, administrative reviews and investigations/oversight 
functions
Relevance/place in the 
stages of legislative 
procedure
Initial stage; committee stage & bill referrals
Source: Reconstructed from various documents of the National Assembly
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National Assembly by the PDP between 1999 and 2015 reconfigured the nature of 
political permutations. The basis of alliance shifted from forging party-based 
coalitions to achieve majoritarian status to the individualization of alliances by 
contestants to achieve ascendance to principal offices in the National Assembly. 
This individualization of alliances first started with the “capturing” of the chieftains 
and stalwarts within the party, especially the presidency by contestants and making 
them adopt them as sole candidates. Thus, in 1999, the presidency and the party 
projected the duo of Senator Evan Enwerem and Hon. Salisu Ibrahim Buhari, for 
the headship of the Senate and the HoR respectively. Both of them won but were 
soon swept away by scandals; for Buhari, he resigned after a media accusation of 
falsification of age and educational qualification was proved. And for Enwerem, he 
was impeached on the grounds of unanswered questions surrounding his integrity as 
well as accusations of gross incompetence. The political tinkering, which was aimed 
at securing the independence of the senate through the election of Senator Chuba 
Okadigbo fell flat as the presidency instigated and supervised his downfall.
Most of the scandals involving the National Assembly originated from the opera-
tions of its committees. For instance, in 2003, the former Federal Capital Territory 
Minister, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai accused some senators of demanding N54 million 
to clear him for a ministerial position. Also, the Senate Committee on National 
Communications Commission (NCC) was dissolved by the Senate President for 
corruption (Ayorinde 2012). In the same vein, the House Committee on Capital 
Market was embroiled in scandal involving “allegations of bribery, conflict of inter-
ests and bias” in the conduct of its oversight functions (Ayorinde 2012). Allegations 
of financial misdeeds and bribery scandal cost the then senate president, Adolphus 
Wabara his position in April 2005. The list is legion. Often, the underlying motives 
for such exposés were not so much a manifestation of the determination of the 
administration to stamp out corruption than as a strategy to overcome the National 
Assembly and convert it to a rubber stamp entity of the executive. As observed by 
Lewis (2009, p. 193), “from the outset of the Fourth Republic, legislators seemed 
intent on asserting their prerogatives and resisting the arbitrary dominance of the 
president”. But the tremendous resources at the disposal of the presidency made 
fighting it a lost battle. This was because even the patronages which flowed from 
committee-involvement of legislators were regulated by the executive.
The Nigerian legislature has served as a major channel of political recruitment 
and leadership development as well as a reserve bench that recycles leaders and 
ensures their continued relevance in the polity (Ihedioha 2012). Thus, some members 
of Nigeria’s National Assembly are there to remain in the front row of political 
relevance. In order words, they got into the National Assembly because of the 
absence of certain kinds of opportunities in the patronage system. Thus, the National 
Assembly serves as a stop-gap measure for most of them, either before ascending to 
executive positions or after serving at the executive level. Table  3 captures the 
variants of committees in the National Assembly.
The committee system and the composition of its membership are at the heart of 
legislative politics in Nigeria. The successive leaderships of the National Assembly 
have used the composition of committees as their own stick and carrot strategy to 
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beat legislators into line. Within the elite circles, all ministries and governmental 
agencies are not equal in their capacity as sources of accumulation; certain ministries 
and agencies are regarded as more lucrative than others based on their budgetary 
allocations and their ability to generate income. So, very loyal members, and others 
who are strategically important in sustaining the administrations of the chambers, are 
compensated with multiple membership of these committees. Lewis (2009) observes 
that while few legislators in the fourth and fifth legislative assemblies—1999–2003 
and 2003–2007 respectively belonged to more than two committees, many legislators 
in the sixth legislative assembly—2007–2011) were involved in as many as a dozen 
committees. This was possible because the leaderships of both chambers created 
more committees. Interestingly, the expansion of committees has served the useful 
purpose of creating stability in the National Assembly as feelings of marginalization 
due to non-appointment to leadership positions in the committees have been greatly 
assuaged. This trend appeared to have started with Dimeji Bankole, who on 
assumption of office as Speaker after the ousting of Patricia Etteh, created additional 
12 new House committees to cater for the masterminds of the impeachment of Etteh. 
Subsequently, leaderships of the National Assembly have been using this strategy to 
cater to the varied power constituencies in the National Assembly and, thus, cling to 
Table 3 Types and nature of committees in Nigeria’s National Assembly
Type Nature of committee
Statutory 
committees
These are committees provided for in the Constitution. An example is the 




These are committees appointed by the National Assembly to aid it in its 
day-to-day functions. Standing committees operate according to their terms 




They are set up for specific purposes and for a specified duration. The 
completion of their designated tasks may bring it to an end
Joint committees There are two variants of joint committees. They could be committees 
established to harmonize the divergent positions of both chambers on bills. 
Under this scenario, they could be either a combination of two or more 
similar committees from the two chambers. The second variant is the 
combination of similar committees from one Chamber to deal with issues that 
fall within their jurisdictions
Subcommittees These are specialized committees set up to perform some special tasks that 




This is a kind of special committee convened to resolve differences in the 
wording of a bill if the two chambers are in disagreement on specific 
provisions in a bill. The conference committee consists of members of both 
chambers appointed by their principals
Committee of 
the Whole
This is the conversion of the legislature into a committee. It dispenses with its 
rigid rules as it operates like any other committee and under an elected 
chairman different from the Speaker or the Senate President
Source: Various National Assembly documents
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power. The number of committees has made it possible for every senator to be either 
a committee chairman or vice-chairman and for every other House member to be the 
same (Erunke and Ndiribe 2013).
 The Committee System in Nigeria’s Legislature: An Appraisal
Nigeria’s legislative assembly, known as the National Assembly, is a creation of the 
1999 Constitution and serves as the second arm of government; the executive and 
judiciary complete the tripodal structure of the presidential system of government 
which is operational in the country. It is bicameral in nature as it is divided into two 
chambers—the Senate and the HoR.  Membership of these chambers is on 
representative basis through an election. The criteria for the determination of how a 
state is represented in the HoR are based on population and land mass, but for the 
Senate, representation is based on the principle of equality of all states (Sections 
47-49, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). In the delimita-
tion of constituencies, the purity of states is emphasized. Section 49 of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution, as amended, provides inter alia that “no constituency shall 
fall within more than one state”. Therefore, the 109 membership of the Nigerian 
senate is drawn equally from the 36 states of the country. Each state is roughly 
divided into three districts with the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) represented as a 
monolith.
The HoR, on the other hand, consists of “three hundred and sixty members rep-
resenting constituencies of nearly equal population as far as possible” (Section 49, 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The delineation of con-
stituencies is not a closed matter. The Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) is mandated by the Constitution to review the division of states and the 
federation into senatorial districts and federal constituencies at intervals of not less 
than ten years (Section 73, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999). This provision coincides with 10-year constitutional requirement for the 
review of national population figures through a census.
But despite the recognition of population distribution as basis for dividing con-
stituencies, there is a widespread disparity in the population composition of con-
stituencies. It is unclear what the effect of this disparity is, especially in the 
composition of committees and whether it is considered by the leaderships of the 
National Assembly in drafting members into multiple committees. But, it appears 
that membership of multiple committees is a product of the perception of the 
utilitarian value of individual legislators as well as their lobbying prowess rather 
than as a tool to correct the disproportionateness in population distribution among 
constituencies.
Since Nigeria’s independence, the country has witnessed punctuated democratic 
governance as a result of military interventions. Thus, each epoch of democratic 
governance is designated a republic: first republic was 1960–1966; second republic 
spanned from 1979 to 1983; the third republic coincided with the ill-fated democratic 
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transition of General Babangida and lasted from 1992 to 1993. Currently, Nigeria is 
in its fourth republic which started in 1999. In the same vein, a chronological order 
has been developed to differentiate legislative assemblies. The first, second and 
third legislative assemblies coincided with the first three republics. The fourth 
legislative assembly coincided with the fourth republic that started in 1999. 
However, from 2003 upwards, legislative assemblies have coincided with 
constitutionally guaranteed four-year tenures, see Fig. 2.
Committee system is recognized by section 62 of the Nigerian Constitution. As 
has already been noted, the major reason for setting committees as integral part of 
the National Assembly is to facilitate the work of the legislature. The constitution 
recognizes that certain aspects of lawmaking and other statutory functions of the 
National Assembly could be best enhanced by committees. This is particularly so 
because of the intricacies of lawmaking, especially the meticulous examinations 
required to sift through its provisions. Such meticulous scrutiny is impossible in the 
plenary sessions. Thus, the functions of committees revolve around smoothening 
rough edges in the legislature’s capacity to carry out its mandate.
Since 1999, both chambers of the National Assembly have used committees to 
discharge their duties. Chibudom Nwuche, former Deputy Speaker of Nigeria’s 
HoR (1999–2003), captured the essentiality of committees in the effective operations 
of legislative bodies when he pointed out that committees:
 1. can provide a forum for public participation in legislative process;
 2. serve as a source of expertise outside the executive;
 3. offer platforms for less partisan, more solution-oriented discussions;
 4. receive and consider referrals in plenary sessions (Referrals refer to the assign-
ment of legislative items such as a bill, a petition, screening exercise, request 
for opinion, or an enquiry to specific committees for further in-depth 
consideration);
 5. present committee reports and defend same in plenary sessions (House of 
Representatives 2015).
The number of committees has been on the increase since the inception of the 
National Assembly in 1999. It is difficult to pinpoint the specific number of 










































Fig. 2 Periodization of legislative assemblies in Nigeria
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various legislative assemblies. This is so because these expansions regularly 
occurred to cater for emerging needs as interpreted by the leaderships of the 
legislature. Table 4 below provides information on the leadership turnover in the 
National Assembly as well as the committee strength at various periods. There was 
Table 4 Legislative assemblies and committee strength since 1999




  1. Evan Enwerem (3 June–18 
November 1999)
  2. Chuba Okadigbo (18 November 
1999–8 August 2000)





  The committee 
composition is as 
follows
  • 1999–2003—39 
committees
  • 2003–2007—63 
committees
  • 2007–2011—54 
committees
  • 2011–2015—56 
committees
  • 2015–2019—68 
committees
HoR
  The breakdown is as 
follows
  • 1999–2003—45 
committeesb
  • 2003–2007—72 
committees
  • 2007–2011—85 
committees
  • 2011–2015—80 
committees
  • 2015–2019—96 
committees
HoR
  1. Salisu Buhari (3 June–21 July 
1999)





  1. Adolphus Wabara (June 
2003–April 2005)













  1. Patricia Etteh (6 June 2007–30 
October 2007)

















  Yakubu Dogara
Culled from various sources by the Authors
aAs result of periodic dissolution and reconstitution of committees by National Assembly 
leaderships, there is no uniformity in the number of committees in the literature, including National 
Assembly documents, across the legislative assemblies. We have, therefore, provided averages 
where there are wide disparities
bInitially, the HoR set up 37 committees with 3 select committees. This later expanded. Thus, the 
number for each legislative assembly represents the last count as at the time of winding up the 
assembly
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seeming instability in the leadership cadre of the National Assembly, especially in 
the Senate during the fourth and fifth legislative assemblies. However, there has 
been stability in the leadership of both chambers since 2011.
The expansion in the number of committees is anchored on several rationales. 
The first rationale was the need to deal with the increasing complexity of modern 
governance, which necessitated creating specific committees to enable the National 
Assembly develop capacity to deal with all governance issues. The second was 
informed by the unwieldiness of some existing committees and the imperative of 
splitting them to ensure more effectiveness. As Yakubu Dogara, Speaker of the HoR 
between 2015 and 2019, pointed out during the first session of the 8th Assembly, 
“experience gained from the operation of Committees since 1999, shows that some 
Committees’ functions and mandates are very wide indeed and cannot be effectively 
supervised and oversighted by a single Committee” (House of Representatives 
2015, p. 457). The third rationale was to minimize frictions and gridlocks that might 
occur amongst committee leaderships due to overlapping mandates. And the fourth 
rationale was to “meet the exigencies of the moment and in response to the demand 
of some of our development partners for better oversight of funds that are being 
raised for a particular sector” (House of Representatives 2015, p. 458).
Despite the rationalizations for the expansion in the number of committees in the 
National Assembly, critics argue that the overriding motive is to fuel the patronage 
system and satiate the web of prebendalistic yearnings of Nigeria’s political class. 
The observations of Ayorinde (2012, np) are instructive, “…most members of the 
committee[s] see the power to carry out oversight functions as a way of making easy 
money. This usually provokes scrambling for membership of committees deemed 
‘juicy’ whenever the leadership of any of the chambers decides to constitute or 
re-constitute the committees”.
A major contribution of committees is their stopgap relevance. The National 
Assembly has been accused of not sitting up to the stipulated 181 days in a legislative 
year. It has been argued that the inability of the National Assembly to utilize the 
constitutionally stipulated 181 days has had the effect of backpedalling debates on 
some significant legislations and thus undermining their general productivity (Jimoh 
2015). However, the committees have filled this gap as they continually work 
outside the plenary sessions.
The National Assembly has come a long way from the inception of the fourth 
republic in 1999 when it started from the basics and faced daunting teething 
problems. At that incipient period, the National Assembly faced a motley of huge 
challenges consisting of:
 1. huge human capacity gap due to near absence of trained and professional staff;
 2. inexperienced and inadequately prepared legislators;
 3. infrastructural challenges, especially dearth of parliamentary facilities;
 4. poor public perception of the relevance of the legislative arm in the democratic 
structure;
 5. overbearing and intimidating influence of the executive arm (Aiyede 2013).
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A major initial key challenge that undermined the capacity of the National 
Assembly to deal with these challenges was the running battle it had with the 
executive. Most of these challenges have been surmounted. The National Assembly 
has demonstrated that it is its “own man” judging by its resistance to executive 
interference, especially in choosing its leaders. The National Assembly has taken 
critical steps to strengthening its operations such as:
 1. establishing the National Assembly Service Commission to deal directly with its 
human resource needs,
 2. achieving financial autonomy by drawing its allocated funds directly from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation;
 3. strengthening its budgetary and oversight capacity by building the capacity of 
legislators and legislative staff through the Policy Analysis and Research Project 
(PARP) in conjunction with the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (Aiyede 
2013).
In addition, the HoR was able to assert its autonomy by impeaching and replac-
ing Patricia Etteh with Dimeji Bankole as the speaker in 2007 and subsequently 
ignoring zoning of principal offices by the party and the executive. Thus, since 
2007, the National Assembly has progressively consolidated its autonomy, judging 
by the manner in which speakers and senate presidents subsequently emerged as 
well as the stability of their tenure, and the control of the processes of its key con-
stitutional functions.
The operations of the National Assembly have come at a great financial cost to 
the country raising questions about the affordability of bicameralism by a lower- 
middle income economy like Nigeria. From the various budgets of the National 
Assembly, there is evidence of massive upward expansion in its allocations: from 
N2.24 billion in 1999, the budget of the National Assembly rose steadily to N29.458 
billion in 2000, dropping to N15.49 billion in 2001 before picking up to N55.43 
billion in 2005 from where it reached an all-time high of N154.2 billion in 2010 and 
currently settled at N139.5 billion based on the 2018 budget. Some critics believe 
that a contributory subhead to the burgeoning budget of the National Assembly is 
linked to the expanding number of committees.
Against the backdrop of the mandate of the committee system in the National 
Assembly, a balanced assessment will find them useful in terms of their overall 
contributions to the effectiveness of the legislature. Generally, legislative committees 
have been quite active in carrying out their overall mandates. The relevance of 
committees in the lawmaking process is underscored by the requirement that bills 
can never be processed into law without their imprimatur. In terms of lawmaking, 
the committee system has been quite indispensable in the expansion of body of 
legislations passed by the National Assembly.
According Fayemi (2012), between 1999 and 2003, the National Assembly 
received a total of 258 bills. Out of this number, a total of 36 bills were passed by 
both chambers and sent to the president for assent. The president assented to only 
26 bills and declined 10 bills. However, the National Assembly used its powers to 
override four cases of presidential veto. Between 2003 and 2006, the 5th legislative 
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assembly received and considered 352 bills and passed 77 bills in the Senate while 
the HoR received and considered 299 bills and passed 113 bills (National Assembly 
2007, p. 60). Between 2007 and 2011, the 6th legislative assembly scheduled 227 
bills, out of which 186 bills were presented and 93 bills passed (Bamidele and Alaba 
2014). The 7th legislative assembly also recorded hyperactivity in its lawmaking 
mandate. Between 2011 and 2015, the HoR and senate received and considered 752 
and 475 bills respectively. Out these numbers, the HoR passed and transmitted 80 
bills to the senate while the senate passed a total of 123 bills (Bill Progression Chart, 
7th Senate, and HoR n.d.; Agbakwuru and Erunke 2015). The upper chamber of the 
8th legislative assembly announced in March 2018 that it had passed a total 200 
bills comprising senate bills, concurrence bills and constitution alteration bills since 
its inauguration on 9th June 2015. The breakdown showed 82 senate bills, 89 
concurrence bills and 29 constitutional alteration bills (Nation 2018).
In the discharge of their oversight functions, the legislative committees have had 
to grapple with integrity issues emanating from both abuse and laxity in the exercise 
of their oversight powers. This has, undoubtedly, undermined public confidence in 
the National Assembly and devalued its credential as a constitutionally empowered 
watchdog to champion “accountability and good governance through prudent fiscal 
management” (Jombo and Fagbadebo 2019, p. 123). The abuse of oversight powers 
is in the area of leveraging them for personal aggrandizement thus throwing the 
legislative committees into corruption-related scandals. The list of such scandals is 
long and ranged from Ibrahim Mantu-led committee for the screening of ministerial 
nominees which Nasir El-Rufai accused in 2003 of demanding N54 million as 
condition for his clearance; National Assembly committees on health which partook 
in sharing the unspent health budget of 2007; the House Committee on Capital 
Market which was accused in March 2012 of demanding N39 million from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to fund its assignments and additional 
N5 million for the personal use of the chairman, Hon Herman Hembe; the HoRs’ Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy which demanded and received a 
total of US$620,000 as bribe from Zenon Oil and Gas to remove it from the list of 
companies accused of buying foreign exchange from the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) without importing petroleum products; to the Maina pension scam in which 
the investigating senate committee led by Aloysius Etuk was accused of demanding 
for N3 billion (Nwankwo 2008; Ayorinde 2012; Kazeem 2013; Nwagwu 2014).
The major area of laxity is the inaction of committees in terms of following cer-
tain corrupt cases to their logical conclusions. There were several cases that the 
legislative committees simply swept under the carpet through inconclusive 
investigation. For instance, during the 7th national assembly, the relevant committees 
never seriously investigated the kerosene subsidy scam. The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the petroleum ministry claimed that kerosene 
was being subsidized so it could sell at N50 per liter. But the product never sold at 
that amount but at the range of N100 and N120 per liter. Similarly, the relevant 
committees never conclusively investigated the allegations of: missing N20 billion 
oil money raised by Lamido Sanusi, former Governor of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria; the Abba Morro Immigration recruitment scandal where N1000 was 
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received from applicants for forms and over 15 individuals lost their lives during the 
exercise in 2015 and, the US$15 million private jet/arms scandal in which a private 
jet purportedly conveying US$15 million in cash for procurement of arms was 
arrested in Johannesburg (Olufemi et al. 2015).
Another area of laxity is demonstrated by the unearthing of massive looting and 
embezzlement in the Petroleum Ministry and the Office of National Security 
Adviser shortly after Muhammadu Buhari became President. Ita Enang, a former 
senator and the senior Special Assistant to the President on National Assembly 
Matters (Senate) blamed lack of effective oversight on the agencies of government 
by committees as being responsible for the continued festering of corruption (Jimoh 
2018). Notwithstanding the shortcomings of legislative committees, they have 
registered successes in their various areas of operation including detecting and 
exposing corruption in several establishments and spearheading motions and 
resolutions aimed at good governance of the country.
 Conclusion
The committee system as a mechanism to meet the mandate of legislatures is used 
by Nigeria’s National Assembly to discharge its responsibilities. However, the 
committee system also serves other purposes beyond the universal raison d’être for 
their institutionalisation in modern democracies. Committee system offers a 
prebendal leverage for the leaderships of the National Assembly to consolidate their 
positions. Although committee system has helped the two chambers of Nigeria’s 
National Assembly to discharge their duties in timely fashion, the manner in which 
legislative committees have gone about their oversight functions creates the 
impression that it is narrowing the theoretical gap of separation of power and 
erecting in the gap so created a pseudo-executive entity.
The increment in the number of legislative committees since 1999, although 
criticized by some people as being unwieldy and contributory to the burgeoning 
budgets of the National Assembly, has contributed to the accomplishments recorded 
by the National Assembly. Evidence from the number and quality of bills passed 
into law as well as the number of motions and resolutions that emanated from the 
National Assembly show that it has performed relatively well.
Despite the many scandals surrounding the committees of the National Assembly, 
their value is evident in those bills that went through legislative processes and 
emerged as Acts of the National Assembly as well as the whistle-blowing on the 
negation of the provisions of due process in ministries, extra government departments 
and agencies in the course of their oversight functions. The only way the National 
Assembly can bring back respectability and public confidence in its oversight 
functions is to properly fund the committees and set up code of conduct and 
disciplinary measures for erring committee members. The committees must learn to 
operate within their budgetary limits; otherwise, the public perception that legislative 
committees are for patronage will be hard to erase.
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Feminism and sexism are two gendered frameworks for defining and analysing the 
roles of women and men in society and politics as well as other realms of human 
existence. While men have historically leveraged on their ascribed cultural and bio-
logical superiority to sustain their dominance in the political realm, the fundamental 
question of what should be the status of women—in relation to politics and gover-
nance—has remained largely unanswered. As a situation that characterises virtually 
all climes of the world, it has continued to dazzle the promoters of feminism who 
stress ‘the similarities between men and women and the entitlement for women to 
the same rights and responsibilities that men have’ (Kaarbo and Ray 2011, p. 20). 
The situation in Africa—the continent where Nigeria is located—is even more 
undefined and worrisome. Given the prevailing culture of patriarchy and other soci-
etal encumbrances, the feminists’ campaign for gender parity in politics and gover-
nance (and a greater appreciation and recognition of the role of women) has not 
yielded much fruits in the African context. The sexist orientation of key political 
actors—government officials, party officials and godfathers—has largely contrib-
uted to this state of affairs.
Over the years, the Nigerian women ‘have been deprived, neglected, exploited 
and oppressed’ (Agaba 2007, p. 73). The continuous political subservience of the 
female folks to their male counterparts has led to the proliferation of feminist move-
ments with diverse ideological and philosophical orientations (Sha 2007, p.  3). 
Whatever the orientation—whether radical, reformist, economic or problem solv-
ing—the ultimate goal has been the liberation of women from the societal encum-
brances that limit their political opportunities and participation. The persistent calls 
S. Oshewolo (*) · S. Adedire 
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University,  
Omu-Aran, Kwara, Nigeria
190
for gender parity in Nigeria followed the 1995 Beijing Conference which recom-
mended ‘at least 30% representation of women in power and decision making. The 
2007 National Gender Policy (NGP) in Nigeria further raised the gender stakes by 
providing for 35% affirmative action’ (Ezeilo 2011, p. 45). The main objective of 
this paper is to examine gender representation in Nigeria’s National Assembly under 
the Fourth Republic, by considering the proportion of both sexes elected into the 
Senate and House of Representatives from 1999 to 2015. This piece also investi-
gates the societal factors that inhibit the fair representation of women in political 
governance. To achieve these objectives, the work relies on the secondary methods 
for the purpose of data collection and the interpretive method for the purpose of data 
analysis.
 Gender, Politics and Parity: A Theoretical and Philosophical 
Discussion
Gender parity in politics emphasises equality of opportunities for both genders in 
relation to politics and governance. It measures/calculates equality by the ratio or 
proportion of men and women with access to political opportunities and/or contrib-
uting to politics and governance. In the interpretation of Anshi (2007, p. 46), gender 
parity in politics could imply the provision of opportunities for the participation of 
both sexes through equal, level playing field, and unbiased parameters that allow 
both genders to demonstrate their capabilities and abilities in politics and gover-
nance. The feminist perspective that makes gender parity the crux of its advocacy is 
Liberal Feminism. This is ‘a category of feminist theory that sees men and women 
as equal in skills and capabilities, and promotes the equal participation of women 
under existing political, legal, and social institutions and practices’ (Kegley Jr and 
Blanton 2013, p.  44). Liberal feminism demands ‘that females should enjoy the 
same rights and responsibilities enjoyed by males, and that laws and practices plac-
ing females in a lower status are unfair, foolish and wasteful’ (Ethridge and 
Handelman 2013, p. 44).
Articulating the bases for gender parity in politics and governance, Anshi (2007) 
further recognises two forceful analytical variables. The first has to do with ‘the 
conviction that women have a specific role to play in the general political balance 
and development of countries’ (p. 37). The second emphasis is derived from the 
Marxian principle which states that ‘the index of the progress and development of 
any society or nation is the general position of women in that society’ (p.  38). 
Another basis for gender parity in politics is the assumption that ‘feminist qualities 
have not been fully appreciated and that masculine qualities have dominated and 
distorted social and cultural development’ (Ethridge and Handelman 2013, p. 44). 
While the need for gender parity in politics (or at least a fair representation of 
women in political governance) has been recognised and supported globally, how-
ever, this recognition has not translated into the thorough liberalisation of the 
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 political space to allow the unfettered participation of women. How then do we 
explain the limited political opportunities for women in spite of the global cam-
paigns for inclusion and parity?
Philosophy has no doubt contributed to male dominance in different societies/
climes of the world. Most prominent philosophers (Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, 
and Hegel, among others) have been quick to ignore and dismiss the status of 
women. They have tried to justify and defend women’s subordination by making 
reference to the ‘alleged natural and biological differences between the sexes, and 
have also pointed to the inherent physical and mental superiority of the male’ 
(Mukherjee and Ramaswamy 2007, p. 41). Again, from the philosophical point of 
view, public realm versus private sphere dualism has reinforced the domination of 
men over women. While the public realm belongs to the man, the private sphere 
belongs to the woman. ‘In this sense, the woman was (is) confined to the domestic 
environment with the specific duties of bringing up children and maintaining stand-
ing traditions such as keeping the domestic alter aflame’ (Anshi 2007, p. 40). From 
the psychoanalytic point of view, it is also assumed that ‘women lack the capacity 
for self-criticism and critical judgement in public matters’ (Odey 2007, p.  20) 
because they are less intelligent than men (Agaba 2007, p. 73).
Whatever arguments that may support women’s subordination have been rebut-
ted in the literature. One of the mainstream philosophers to discard sexism and rid 
themselves of gender blindness was JS Mill. While he rejected patriarchy, he can-
vassed that liberal principles must apply to women and family. He espoused ‘the 
cause of women, pleading for the need to reorder the private sphere on the same 
lines as freedom, equality, justice, self-worth and dignity that govern the public 
sphere’ (Mukherjee and Ramaswamy 2007, p. 42). Furthermore, in reaction to the 
disadvantaged position of women, feminism has developed both as a critique and a 
course of action. As a critique, the feminist framework challenges the popular ori-
entation which ‘dismisses the plight and contributions of women and treats differ-
ences in men’s and women’s status, beliefs, and behaviours as unimportant’ (Kegley 
Jr and Blanton 2013, p. 42). As a course of action, feminism seeks to address the 
fundamental gender bias in power relations, encourages reformulation of concepts 
particularly those with inherent masculine characteristics, and the incorporation of 
female perspectives in the analysis of politics, policy and society (Kegley Jr and 
Blanton 2013).
 Gender and Politics in Nigeria: A Historical Review
During the Nigerian pre-colonial era, the female gender was not considered inferior 
to the male. As explained by Anshi (2007, p. 44), ‘the complimentary contributions 
of both men and women were considered indispensable for the running of the fam-
ily and community’. Although the pre-colonial political configuration of Nigeria 
was essentially patriarchal, ‘women nevertheless had access to political participa-
tion through a complex and sophisticated networks of relationships, rights and 
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control of resources’ (Agaba 2007, p. 74). As an integral part of the political set up 
of their respective communities (Oluyemi 2016), a number of women distinguished 
themselves and are today regarded as heroines. For instance, in ‘pre-colonial 
Hausaland, were Queen Daura of Daura Emirate and Amina of Zaria. In Kanem 
Borno political organisation, even women in pudah were actively connected to state 
affairs. In Igbo society, Omu ruled women as Obi ruled men’ (Odey 2007, p. 26). In 
Yoruba land, there were female Obas (kings) in Ile-Ife, Oyo Kingdom, Ilesa and 
Ondo respectively. The ones remembered by tradition were Iyayun and Orompoto 
(Agaba 2007, p. 76).
However, discriminatory colonial policies ensured that women became confined 
to the domestic/private realm during the era of colonialism. Men had more access to 
the emergent power structure because of their greater access to education than 
women (Agaba 2007). However, the discriminatory policies of the colonial govern-
ment were met with stiff resistance from women. For instance, Igbo women were 
politically influential in state apparatus to put an end to colonial taxes. Mrs 
Olufunmilayo Kuti also demonstrated her political influence by agitating for ‘no 
taxation without representation’ in 1946 through the platform of the Abeokuta 
Women Union (AWU) (Odey 2007, p. 26). Because of the inability of women to 
participate in political governance through the conventional means, they therefore 
used the unconventional means such as protests and demonstrations to express their 
political views. Despite the remarkable achievements of women during the pre- 
colonial era, their dwindling political fortunes during the colonial period were really 
confounding (Olalere 2015).
During the post-colonial era, women’s participation in politics and governance 
was very minimal compared to men. In the first republic, ‘the running of govern-
ment was largely dominated and monopolised by men. There were only three female 
legislators and no woman was appointed as Minister’ (Agena 2007, p.  135). In 
1960, Mrs Wuraola Esan from Western Nigeria became the first female member of 
the Federal Parliament. The following year, Chief (Mrs) Margaret Ekpo became an 
elected member of the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly (Oluyemi 2016). 
During this period, only Southern Nigerian women could exercise franchise. In the 
second republic (1979–1983), ‘women participation remained significantly low. 
There was only one woman of the fifty-seven members of Senate and three women 
of four hundred and forty five Federal House of Representatives, and two women 
Ministers’ (Agena 2007, p. 135). This was the period that women from the North 
became enfranchised. After the 1992 Parliamentary elections to begin the process of 
institutionalising Nigeria’s aborted third republic, women won only 14 seats of the 
678 available seats (that is 2% of the total seats) in both legislative chambers (Odey 
2007, p. 18). For instance, Mrs Kofo Bucknor Akerele won a seat in the Senate and 
Chief (Mrs) Florence Ita Giwa won election into the House of Representatives rep-
resenting the Calabar constituency (Oluyemi 2016). The marginalisation of women 
during the post-colonial era was largely as a result of acrimonious politics charac-
terised by bitter rivalries. This situation was detrimental to women’s political inter-
est (Olalere 2015).
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 Gender Representation in the National Assembly: The Fourth 
Republic
In the contemporary world, only a few women have attained political power at the 
national level. The reason is ‘the world of political participation is the world of 
machismo’ (Ogiji 2007, p. 109). The limited involvement of women in political 
governance is therefore a global issue. However, the situation in Nigeria’s fourth 
republic, particularly in the National Assembly, leaves much to be desired. 
Although women constitute about 50% of the Nigerian population, their participa-
tion in the political governance of the country is not proportionate to their demo-
graphic strength (Apenda 2007). This situation represents a flagrant abuse of the 
1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. The constitution 
stipulates that all citizens, women inclusive, shall enjoy some fundamental rights 
such as right to personal liberty, dignity of the human person, right to freedom of 
thought, among others (sections 22–24). The constitution also guarantees the prin-
ciples of democracy and social justice, freedom and equality. It equally frowns at 
discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, among others 
(Ukooh 2007, pp. 276–277). These constitutional provisions notwithstanding, the 
national average of women’s participation in political governance has been 6.7% 
for elective and appointive positions. This situation is well below the global aver-
age of 22.5%, African continental average of 23.4%, and West African average of 
15% (Oluyemi 2016).
One way to assess women’s involvement in political governance is to consider 
their rate of election into the Parliament. Next, we consider gender representation in 
Nigeria’s National Assembly under the fourth republic, 1999–2015. The existing 
compendia reveal that women’s election rates into the National Assembly have been 
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From the data provided above, women have been limitedly involved in political 
governance through the National Assembly under the fourth republic. During the 
first term of President Obasanjo (1999–2003), women held less than 5% of seats in 
both chambers of the National Assembly. In relation to the other electoral returns, 
the figures for 1999 represent the lowest. This situation is not indecipherable. For 
one, the 1999 election represent Nigeria’s founding election. As articulated by 
Omotola (2010, p. 543), ‘founding elections in Africa, usually the first in a demo-
cratic transition process, have been found to exhibit certain features that tend to 
inhibit the democratisation process’. Again, given the protracted era of military dic-
tatorship in the country, Nigerians were sceptical about the transition process in 
1999, particularly considering the previous aborted democratic projects. This scep-
tical attitude may have kept women away from the entire political process. As a 
result of the subsequent political stability and successful transition programmes, as 
well as the campaigns for gender mainstreaming in political governance, the elec-
tion rates of women into the National Assembly marginally increased afterwards. 
However, the increase in women’s election rates (particularly in the House of 
Representatives) has not significantly reduced the disparity in political representa-
tion between men and women.
Table 1 Gender distribution in the Nigerian Senate, 1999–2015
Year Seats available Men % Women %
1999 109 106 97.2 3 2.8
2003 109 105 96.3 4 3.7
2007 109 100 91.7 9 8.3
2011 109 102 93.6 7 6.4
2015 109 101 92.7 8 7.3
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 The Emerging Issues
The poor involvement of women in the political process and minimal representation 
in the Nigerian National Assembly require an investigation of the limiting factors. 
The understanding and appreciation of the societal encumbrances will facilitate the 
development of appropriate policies for remedying the situation.
In the first place, if the political fortunes of women must improve in Nigeria, 
political parties have a critical role to play. As bodies constitutionally empowered to 
present candidates for elective offices, political parties occupy a privileged position 
in promoting gender mainstreaming and parity in political governance. Nigeria’s 
political parties have failed in this regard. The provision for gender quota that con-
cedes a reasonable number of slots for women in both elective and appointive posi-
tions, as well as the strict adherence to such provision, is what is lacking in the 
administration of political parties in Nigeria. Weaker and smaller political parties 
tend to concede more positions to women than stronger and bigger political parties 
with more prospects of electoral victories (Ezeilo 2011). However, this may not be 
out of genuine concerns for gender parity in politics. The undercurrent could be the 
need to generate sympathy, support and loyalty among the teeming female popula-
tion and enhance their political standing. According to Sha (2007, pp. 7–8),
political parties in Nigeria do not have the set targets for women representation in the coun-
try’s legislative houses, nor do they have targets for the representation of women in party 
leadership structures even when it is known that women constitute a larger percentage of 
their supporters and voters. Party manifestoes and programmes show a weak commitment 
to, and understanding of, issues of gender equality.
Again, the feminisation of poverty thesis offers insightful explanations into why 
women are politically underrepresented in Nigeria. Although Nigeria’s pervasive 
poverty cuts across sexes (Oshewolo 2011), the female gender is considered the 
most vulnerable. The bias against women in socio-economic categories represents 
a barrier to the fair representation of women in the Nigerian political processes, 
like in most parts of the world (Odey 2007). Seeking elective offices in Nigeria 
requires huge financial commitments. The feminisation of poverty and the conse-
quent disempowerment of women largely account for their underrepresentation in 
political governance and their electoral defeats. Because Nigerian politics is money 
politics, women courageous enough to venture into politics are not economically 
buoyant enough (Agena 2007). More so, political godfathers who normally foot the 
Table 2 Gender distribution in the house of representatives, 1999–2015
Year Seats available Men % Women %
1999 360 348 96.7 12 3.3
2003 360 339 94.2 21 5.8
2007 360 337 93.6 23 6.4
2011 360 334 92.8 26 7.2
2015 360 341 94.7 19 5.3
Source: Compiled by the authors from Oluyemi (2016) and Nwabunkeonye (2014)
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electioneering bills of their clientele are more favourably disposed to male candi-
dates/aspirants on the assumption that ‘political activities are masculine and male 
candidates are believed to stand better chance of winning elections’ (Nwabunkeonye 
2014, p. 287).
Furthermore, the electioneering environment in Nigeria is antagonistic and hos-
tile to women. The desperation that goes with electioneering implies that the pro-
cess is often characterised by violence, intimidation, blackwash, threats and counter 
threats (Nwabunkeonye 2014, p. 287). These violent dispositions do not resonate 
with the soft psychology of women. The history of elections in Nigeria is a history 
of violence. More recently, all elections conducted since democratic rebirth in 1999 
have been characterised by violence, with the 2011 post-election violence in the 
North considered the bloodiest. The consequences have been loss of human lives, 
internal displacements, suspicion and fear (Oshewolo 2013). Women, by their psy-
chological and emotional makeup, do not possess tough and rugged disposition 
towards electoral violence like their male counterparts. This situation may have 
limited women’s active participation in politics.
Another major issue has to do with role conception and definition. The contem-
porary Nigerian women have the tendency to view their role in society through the 
psychological and interpretive lens/prism of men. This orientation can be explained 
from two angles. First, as a result of their biological attributes, women tend to con-
fine themselves to the domestic/family sphere and only take a limited role in society 
prescribed and supported by the men (as husbands and godfathers). In this context, 
the level of support they get from the men is determined by their readiness to adhere 
strictly to the role defined for, and prescribed to, them. Second, the sexist orientation 
of the average contemporary Nigerian man appears to legitimise women’s role con-
ception and definition by men. In this context, the men arrogate to themselves the 
power to determine the political destiny of women and thus give a cultural force to 
the chauvinistic belief in the inferiority of women. The implications include wom-
en’s limited access to the political arena and their inability to mobilise adequate 
resources to win votes like their male counterparts (Ogiji 2007). Therefore, if the 
political fortunes of women must improve, the prevalent sexist ideology must be 
discarded. This will allow women to determine their role in society (particularly in 
relation to politics and governance) and aspire to any political height within the 
limits of their educational, economic and financial credentials and resources.
Finally, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended has pro-
vided adequate legal framework for the participation of all citizens in politics 
regardless of sex. Women’s limited involvement in political governance is clearly 
not as a result of legal restrictions (Ukooh 2007, p. 279). That such situation exists 
is an indictment on Nigeria’s constitutional democracy. A critical measure of demo-
cratic growth has to do with the extent of compliance to constitutional provisions. 
In the Nigerian context, the constitution guarantees democracy, social justice, equal-
ity, and prohibits all form of discrimination on the ground of sex. Therefore, the 
political marginalisation of women as a result of their underrepresentation in politi-
cal governance reveals the lack of commitment to constitutional democracy on the 
part of political leadership. In the interest of justice and fairness, the clash between 
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the sexist orientation of political leadership dominated by men and constitutional 
democracy must be resolved. The constitution as a legal document should be con-
sidered a more superior document to any other form of practice, convention or tradi-
tion. This consideration will not only promote gender parity in political governance, 
but will also place Nigeria on the path of democratic growth.
 Concluding Reflections
For pragmatic reasons, the call for gender parity in politics is not mislaid. As 
explained by Odey (2007, p. 17), the pragmatism in the call for gender parity, in the 
Nigerian context, has two intellectual roots. First, considering the fact that Nigeria’s 
current socio-economic troubles affect all strata of the society (including men and 
women), the resolution of these problems would require the full participation of 
women, particularly in the administrative and political spheres. Second, the Nigerian 
demographic configuration is almost equally divided between the two sexes. The 
call for gender parity in politics is therefore a call for gender justice. To enhance the 
active participation of women in political governance, the female folks must con-
tinue to ‘advocate for internal party democracy and gender mainstreaming that 
binds political parties to field a desired percentage of women for both elective and 
appointive positions’ (Ezeilo 2011, p. 50).
More so, political leadership at all levels must demonstrate an unwavering com-
mitment to constitutional democracy, which guarantees social justice and equality 
while disallowing discrimination on the basis of sex. Furthermore, there is the need 
to create enabling environments for the empowerment of women, supported by law 
and good policies. This will enable them to overcome the burden associated with the 
‘feminisation of poverty’ in Nigeria and mobilise the required resources for achiev-
ing their political ambitions. Again, the attitude of reckless desperation that charac-
terises politics in Nigeria must be jettisoned. This do-or-die orientation, which 
normally does not resonate with the soft psychology of women, has always precipi-
tated violence before, during and after elections. Finally, the prevalent sexist ideol-
ogy in our society that considers women as inferior in every sense should be 
discouraged. This will be a demonstration of the spirit of magnanimity towards 
women and the recognition of their innate capabilities as well as the need to effec-
tively maximise these capabilities.
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